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ABSTRACT
The use of program behaviour modelling (PBM) is widespread in several fields of computing in-
cluding security and software development. The goal of PBM is to accurately and simply represent
the defining behaviour of a computer program. Numerous techniques for PBM have been developed
in the software development and computer security domains. Software development PBM techniques
define a program’s behaviour in terms of the interactions between its constituent components, while
computer security PBM techniques most often use operating system interactions. The operating sys-
tem provides a generic interface for all programs, which makes these techniques widely applicable.
However, a typical program’s operating system interactions are too numerous to easily manage, diffi-
cult for a human to comprehend, and individually insignificant.
Recent techniques for computer security PBM, employ a slightly more abstract approach. In-
creased abstraction allows a simpler, and more powerful view of program behaviour. These more ab-
stract techniques enable groupings of operating system interactions into ‘events’. These abstractions
are purely theoretical, and the PBM models that employ them are still defined in terms of concrete
operating system interactions.
This study extends the use of abstraction in PBM, and provides a flexible abstraction technique
that allows modelling in terms of the logical abstract concepts with which a programs operates. This
new technique is called Logical Entity Abstracted Program Behaviour Modelling (LEAPBM). The
LEAPBM technique is evaluated within the High Level Architecture (HLA) distributed simulation
domain. The HLA encompasses suitably complex programs which employ a range of system func-
tionality; and is pervasive in important industries including aerospace and defence.
It is shown that LEAPBM, with the appropriate identification of abstract program concepts, pro-
vides improved accuracy and maintains acceptable complexity. It is intuitively expected that the hu-
man comprehensibility of LEAPBM models is simpler, due to the reduction in model size that flexible
abstraction allows.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Our natural world abounds in complexity. The interactions between plant and animals in an
ecosystem, the behaviour of weather systems, and the function of a human brain are all examples
of systems whose behaviours can be considered complex. In addition to these natural systems, an
increasing number of man-made systems continue to grow in complexity. Examples of these include:
the dynamics of vehicles’ movements (the handling of an automobile or the manoeuvrability of an
aeroplane), and the binary digits which encode the behaviour of computer systems.
The complexity of these systems makes them difficult to understand in their entirety, and limits
development and improvement. Models are created for a range of reasons: to aid understanding, to
make predictions, and to facilitate analysis and development. Models encapsulate complex details
and provide a more abstract, more easily understood, and more easily manipulated representation of a
system’s behaviour. For example, weather models encapuslate highly complex heat transfer amongst
the atmosphere, ocean and sea-ice and provide weather forecasts.
This study specifically concerns the modelling of complex computer software systems. As a result
of increasing processing power and storage space, the size and complexity of programs which can be
executed by a computer system is growing. This complexity inhibits a human’s understanding of
computer software requirements, behaviour, and impact on a computer system. It is advantageous to
increase human understanding of complex computer programs for two reasons:
1. Simpler communication and collaboration between software developers during development.
2. Simpler decision-making about the security impact of a computer program.
Development models assist software creators in producing more correct software in less time.
Development models are abstract and detail the internal interactions between program components.
2They are used as a guide during a program’s development. These models are created before the
program is developed, and do not include representations of program’s interactions with the operating
system environment. They are therefore of little use in computer security applications.
Models of program behaviour for computer security aim to identify, and control, damaging be-
haviour of computer software. Computer security models often focus on a program’s interactions
with the computer operating system, and are used to simplify the decision-making process concerning
a program’s security impact. These models are created after a program’s development, and focus on a
program’s external interactions. They are commonly too complex to be easily understood by a human,
as they often maintain a large number of such interactions.
Computer security models are sometimes simplified, and their performance degraded, to meet the
performance requirements of real-time applications. This simplification is achieved by discarding the
details of each program interaction. This exclusion of details, limits the accuracy with which program
behaviour can be represented by such models. The limited accuracy of existing computer security
program behaviour models, is the driving motivation of this study.
1.1 Goals
This study is concerned with program behaviour modelling (PBM) applied to computer security. The
goal of this study is to investigate PBM using flexible abstract basis-terms to represent the logical
concepts understood by a program. The expected benefits are:
Improved accuracy : A more accurate way of modelling program behaviour can improve computer
security. Ensuring security of computer systems is an important requirement in today’s envi-
ronment of costly computer security attacks; over the past 4 years the cost of computer abuse
to an organizations has averaged US$425,325 a year (Richardson, 2003; L. A. Gordon and
Richardson, 2004, 2005, 2006).
Improved human comprehensibility : Human comprehension of a program’s behaviour has the
potential to allow users to verify the behaviour of computer software they use and develop, and
augment existing computer security processes. Models of complex systems, be they programs
or raw data, often have poor human comprehensibility (R. Santos and Freitas, 2000).
3The success and improvement of these benefits depends greatly on whether usable complexity is
maintained. Thus, ensuring acceptable complexity and usable performance are also crucial goals of
this study.
Finally, this study also aims to investigate the applicability of flexibly-abstracted PBM to a range of
software not previously examined. Previous research focuses on either privileged server software such
as those responsible for delivering email, or mobile programs such as those employed on the World
Wide Web. While these programs are important and commonly used, they are not representative of
all complex computer programs.
1.2 Approach
This study approaches these goals with the proposition of flexible abstraction. This approach allows
the flexible identification of the program interactions used to model behaviour, where previous efforts
utilise set interaction groups only. The chosen interactions are tailored to represent the external logical
abstract concepts employed by a program. It is proposed that these concepts can be represented by a
program’s interactions with external software libraries.
The program interactions understood by a model are the terms used to define a program’s be-
haviour. The flexible identification of these interactions is to provide a reduction in the number of
interactions a model must represent to capture program behaviour. This reduction will logically al-
low more detailed representation of each interaction, which is to enable more accurate comparisons
concerning the security impact of program behaviour. It is also expected that a model consisting of
a smaller number of more detailed interactions will be more easily understood by a human, and of
lower complexity. The goals of maintained performance and complexity are expected to be fulfilled
by this reduced number of interactions, and the performance improvements that follow.
The final goal of this study, to apply PBM to new types of programs, can be achieved through
the choice of an appropriate investigation test domain. This goal requires that the selection of the test
domain is neither mobile code, nor privileged server processes (historically the typical PBM domain
(Ko, 1996; Sekar et al., 1998; Wagner and Dean, 2001; Eskin et al., 2001)), and is representative of
non-trivial and commonly used programs. The domain of High Level Architecture (HLA) distributed
simulation meets these requirements. HLA programs are appropriate for testing the proposed flexible
4abstraction technique due to their suitable size and complexity, common use in industry, and utilisation
of a range of system functionality. Their distributed nature also enables the controlled alteration of
distinct components and simplifies the investigation.
1.3 Organisation
This study is organised to provide a logical investigation of the merits of flexible identification of
logical abstract concepts for the basis of program behaviour model definitions. Chapter 2 provides a
critical review of the field of program behaviour modelling. This chapter is divided into four sections:
applications, basis-terms, definition techniques, and performance. These sections cover the different
aspects and factors concerning PBM techniques.
Chapter 3 details a technique for the flexible, abstract identification of a model’s basis-terms,
called Logical Entity Abstracted Program Behaviour Modelling (LEAPBM). This chapter details the
specification and identification of the logical abstract entities which reflect the concepts used by a
program, how they are used to define a program’s behaviour model, and two different formats for
this model definition. Additionally this chapter defines the requirements for a security application of
LEAPBM, such as an anomaly-prevention system.
Chapter 4 outlines the investigations into whether the proposed LEAPBM approach achieves the
expected benefits and goals: improved accuracy, human comprehensibility and maintained complex-
ity. This chapter details the chosen specifics of these investigations: the domain within which they
are performed, and the specific subject systems they concern. The chosen domain is High Level Ar-
chitecture distributed simulation and the subject systems are the proposed LEAPBM and the existing
Sequence TIme-Delay Embedding (STIDE) PBM techniques.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 detail the individual investigations into, respectively, the relative precision
accuracy, focus accuracy, and complexity of the two investigation subjects.
Chapter 8 concludes this study and reviews the degree to which the goals are achieved, the impli-
cations of these results, and the potential future directions for research on the subject of flexible and
abstracted PBM.
51.4 Outcomes
The demonstrations for the investigations in this study, show positive results for the LEAPBM tech-
nique when compared with the existing STIDE technique. The use of flexible abstraction allows the
LEAPBM technique to model HLA federate program behaviour that more precisely identifies anoma-
lous behaviour, and correctly equates distinct program implementations of functionally equivalent
behaviours. These two results indicate improved accuracy of the LEAPBM technique and fulfil the
first goal if the study.
The investigation into the relative complexities showed that, compared with the STIDE technique,
the LEAPBM technique produces relatively small and comprehensible models of HLA federate be-
haviour. The LEAPBM technique also provides substantially smaller diagrammatic models of the
same program’s behaviour. This investigation also demonstrates that both the LEAPBM and STIDE
techniques require little storage space.
The flexible identification of abstract concepts for the basis of program behaviour models has
produced promising results in this investigation. Future directions for ongoing research are described
in section 8.3.
Chapter 2
BACKGROUND: PROGRAM BEHAVIOUR MODELLING
Models play a critical role in facilitating investigations and on-going development of complex
systems. Complex systems are often difficult or impractical to investigate and manipulate in reality.
Representative models are created to overcome these difficulties. For example, traffic flow models
allow civic engineers to investigate different configurations of cities’ motorways without expensive
real-life trial-and-error.
Behaviour models are designed to encapsulate and abstract the complexities of the systems they
represent and provide a more simple representation of behaviour. They are commonly defined as a
state machine, which distinguishes between the different internal configurations in which a system
can exist. The basic premise of a state machine behaviour model is that there exist a set of interactions
made by the system that change its logical state. A state refers to a unique internal configuration
during a system’s behaviour. The interactions that change a system’s state are termed the model’s
basis-terms, and can identify operations with other internal components of the system itself or with
external components.
State machine system behaviour models associate basis-term interactions with states. A system
is considered to exist in exactly one of a set of defined states. Each state maintains which basis-term
interactions can occur, and the effect of each such interaction on the system’s state. To illustrate these
concepts, consider a state machine which models the behaviour of a car. The basis-terms chosen
for this state machine are speed and acceleration. These basis-terms are internal as they represent
attributes of the car itself. Three states: stopped, accelerating and cruise can be defined by values of
these basis-terms and linked by transitions to produce the state machine behaviour model shown in
Figure 2.1.
The remainder of this chapter covers behaviour modelling of computer programs: its history and
applications, the terms upon which it is based, the techniques used for its definitions, and how its
performance is measured and compared.
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Figure 2.1: Car State Machine
2.1 History and Applications
The earliest program behaviour models were used in the development of computer programs. Ap-
plications of PBM have occurred after the emergence of computers capable of executing complex
software. This application of PBM is still pervasive today. Program behaviour models are used to
assist developers to specify and plan the functionality of a computer program, before it becomes a
complex implementation.
The techniques used to define these program behaviour plans have evolved with the programming
languages used to implement them. Older procedural type programming languages, such as BASIC,
required little more than simple pseudo-code descriptions (Seefeld, 2002), or simple diagrams such
as decision trees (Mind Tools, 2006), data flow diagrams (Bruza and Van der Weide, 1989) and flow
charts (Bennett, 2004). Program behaviour models for software development are designed primarily
for use by humans, and consequently are often abstract and generic.
The goal of software development is to create computer programs to fulfil tasks. This goal does
not take into consideration the possibility of computer programs being misused to perform tasks other
than what they were designed for. The ability to misuse a computer program, and perform function-
ality other than intended, was not initially important to software developers working on single-user
8computer systems.
The advent of multi-user computer systems however, quickly led to the identification of computer
security as an important requirement (Anderson, 1972). Computer security seeks to control which
different functionality and information of a computer system is available to different users. As com-
puter security matured, concepts such as authentication (to confirm a user’s claimed identify) and
access control (to enforce rules about the programs and data available to users) were implemented in
computer systems to which multiple users had access (Whitmore et al., 1974).
The misuse of computer programs to perform extra and uncontrolled functionality, was soon iden-
tified as a means to circumvent traditional computer security access control (Foster et al., 2005; Casad,
2004; Grover, 2003). Misuse continues to be a common security attack made against computer sys-
tems (SANS-Institute, 2005).
The second pervasive application of PBM is within the field of computer security, and seeks to
(amongst other things) minimise this misuse of computer software. This PBM application is termed
intrusion detection, and seeks to identify and recognise software misuse. Intrusion detection was
originally proposed by Denning (1987) to identify intrusions, and is based on the hypothesis that they
result in abnormalities in system usage. PBM is used in intrusion detection to enable the comparison of
occurring behaviour with normal behaviour, to identify anomalies which can signify security attacks.
The software development and computer security domains, and their different uses of PBM, are
further reviewed in the following sections.
2.1.1 Software Development
Software development is constantly developing to reflect the functionality of new and emerging pro-
gramming concepts. Software development can be generally described by a number of stages (Chris-
terson et al., 1992; Henderson Sellers and Edwards, 1990; Raccoon, 1997):
Analysis : Examine the requirements for the software to be built. This includes analysing what
functions it must perform.
Design : Define the specifications for the software system that will fulfil the analysed requirements.
This specification identifies how functions will be performed.
9Construction : Build the software system based on the defined software specifications. Considera-
tion should still be given to ensuring the analysed requirements are fulfiled.
Testing : Verify through practical use, and theoretical examination, the constructed software correctly
implements the designed specifications, and fulfils the analysed requirements.
PBM for software development has evolved in parallel with the processes and languages that are
used in the construction phase. Simple models using pseudo-code and flow charts were sufficient
for equally simple procedural programming languages. However, the advent and continued growth
of object-oriented and other high-level programming languages (Henry, 2001; Nasir, 1996), requires
more powerful ways for creating planning models for program behaviour. The industry standard for
planning object-oriented programs is called the Unified Modelling Language (UML) (Siegel, 2005;
Object Management Group, 2005). The UML standard is designed to enable the planning of software
constructed with modern, object-oriented programming languages, such as C++ (Stroustrup, 1986).
While the planning (analysis and design) phases of software development utilises PBM heavily,
PBM is also employed during the verification (testing) phase. Both these applications of PBM are
discussed in the following sections.
Planning: Analysis and Design
Program behaviour models are employed during the planning stages (analysis and design) of software
development to enable developers to better understand and tailor the functionality of a system to its
requirements. Models facilitate this task by abstracting the specific programming language syntax
that will be used to define the program, and simplifying the developer’s view of the program.
The UML is the standard industry technique for planning object-oriented programs, such as those
written in C++1. The UML utilises numerous diagrams to define a model for planned computer
software. These diagrams represent the interactions of various parts of the planned software:
• With each other (Martin, 1998c, 1997).
1 This study is primarily concerned with C++, as it is object-oriented, widely used, and has a native interface in the chosen
HLA test domain.
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• With the users of the software (Martin, 1998d,b,a).
Program behaviour models for software planning, such as a set of UML diagrams, are distinct
from software implementations in that they define what happens, but not how it happens. This allows
the abstract software requirements to be specified, investigated and developed prior to any complex
implementation. UML utilises state machines2 heavily to represent the behaviour of the planned com-
puter software. State machines are employed to model the dynamic nature of software components
(Ambler, 2004) in several types of UML components: activity diagrams, state machine diagrams,
collaboration diagrams, communication diagrams, and interaction overview diagrams.
UML does not allow flexibility in the basis-terms of its models of software component behaviour.
Recall that a program behaviour model’s basis-terms are the elements whose interaction with by a sys-
tem represent its behaviour. The basis-terms for UML behaviour models are limited to other planned
software components, and the users of the software.
Verification: Testing
Program behaviour models are also employed during the testing stage of software development to
enable the speedy checking of correct program functionality. A model of the program’s intended
behaviour is created from its specifications or documentation. This procedure is becoming more
automated, with the increase in size of modern programs making manual definitions impractical and
arduous (Holzmann and Smith, 2001). The program’s behaviour definition can then be checked for
conformance to this model, often through analysis of its code (Bates and Wileden, 1983; Auguston,
1995; Hangal and Lam, 2002; Sterlicchi, 2004; Andrews et al., 2006).
PBM is also employed in software testing architectures that focus on the security related behaviour
of a program. In this application, PBM is used to check that a program does not violate a predefined
safe policy (Chen and Wagner, 2002; Ganapathy et al., 2004; Schwarz et al., 2005). This is also an
example of the use of PBM for computer security applications, which is more fully discussed in the
following section.
2 Similar to the introductory behaviour model illustrated in Figure 2.1.
11
2.1.2 Computer Security
Computer security is a well established field of study with roots in the United States of America
defence forces. Some of the earliest research into this area was conducted by the Electronic Systems
Division of the Air Force Systems Command in the 1970s (Schell et al., 1973; Karger and Schell,
1974; Whitmore et al., 1974; Bell and La Padula, 1975). In one of the earliest such papers, the
issue of computer security is said to have originated from the emergence of complex shared computer
systems and networks, and from the use of these systems by a population of users with non-uniform
security clearance (Anderson, 1972). Thus, computer security spawned by the need to protect sensitive
military data, which is also a guiding motivation of this study3 .
Since the 1970s, the charter for computer security has grown from “the protection of classified
information on military systems”, to encompass the “protection of a computer system from all hostile
acts, influences or dangers” (Olovsson, 1992; Garfinkel et al., 1996). This more challenging goal
now includes requirements such as the assurance of availability (ensuring a system is appropriately
accessible) and integrity (ensuring a system is not manipulated). A secure computer system is one that
is safe from all hostile influences that may affect its normal operation. Hostile influences are termed
attacks, and the persons responsible termed attackers.
Providing computer security is a question of cost versus benefit. It is not a simple or cheap
task to ensure that all aspects of a computer system including software, users, physical location and
connectivity, are 100% secure. This is primarily due to two reasons:
1. The majority of existing software was written without a major emphasis on security4 . For exam-
ple, most software suppliers include the facility for future upgrades or “patching”, specifically
to address security issues that may arise.
2. Writing secure code is difficult and requires an in-depth understanding of the target computer
system and language.
3 The protection of sensitive military simulation data is possible through improved distributed simulation security, which
is addressed later in this study.
4 Recall that programs are often developed with the primary goal being the solution to a problem, and little emphasis
placed on the potential for misuse.
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The cost of re-writing all existing computer programs, which stretch back decades, is prohibitively
high. In some highly sensitive domains however, the cost of total computer security is justifiable; for
example, in the banking and defence sectors.
Approaches for ensuring computer system security, as with all forms of security, can be cate-
gorised as follows (Axelsson, 1998; Halme and Bauer, 1995):
Prevention : Hindering or completely blocking an attacker’s intrusion attempt.
Preemption : Identifying a potential attacker, and removing their ability to cause harm before they
have the opportunity to successfully intrude.
Deterrence : Increasing the necessary effort required for successful intrusion, increasing the per-
ceived risk associated with intrusion, and decreasing the perceived gains.
Deflection : Convincing an attacker they have succeeded where they have not.
Detection : Distinguishing attacks and intrusions from legitimate activity and raising alarms.
Countermeasures : Automatically countering an intrusion as it is being attempted.
Of these approaches, the two most commonly employed are also the two within which PBM is
used: prevention and detection (Sekar and Uppuluri, 1999; Li, 1997). The following sections discuss
these two approaches to providing computer security and their use of PBM.
Intrusion Detection
Intrusion detection is performed by monitoring the activity of a computer system to identify abuse
(attacker activity) after it has occurred. Intrusion detection is built upon the theory that the use of
a computer system by an attacker produces detectable changes in the system audit trail, which was
originally proposed by Anderson (1980). The term ‘system audit trail’ refers to a record of functions
that are performed by the operating system for users, or programs. Some of the most influential
subsequent research in this field is by Denning and Neumann (1985), during the development of the
first intrusion detection system (IDS) (Denning, 1987).
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Changes in the system audit trail caused by attackers are identified by intrusion detection systems
in one of two ways (Axelsson, 1998):
Anomaly Detection : Observed behaviour is compared to a model of normal behaviour. Any be-
haviour that does not match the normal model is considered anomalous and a potential intrusion
(Javitz and Valdes, 1994; Ko et al., 1994; Sekar et al., 1998).
Anomaly intrusion detection provides, in theory, the best level of protection due to the ability
to detect previously unknown intrusions. However, some techniques of representing normal
program behaviour focus too heavily on low-level details that often leads to behaviour which
is normal, but is not strictly equivalent to the representation, being incorrectly identified as
an intrusion. This incorrect identification is termed a false-alarm. Historically, anomaly IDS’
main weakness is the high rate of false-alarms they produce, ofttimes betwen 50 and 80 per day,
which can necessitate a prohibitively high investigative workload (Lundin and Jonsson, 1999).
Misuse Detection : A specific set of small models representing known intrusions, termed signatures,
is compared to observed behaviour. A match indicates the presence of anomalous behaviour
that is known to be indicative of an intrusion (ISS, 1999; CISCO, 1999; Paxson, 1998).
The main advantage of misuse intrusion detection is the low rate of false-alarms, which is a
result of detailed signature specifications and the potential detail of the computer system audit
trail. However, misuse intrusion detection has two main weaknesses:
1. Only intrusions that have been configured may potentially be detected. This means any
intrusion developed in the future will never be detected. The solution to this issue means
constant and time consuming updating of known intrusion signatures.
2. Identifying the potentially broad range of equivalent signatures for a particular intrusion
is difficult. Thus, often a small change to an attack by an attacker results in the incorrect
identification of this attack as normal behaviour (Cohen, 1998). The incorrect identifi-
cation of intrusive behaviour as normal is termed a false-acceptance. Misuse intrusion
detection is prone to suffer from a high rate of false-acceptances.
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Historically, the models employed by both misuse and anomaly intrusion detection systems did
not include representations of program behaviour. Instead the activities of either the network to which
the computer was connected (Handley and Paxson, 2001; Cansian et al., 1997; Jou et al., 2000; Chang
et al., 2001), or the user interface (Neumann and Porras, 1999; Handley and Paxson, 2001; Lane and
Brodley, 1997; Teng et al., 1990), were used as the basis for their models.
More recent intrusion detection systems, however, do incorporate program behaviour as part of
the behaviour models upon which they operate. The terms upon which program behaviour models for
intrusion detection systems are commonly based are5:
• Operating system records, such as a program’s processor, memory and file usage.
• Interactions with the computer operating system kernel (Axelsson, 1998)
Early work by Forrest et al. (1996) and others (Kosoresow and Hofmeyr, 1997; Forrest et al.,
1997; Hofmeyr et al., 1998) identified the potential to distinguish between programs based on their
interactions with the operating system kernel. These interactions occur via system library function
calls (commonly termed system-calls). Subsequently, a variety of implemented and proposed in-
trusion detection systems utilise system-calls as basis-terms for the definition of program behaviour
models (Kosoresow and Hofmeyr, 1997; Lee et al., 1999; Warrender et al., 1999; Ju and Vardi, 2001;
Somayaji and Forrest, 2002; Eskin, 2000; Ghosh and Schwartzbard, 1999).
Misuse detection systems employ these terms only in conjunction with others. Thus, in the strictest
sense they do not employ program behaviour models, but rather their models incorporate portions of
program behaviour to define the more broad behaviour of a computer system.
Anomaly detection systems however, utilise program behaviour models exclusively to define the
model of normal behaviour from which anomalies are identified (Ko, 1996; Somayaji and Forrest,
2002; Sekar et al., 1998; Ghosh et al., 2000; Wespi et al., 1999; Wagner and Dean, 2001; Liu, 2002;
Maxion and Tan, 2002; Eskin et al., 2001). Each model refers to a specific program, in contrast with
to misuse detection systems whose models more commonly cover an entire computer system.
5 Refer to section 2.2 for a full discussion of PBM basis-terms.
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Intrusion Prevention
Intrusion prevention has its origins in early multi-user operating systems and, along with more recent
advancements, employs PBM. Intrusion prevention is performed by restricting access to computer
system functions or capabilities, based on who (or what) is requesting it. By restricting and con-
trolling access, intrusion prevention aims to stop attacks before they succeed. The earliest intrusion
prevention systems were implemented as part of some of the first multi-user operating systems: Mul-
tics (Whitmore et al., 1974), and UNIX (Ritchie, 1977). These same techniques are still employed
today.
Intrusion prevention is a class of functionality that includes network appliances called Intrusion
Prevention Systems (IPS). In today’s technology environment, IPS refers to a misuse-detection sys-
tem, responsible for preventing network-based attacks from reaching a computer system.
The mechanisms that support standard intrusion prevention are access control and authentication
(Ross, 1999). Access control is designed to ensure that information or computer resources are not
viewed, utilised, or modified, by unauthorised users or programs. Access control requires that differ-
ent users and programs can be distinguished: a task that is provided by authentication, which aims
to ensure specific identities. Authentication can be achieved in a number of ways, from simple pass-
words (Sandhu and Samarati, 1996), to encryption keys (Freier et al., 1996), and complex biometrics
(Dugelay et al., 2002). Access controls for computer system resources are specified in terms of au-
thenticated identities, making the success of intrusion prevention dependent on correct and consistent
authentication.
The increasing maturity of anomaly detection algorithms and processes (employed in intrusion
detection) has more recently led to the exploration of the identification of anomalies as an intrusion
prevention measure (Sekar et al., 1998; Somayaji and Forrest, 2000; Herrmann et al., 2002; Wagner
and Dean, 2001). The use of anomaly detection as an access control technique is termed anomaly
prevention.
Anomaly prevention differs from anomaly detection in the stage of program execution at which
the identification of anomalous behaviour is performed. Anomaly detection, as utilised by intrusion
detection systems, focuses on the impact and the results that are visible after a program’s execution.
Anomaly prevention however, examines a program’s behaviour before and during its execution.
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The examination of program behaviour before it is executed enables identified security attacks to
be prevented from occurring. This requires that some way of examining the program in its distributed
state prior to execution is available. Techniques for this have been proposed for the Java programming
language (Sun Microsystems, 1998), which take advantage of several Java attributes: the Java byte-
code, and the well-defined and standardised Java library interface (Necula, 1997; Necula and Lee,
1998; Sekar et al., 2001b).
However, an assurance that a program performs no attacks before it is executed does not protect
against the common security attack of malicious code injection, which can occur during execution.
Examination of program behaviour during the program’s execution, is used to enforce the model
that was previously checked for security attacks. Any program behaviours that deviate from the
approved model of behaviour, are denied or blocked. This run-time examination requires that program
interactions with external components are intercepted for analysis before they are executed. This can
be performed in several ways:
• Adding functionality to the program to perform self-checking, before interacting with external
components.
• Adding functionality to the external component to check program interaction requests.
• Adding software that controls the interface or medium between the program and the requested
external component.
An example of the first approach for behaviour interception is the addition of functionality to the
operating system kernel and is employed for the system-call-based anomaly-prevention system pH
(process Homeostasis) developed by Somayaji and Forrest (2000, 2002). The popularity of system-
call sequences as the basis-terms for PBM definitions in anomaly-detection is also present in anomaly
prevention. The pH kernel modification provides the automated real-time identification of potential
anomalies in every program that is executed. This approach is limited to the operating systems for
which this additional functionality is implemented.
A more widely applicable technique, called interposition (Jones, 1993; Curry, 1994), is an exam-
ple of the second approach to behaviour interception. Interposition facilitates the transparent intercep-
tion of calls made by programs on a wide range of software components, such as the operating system
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kernel (Kuperman and Spafford, 1999; Jain and Sekar, 2000; Gonzalez et al., 2000) and third party
software libraries (Wharington and Andrews, 2002; Andrews et al., 2002b).
PBM techniques are commonly utilised by anomaly-prevention techniques for the automated gen-
eration, checking, and enforcement of the program behaviour.
2.1.3 Summary
This section has introduced PBM from its genesis in software development planning, and discussed
its current applications in this field, and that of computer security.
Program behaviour modelling is pervasively used in the planning phase of software development,
and in the detection of computer security intrusions. More recent applications include the verification
phase of software development, and in the prevention of computer security intrusions.
The basis-terms for PBM varies from other internal components of the program, to operating sys-
tem logging application output, and direct operating system interactions. These different approaches
to the definition of program behaviour are discussed in the following section.
2.2 Model Basis
Different basis-terms are employed for different PBM applications. To review, a program behaviour
model’s basis-terms are the set of terms representing the elements with which the program interacts.
Internal basis-terms refer to software components of a program itself, while external basis-terms refer
to other computer system elements with which a program interacts.
The PBM applications discussed in the previous section, commonly utilise one of three different
choices in model basis-terms:
1. Internal software components.
2. Operating system audit trails.
3. Operating system library calls.
Each of these basis-term choices is discussed in the following sections. Additionally, the recent
trend in PBM research towards abstractions of these model basis-terms is discussed.
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2.2.1 Internal Software Components
Internal basis-terms for program behaviour models place the focus of a program’s behaviour on in-
teractions between its various components. This is particularly useful to assist software developers in
understanding, and making decisions about, the design of a planned program.
Early forms of these internal based program behaviour models, such as flow charts and data-flow
diagrams, were used in the software development planning for procedural programs. The main type
of internal basis-term for procedural languages are function calls. That is, function calls are the most
logical division of procedural programs. Thus, flow charts and data-flow diagrams often distinguish
between program behaviour states by the name of the current function call (Raccoon, 1997).
More recent programming languages, such as C++, incorporate both functionality and data into
logical components, termed objects. Objects provide more meaningful division of a program’s com-
ponents and are the main type of internal basis-term used in models for planning object-oriented pro-
grams. Examples of this include UML sequence and collaboration diagrams (Martin, 1998c, 1997),
which describe the dynamic behaviour of a program in terms of interactions between objects.
Beyond the realms of software development, the usefulness of program behaviour models that
utilise internal basis-terms is limited. For example, the internal behaviours of a program are meaning-
less concerning the security of a computer system, as they do not provide information about the wider
effect of a program.
2.2.2 Operating System Audit Trails
Audit trails have been utilised for defining the behaviour of computer system programs since the pa-
per on intrusion detection by Anderson (1980). Audit trail is a relatively loose term that can be used
to describe the results of program interactions on objects within a computer system, such as files,
other programs and peripheral hardware devices (Denning, 1987). While many different proposals
concerning the use of audit-trail data in PBM exist (Axelsson, 1998; Lunt, 1988; Wetmore, 1993), the
definition of an audit-trail object is commonly: “an element controlled by the computer’s operating
system”. The US Department of Defence Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (Depart-
ment of Defence, 1985) defines auditting as a requirement of C2 or higher classified systems. The
audit-trail data required for C2 systems includes operating system objects, such as files, programs and
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authentication events.
Thus, the interactions used to define audit-trail-based program behaviour models, are those that
can occur between a program and the operating system. The process of collecting audit-trail events is
termed logging (Wetmore, 1993; Bishop, 1989). Logically, a program which performs this function
is termed a logger. Loggers collect the audit-trail events (operating system interactions) which occur
as a result of a program’s behaviour during its execution.
The interactions between a program and the operating system are examined in one of two ways.
The first technique examines the audit information provided by the operating system for each audit
object after an interaction by a program. This is illustrated in Figure 2.2. This audit information
typically concerns how an object was used by a program. The computer processor, input and output
devices, memory and files are considered audit objects (Anderson et al., 1995; Wetmore, 1993; Endler,
1998).
Operating System
File Object 1 File Object 2 Processor Object 1Device Object 1
Program
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examined
Figure 2.2: First Technique for Audit-Trail Examination
The second technique directly examines a program’s interactions with the operating system soft-
ware. The operating system software is termed the kernel (Webopedia, 2003). This technique is
illustrated in Figure 2.3.
While these two techniques provide essentially the same information, the first technique empha-
sises the audit object’s data, whereas the second technique emphasises the interaction with the audit
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Figure 2.3: Second Technique for Audit-Trail Examination
object. That is, the first technique might describe a program behaviour by saying “file X had 4 bytes
read by the program A”, while the second technique may say “the program A read 4 bytes from the file
X”. The same information is provided in both cases, but the organisation and emphasis is different.
Examples of the first technique commonly employ logging software to monitor the operating sys-
tem objects for interactions by a program, while examples of the second technique directly monitor
the operating system for interactions. The interactions monitored by the second technique are com-
monly those that occur with the kernel software via system library function calls, termed system-calls.
The use of system-calls as PBM basis-terms is further discussed in the following section.
The first technique for PBM, utilising audit-trail basis-terms, has several limitations.
• The audit trails for this technique are captured by monitoring operating system objects, which
requires additional system resources to execute the logger software.
• The large number of potential objects for an operating system6 means that practically, a smaller
subset must be selected (Lane and Brodley, 1998).
Discarding a significant number of these operating system objects, to reduce the amount of audit
6 For example, a typical Linux operating system, such as that utilised in this study, has over 9500 objects representing the
operating system’s processor and input and output devices and over 430,000 file objects.
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data, increases the likelihood that potentially important program behaviour is overlooked (Lunt, 1993).
For example, if a program’s behaviour is best defined by its interactions with a file ’Y’, and this file
object is discarded, it will not form part of the program’s behaviour model using this audit-trail-based
technique. The oversight of this file then reduces the model’s accurate representation of program
behaviour.
Even with the reduction in objects for which program interactions are monitored, the amount of
data generated is still large: on a 1987 computer system, up to 135 megabytes per user per day can
be generated day (NCSC, 1988; Picciotto, 1987; Wetmore, 1993; Lunt, 1993). The large amount of
audit data necessitates substantial processing for the model for three reasons:
1. It is difficult to identify a single program’s interactions amongst all other programs on the com-
puter system.
2. A program’s uses must be collected and often further processed to ensure correct ordering.
3. Duplicate entries for individual program interactions must be both identified and removed (Wet-
more, 1993).
The large amount of audit data is composed of representations of numerous program interactions
with the operating system. Each individual interaction has little meaning, which complicates the task
of understanding such a model (Lunt, 1993).
These limitations are a result of this technique’s focus on the potentially large number of operating
system objects with which programs interact, and the resulting large number of interactions which
must be represented.
2.2.3 Operating System Calls
The interactions between a program and the core operating system software (kernel) are achieved
via function calls to the system library. This specialised type of audit-trail information is commonly
employed as basis-terms for PBM.
The use of system-calls as basis-terms for the definition of PBM was initially proposed by Kuhn
(1986), who asserted that the capture of audit-trails for computer security applications should occur
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at as low a level as possible to minimise the ease with which auditing can be bypassed by an attacker.
However, his proposal did not address the details of how system-call audit trails might be utilised as
basis-terms for PBM.
The work which addressed some of these details was undertaken by Forrest et al. (1996). Their
proposal, in support of Kuhn (1986), asserts that the important behaviour of programs is reflected by
their use of system-calls. This assertion is logical as the operating system provides the interface for
programs to all important aspects of a computer system—files, memory, input and output devices—are
only accessible via the operating system (Hofmeyr et al., 1998).
This assertion by Forrest et al. (1996) logically requires the examination of a program’s use of
system-calls, which has been performed by two different methods. The first is to employ tools (either
existing or customised operating system interface software) to record these interactions as they occur
during the execution of a program (Forrest et al., 1996; Kosoresow and Hofmeyr, 1997; Lee et al.,
1997; Debar et al., 1998; Sekar et al., 1999; Ghosh and Schwartzbard, 1999). This is termed run-time
analysis, and can be performed by existing tools such as:
• Sun’s Basic Security Module for both SunOS and Solaris(Sun Microsystems, 2000).
• Berkley Software Distribution UNIX’s syscall() function (Picciotto, 1987).
• The strace software (Sladkey, 1995), originally written for SunOS, available for SunOS and
Solaris (Mauro and McDougall, 2001; Watters, 2002), Linux (Siever et al., 2005), System V
Release 4.0 (Sobell, 1994), and Irix (SGI, 1998).
The second method to examine a program’s use of system-calls is by investigation of the program
source code before it is executed (Wagner and Dean, 2001; Giffin et al., 2002; Murthy, 2003; Sekar
et al., 2001b). This is termed static analysis, and is performed on the program’s definition as either
source code, or binary machine code. Wagner and Dean (2001) propose the examination of program
source code definitions using simple parsing procedures7 , while Giffin et al. (2002) and Murthy (2003)
employ existing software for examining and editting binary programs8 .
7 The procedure for source code parsing and examination are not unlike those employed by programming language com-
pilers (Wikipedia, 2006b).
8 Executable Editing Library (EEL) (Larus and Schnarr, 1995), and its Linux equivalent, Linux EEL (LEEL) (Xun, 1999).
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Using system-calls as the basis-terms for PBM offers some advantages over other operating sys-
tem audit-trail techniques (refer to section 2.2.2). The number of distinct system-calls with which a
program can interact is much lower than other audit-trail objects. For example, typical UNIX operat-
ing systems have approximately 280 system calls, the majority of which they share in common. This
represents a substantial reduction from the number of devices, files and processes on a computer sys-
tem. A typical Linux operating system understands 289 system calls but can have well over 440,000
general audit-trail objects.
The smaller number of audit-trail objects, and their well-defined interface through numerous sys-
tem documentations and manuals (Linux, 2002; Sun Microsystems, 1999), means the entire set of
system-calls can be analysed for program interactions during model generation. This removes the
possibility which exists using more generic audit-trail objects: an object that is important to a pro-
gram’s behaviour is not examined. Additionally, the processing required to examine this smaller
number of objects and to store a program’s interactions is also reduced.
The use of system-calls as the basis-terms for PBM does however have limitations. System-calls
are still a form of operating system interaction, each of which individually has very little meaning
(Lunt, 1993), and the groups that occur for single application-level actions tend to obfuscate the
program’s actual intention (Picciotto, 1987).
The recommendation by Kuhn (1986), that PBM audit-trail basis-terms should focus on low-level
operating system services, has been used to justify system-call basis-terms as the only alternative to
much higher-level command line basis-terms. However, the software libraries employed by a program
can also be logically considered as operating system services, similarly to the lower-level system
library. Software libraries are portions of the underlying operating system environment, and while
they can be aliased and manipulated, it is much more difficult to do so than it is with command line
elements.
It is possible to guarantee the identity, integrity and correctness of software libraries via a number
of methods:
• Additional PBM to capture and restrict the program behaviour defined by a software library
(Giffin et al., 2005).
• Comparing computed hash values that uniquely represent a program’s code, termed checksums
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(Horne et al., 2001).
Run-time Analysis
The two methods of examining program’s system-call interactions (run-time analysis and static anal-
ysis) have different advantages and disadvantages. Run-time analysis captures all system-calls made
either directly by the program, or by other software (such as libraries) called by the program. The
concept of direct and indirect system-call usage is illustrated in Figure 2.4, which shows both a direct
call by the program to the kernel’s write() function, and two system-calls, open() and read(), made
indirectly by the program via a software library.
Operating System Kernel
Software LibraryProgram
libFunction1()
read()
open()
write()
direct
indirect
Figure 2.4: Direct and Indirect Program System-call Usage
Both the direct, and indirect interactions illustrated in Figure 2.4 are captured by the run-time
analysis of a program. This is an advantage in that no system-calls which stem from a program are
overlooked in its analysis.
The primary disadvantage of run-time analysis of programs is that a single execution of the pro-
gram is not guaranteed to cover all the potential paths of execution by the program. Programs often
have multiple execution paths, each of which constitutes potentially distinct program behaviour. Per-
forming run-time analysis requires as many executions of distinct execution paths being examined as
possible. This is often termed training a behaviour model.
Complete and accurate training of program behaviour models potentially requires significant ef-
fort, such as the alteration of any variables used to determine execution paths. These variables can
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include:
The range of values gathered during interactions with other components : such as configuration
files, input data files, user input, and external software inputs.
The execution periods during which they can occur : can change depending on network speed,
users’ interactions, and computer processor utilisation by other programs.
In some cases these variables are difficult to control which increases the training effort required.
For example, when the timing and values of interactions is dependent on uncontrollable network speed
and distributed processes9 .
An interesting proposal by Debar et al. (1998) suggests using the executions of the small functional-
verification tests provided by a software developer, as the specification for a program’s behaviour.
This proposal has the potential to simplify and improve the training of run-time analysed program
behaviour models, however it assumes the existence of thorough functional verification tests.
Static Analysis
The second method for examining a program’s system-call interactions, static analysis, contrastingly
requires no control or manipulation of variables which influence the program’s execution path. Static
analysis focuses on the definition of the program, either in its human readable source code form, or as
binary machine code. Static analysis of a program’s definition can capture every potential execution
path it contains (Wagner and Dean, 2001), and therefore avoid the training limitations of run-time
analysis.
Statically analysed program behaviour models do have several limitations, caused by program
variables which are indeterminate until run-time. These variables can affect a program’s behaviour,
but do not have specific values in its definition. For example, operating system environment variables
(Giffin et al., 2005). Other run-time dependent variables which make the static analysis of programs
difficult are the software libraries utilised. These software libraries are most commonly external to the
program’s definition, and can potentially be changed at run-time for different executions via dynamic
linking (Wagner and Dean, 2001; Giffin et al., 2002; Murthy, 2003).
9 This scenario exists in the domain investigated in this study. Refer to Chapter 4 for more details.
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Referring back to the example illustrated in Figure 2.4, the examination performed by static anal-
ysis is limited to that shown in Figure 2.5.
Operating System Kernel
Software LibraryProgram
libFunction1()
read()
open()
write()
static analysis capture
Figure 2.5: System-call Usage Captured via Static Analysis
To solve this deficiency, static analysis proposals in current research suggest either the inclusion of
complementary run-time analysis tools, or the modelling of every library utilised by a program (Wag-
ner and Dean, 2001; Murthy, 2003; Giffin et al., 2005). Both these proposed solutions complicate any
system which seeks to employ statically generated system-call-based program behaviour models10:
• Modelling every library utilised by a program potentially increases the model size and generat-
ing processing required by a substantial amount. This increase is all prior to the run-time of a
program.
Modelling each library also requires that the individual models for the single program are com-
bined to provide a seamless representation of behaviour. This increases the complexity of any
application.
• Run-time analysis tools examine the execution a program to determine the values of variables
which cannot be determined by a static analysis system. This increases the run-time processing
required.
10 For example, the application to anomaly-prevention systems for computer security.
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Another solution recently proposed by Giffin et al. (2005) simulates the linking for programs that
are distributed with the software libraries to which they will be dynamically linked at run-time. This
solution is limited in its applicability and begs the question: If a program is going to be linked at run-
time with a particular software library (indeed, a specific version thereof), why is it not just statically
linked to avoid ambiguity and the potential for errors during the dynamic linking process?
Arguments
Much previous research on the use of system-calls as PBM basis-terms focuses on the approach pro-
posed by Forrest et al. (1996) called Sequence TIme-Delay Embedding (STIDE). This technique
utilises multiple, fixed-length sequences of system-calls to model program behaviour (refer to sec-
tion 2.3.1 for more details). Importantly however, all the arguments supplied to each system call
during a program’s interaction are discarded and play no part in the behaviour model. This severely
limits the accuracy of such program behaviour models (Wagner and Dean, 2001; Wagner and Soto,
2002; Kruegel et al., 2003; Sekar et al., 2001b). For example, if the arguments to a unlink system-call
are ignored, STIDE is unable to distinguish between the removal of a temporary file, or a system
configuration file from the file system.
This limitation has been addressed in a several ways. Kruegel et al. (2003) have applied an existing
statistical technique for modelling program behaviour to the task of modelling the different arguments
which occur to system-calls. Interestingly, this approach focuses solely on the arguments to system-
calls and does not mirror the STIDE technique which represents the order and sequencing of system-
calls.
The proposal by Kruegel et al. (2003) utilises data (system-call arguments) as the basis-terms for
the definition of a program behaviour model. This research sacrifices the ‘0 false-alarm rate’, com-
mon to statically generated models which represent program behaviours (Wagner and Dean, 2001),
for improvements to precision. False-alarms are often considered the most significant weakness of
behaviour modelling applications (Lundin and Jonsson, 1999).
The limitation from discarding system-call arguments is also addressed in other research by a
different approach, which includes the arguments to system-calls in the definition of existing stati-
cally analysed program behaviour models (Jain and Sekar, 2000; Giffin et al., 2002). This approach
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has been reported to show an increase in model precision, while still maintaining the desirable ‘0
false-alarm rate’ (Wagner and Dean, 2001; Giffin et al., 2004, 2005). Various approaches to main-
taining argument values can be found in prior research. These approaches have differing levels of
complexity. Initial research allowed for only static values, that is, only arguments with constant val-
ues (Wagner and Dean, 2001; Sekar et al., 2001b). For example, both arguments in the system call
open(“/var/lib/syslog”, O RDONLY); would be maintained by this method; but only the second argu-
ment to open(filenameString, O RDONLY); would be maintained as the first is dynamically set during
the execution of the call and depends on the value of the variable filenameString.
Recent and ongoing research by Giffin et al. (2002) proposes data-flow diagrams and algorithmic
algebra to represent changes that occur to the variables used in system-call arguments (Giffin et al.,
2002, 2004, 2005). Using this technique the value of each variable can be determined at the point in
a program that it is used. This technique has parallels with reverse engineering as internal program
behaviours are determined from its binary form (Weiser, 1981; Beck and Eichmann, 1993).
The inclusion of arguments to system-calls has been reported to enable the most precise forms of
program behaviour models to date. However the effort required to perform this is considerable and can
result in “increased size of program models” (Giffin et al., 2005) and could potentially significantly
impact the performance of systems which employ it. This remains an open question as the technique
has only been tested for trivial programs.
2.2.4 Abstraction
The term abstraction refers to generalising some existing basis-terms leaving formerly concrete details
undefined (Wikipedia, 2006a). The concrete details which are lost during the abstraction of PBM
basis-terms are ideally those which represent unimportant program behaviour details. For example,
consider the C code in Figure 2.6. The system-calls in this program write the string constant “hello
there.” to a file, then read it back and assign it to a character buffer. In this example, the specific file
which is utilised in the bold statements is irrelevant as long as it is shared. A more abstract view of
these system-calls can leave the first arguments to the open calls undefined.
Abstraction is a technique for removing the inconsequential information from program behaviour
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myfileId = open (’’tmpdata’’, O_WRONLY);
write(myfileId, ‘‘hello there’’, 11);
close(myfileId);
afileId = open(‘‘tmpdata’’, O_RDONLY);
read(afileId, &buf, 11);
close(afileId);
Figure 2.6: Abstraction Example: C Code
models, and has been developed to improve the accurate representation of the behaviour of programs11
for use in both software development, and computer security.
As previously discussed12 limitations in PBM with audit-trail basis-terms (both generic audit-trail
objects and system-calls) are caused by: the large number of interactions between the program and
auditted operating system objects, the large volume of information represented by these detailed in-
teractions, and the little meaning attached to each (Lunt, 1993). The necessity of large numbers of
program interactions with audit-trail basis-terms to represent meaningful program behaviour high-
lights the potential for abstraction improvements (Neumann and Porras, 1999).
The initial development of abstracted PBM by Bartussek and Parnas (1977) was called the abstract
trace method of program specification, and was developed for the field of software development. The
abstract trace method allows the definition of software’s behaviour (what it does), without necessi-
tating an algorithm for how it occurs (Bartussek and Parnas, 1977; Heitmeyer and McLean, 1983;
McLean, 1984). This trace method abstracts from the specification all the elements from particular
language for presenting algorithms (such as a programming language), thus making the specification
easier to read and removing misunderstandings that result from the “attempted gleaning of essential
features from a mass of extraneous details” (McLean, 1984).
The same abstractions are also present in the UML object-oriented design technique (Siegel, 2005;
Object Management Group, 2005). The UML concentrates on defining the abstract interactions be-
tween internal software components, but does not require the definition of the algorithms which im-
11 Refer to section 2.4 for a more detailed discussion on PBM performance.
12 Refer to section 2.2.2
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plement these interactions.
The use of abstraction of PBM basis-terms is not limited to the field of software development. A
substantial amount of research has also been done in the field of intrusion detection, more specifically:
misuse detection. This research defines the abstraction of audit-trail details into higher level concepts
to aid in the correct focus of misuse detection program behaviour models on interactions which con-
stitute an attack, as opposed to individual audit-trail details (Lin et al., 1998). This abstraction has
been shown to reduce the number of false-acceptance errors made by a misuse detection system.
These abstract misuse signatures are defined in terms of abstract events, which are themselves
defined in terms of audit-trail basis-terms. The onus for determining if an audit-trail interaction con-
stitutes an event is placed on the human developer of the event, typically a system security officer (Lin
et al., 1998; Lin J., 1998; Ning et al., 2001). This required manual definition complicates any system
which employs such abstract misuse signatures.
Abstractions potentially encapsulate the low-level differences between multiple program interac-
tions into more generalised and powerful events. For example, Sekar et al. (1999) reiterate a point
made by Wetmore (1993), that it is cumbersome to represent an event worth analyzing as low-level
system-calls, and furthermore, that different levels of abstraction may be desirable in different con-
texts. This observation is a key motivation for the flexible abstraction technique proposed in this
study.
2.2.5 Summary
This section detailed the different terms upon which program behaviour models are based. The basis-
terms of a PBM represent the elements of a computer system with which a program is considered to
interact. Proposals exist in previous research for several different types of basis-terms for PBM:
• Internal terms.
• Operating system audit-trial objects (files, memory, hardware devices etc.).
• Operating system kernel function calls (commonly termed system-calls).
• Abstractions of the above types.
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The use of internal basis-terms provides an isolated view of a program’s behaviour, with no infor-
mation concerning its interaction with other computer system components.
Operating system basis-terms, both audit-trail objects and system-calls, typically result in large
volumes of information from which it is difficult to deduce a program’s actual intent (Wetmore, 1993;
Lunt, 1993). This reduces the usefulness of such models whose purpose is to improve understanding
and decision making.
The option of abstractions has, for computer security applications, most commonly been applied to
operating system basis-terms. These abstractions have facilitated definitions in terms of higher-level
concepts, though these concepts still require association and definition in terms of low-level terms.
A point made by Wetmore (1993), and adopted in this study, notes that the use of application-
level audit data (and the implicit abstractions it contains), can both “drastically reduce the volume of
audit-data, and make it easier to comprehend intentions”. The use of application-level audit data is
enabled by interposition and illustrated by Kuperman and Spafford (1999) who utilise interposition
to successfully gain access to application-level audit events (software library function calls). These
software library calls provide the application-level equivalent of operating system level system-calls,
and potentially, ready-made abstract basis-terms for use in PBM.
For each basis for PBM discussed in this section, numerous different techniques have been devel-
oped for representation. While different techniques offer different characteristics, it is possible that
the choice of a model’s basis-terms has more of an influence on its performance than other choices
(Warrender et al., 1999). The following section provides a review of the most commonly employed
techniques for representing program behaviour models.
2.3 Definition Techniques
Different techniques are employed to define models of specific programs’ behaviour. A modelling
technique determines how individual program interactions with basis-terms are organised to provide
a representation of program behaviour. As discussed in the previous section, basis-terms identify the
program interactions that are available to a model.
There are too many types of PBM techniques proposed in previous research to attempt to review
them all. Therefore, this section is split into categories based on these proposed techniques’ inclusion
32
of ordering information in its model representations. Program behaviour model’s ordering informa-
tion refers to information about the sequencing and order of program interactions. Within each of
the categories reflecting a PBM’s inclusion of order, similar proposals are grouped together and an
overview of each group provided.
The groups of PBM techniques, ranging from order inclusive through to order exclusive, are shown
in Table 2.1. Each of these model representation techniques is discussed in the following sections.
Order Category Modelling Techniques
Inclusive Finite Automata, Formal Grammars
Exclusive Statistics, Artificial Intelligence
Partially Inclusive Specialised Finite Automata
Table 2.1: Modelling Techniques Categorised by Use of Order
2.3.1 Order Inclusive
The inclusion of ordering interaction information in PBM representation techniques is common through-
out previous research. Order inclusive PBM techniques maintain distinctions between the different
points a program’s execution can exist in. That is, it reflects the different steps in the program’s exe-
cution path, each of which is termed a state. The order and sequences in which program interactions
occur can then be represented by creating links between states, termed transitions.
Representing the order of program interactions then requires the identification of program execu-
tion states and transitions and their replication in the model. Primarily, two distinct types of PBM
techniques include the order of program behaviour in their representations: finite state automaton and
formal grammar. These two techniques are discussed in the sections below.
Finite Automata
Finite automata are defined by states and transitions and hence provide a natural technique for repre-
senting behaviour as state machines (Kent et al., 1991). They are also termed Finite State Automata
(FSA, used in this study) and Finite State Machines. FSA are one of the most commonly employed
techniques for representing order inclusive program behaviour within both computer security (Kosore-
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sow and Hofmeyr, 1997; Sekar and Uppuluri, 1999; Ghosh et al., 1999; Wagner, 2000; Sekar et al.,
2001b,a; Wagner and Dean, 2001; Sekar et al., 2003; Feng et al., 2004; Giffin et al., 2004, 2005) and
software development (Martin, 1998b,a).
In a FSA model each state is represented by a circle, and each transition is represented as an arrow
linking two states. States and transitions are also termed nodes and edges respectively. States at which
the automaton ends are represented by two concentric circles. FSA states (nodes) represent points in a
program’s execution within which no basis-term interactions occur. FSA transitions (edges) represent
the basis-term interactions which a program performs, and how the program state changes as a result.
FSA can be divided into two categories: deterministic, and non-deterministic. A FSA is consid-
ered deterministic if for each state there exists one, and only one, transition leading to a subsequent
state. Deterministic FSA (DFA) are not well suited to representing the behaviour of a program, which
almost always includes branching, looping, or recursion.
Employing a non-deterministic FSA (NFA), where a state can have multiple transitions, is also im-
precise in its representation of potential program behaviour: there can exist paths through a NFA that
are impossible in the program it represents. Giffin et al. (2002) provide an example which illustrates
the problem of impossible paths. Consider the small C program shown in Figure 2.7.
The NFA representing this program’s behaviour includes additional states for the start and end of
internal program functions and is shown in Figure 2.8.
The statements in bold from Figure 2.7 are those which constitute basis-terms for this example.
These statements identify the program interactions which are represented as transitions in the NFA.
The transitions to and from internal program function start and end states are labelled  to indicate
that they represent no program interaction with basis-terms. For readability, Figure 2.8 shows the
grouping of program states in terms of local program functions. In this example a possible path exists
in the NFA which does not exist in the actual program source code. This impossible path is illustrated
in Figure 2.9.
Impossible paths arise because NFA do not record a history of automaton transitions, in contrast
with a program whose use of functions follows a stack structure. Thus, in a program it is impossible
to return from a function that was not called. However, in a NFA nothing is known about previous
transitions, so no equivalent restriction can be imposed.
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main (int argc, char ** argv) {
}
       write(1,argv[1],10);
       line(1);
       end(1);
        write(1,"none\n",6);
        close(1);
    if (argc > 1) {
    } else {
    }
line (int fd) {
    write(fd, "\n", 1);
}
end (int fd) {
    line(fd);
    close(fd);
}
Figure 2.7: Giffin et al. (2002) Example C Code
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write
write
close
close
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
line function
end functionmain function
ε
Figure 2.8: Giffin et al. (2002) Example Non-deterministic Finite Automaton
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close
close
ε
ε
ε
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ε
ε
Figure 2.9: Giffin et al. (2002) Example Impossible Path through NFA
The problem of impossible paths can be solved by push-down automata (PDA). Illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.10, a PDA solves the example impossible path problem by recording the entrance and exit from
the internal program function group automata. These entrances and exits are maintained in a stack
structure composed of a unique value for each entrance-exit node pair. This additional information
allows the restriction of transitions to better reflect a program’s behaviour.
For example, the previous impossible path shown in Figure 2.9 through the equivalent PDA shown
in Figure 2.10 attempts to ‘pop’ the value ‘C’ from the stack before it has been ‘pushed’ onto it. This
impossible request correctly indicates an impossible path.
The use of both non-deterministic FSA and PDA in PBM is due to the efficiency of the former,
and the precision of the latter. The algorithms to generate NFA from a program’s definition, and make
comparisons with, are of linear complexity (Sekar and Uppuluri, 1999). However, a NFA lacks the
precision to correctly representing all program semantics, as illustrated by the previous impossible
path example.
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pop B
ε
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pop C
Figure 2.10: Giffin et al. (2002) Example Push-Down Automaton
A PDA13 however, has excellent precision, and can be generated from any NFA though the oper-
ational complexity of PDA is prohibitive (Wagner and Dean, 2001; Wagner, 2000; Giffin et al., 2002;
Feng et al., 2004; Giffin et al., 2004).
The majority of research on the topic of FSA-based PBM focuses on the development and appli-
cation of new representations, designed to offer both precise modelling of program characteristics and
low complexity. These new representations include:
• Extended FSA (EFSA).
• Dyck model.
Proposed by Sekar and Uppuluri (1999), an EFSA maintains a series of variables and their values
for each state in a NFA. These variables are used to identify impossible paths, in a manner similar
13 PDA are also referred to as ‘abstract stack models’ by Wagner and Dean (2001); Wagner (2000).
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to the stack structure used by a PDA. Sekar and Uppuluri (1999) admit that the worst-case complex-
ity, however unlikely for smaller applications, is large for EFSA. Expressed in big-O notation, this
complexity is O(n×m1×m2×...×mk) where n represents the number of states and mi are distinct
variable values 1 ≤ i ≤ k where k is the number of variables. An important side benefit of this
proposal is the inclusion of arguments for program interactions with basis-terms represented by each
transition, an improvement in precision also adopted by others (Wagner and Dean, 2001; Giffin et al.,
2004, 2005).
A recent proposal by Giffin et al. (2004, 2005) and Feng et al. (2004) utilises a Dyck model, and
claims to offer the precision of PDA, with operational complexity similar to that of NFA. A Dyck
model employs the same concept as a PDA for the elimination of such issues as impossible paths:
each call to a local automaton which represents an internal program function results is assigned a
unique value and maintained in a stack structure.
The distinction is that these values are inserted into the program itself, via binary editting libraries
such as LEEL (Xun, 1999), as opposed to being maintained by the model, such as with a PDA. This
alteration of the program effects no behavioural change, and simplifies the task of the (Dyck) model:
instead of both assigning, maintaining and checking the stack structure as occurs with a PDA, it need
only check what is present in the program.
However, the Dyck model appears only usable in PBM applications where the program itself is
both accessible in its binary or source form, and can be modified.
Formal Grammar
Formal grammars provide the definition of a set of sequences of expressions, which are termed a
language. A grammar defines the rule of this language. In the domain of PBM, formal grammars
utilise program interactions as expressions, and define a program’s behaviour as a set of sentences
representing the program’s expression sequences.
The semantics and application of formal grammars to PBM are equivalent to those observed in
the previous section on automata: an equivalent formal grammar can be defined for each different
FSA-based technique defined in the previous section. For example, behaviour represented by a FSA
can also be defined as a regular formal grammar, and a PDA can also be defined as a context-free
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formal grammar.
While it is important to note the alternate definition format, and its use in representing program
behaviour in previous research, a discussion of formal grammar provides little extra information. To
illustrate this, consider the often cited work by Ko et al. (1994) that proposes the definition of program
behaviour using two concepts:
Alphabets sets : to distinguish program events in terms of the chosen basis-terms.
Sentences : to define the order and sequencing of the events.
It is logical that these alphabet sets correlate with FSA states: both FSA states and alphabet sets are
used to distinguish parts of a program’s execution. It is equally logical that formal grammar sentences
correlate with FSA transitions: both FSA transitions and sentences are used to represent the changes in
programs during execution. These two concepts, and their direct mapping to FSA concepts, illustrate
that formal grammar techniques can be considered an alternate definition format for FSA diagrams.
2.3.2 Order Exclusive
The final type of PBM techniques is that which excludes explicit storage of the order and sequencing of
program interactions. This type of technique is distinct from order inclusive (of any degree) models:
order exclusive PBM techniques do not simulate a program’s changes in internal state, but rather
provide a ‘black box’ representation allowing comparisons. These models are sometimes termed
hidden in reference to the obscured definition of behaviour.
Order exclusive models enable comparisons with the program behaviour they internally represent,
from which information is gleaned. This characteristic makes order exclusive PBM techniques ideally
suited to computer security applications such as intrusion detection where comparisons are the primary
function; but poorly suited to software development where conveying understanding of the modelled
behaviour is crucial.
Order exclusive modelling techniques are created from existing observations of program be-
haviour. These observations are often captured during the program’s run-time execution. As pre-
viously discussed, the generation of models from run-time analysis is termed training, and a more
thoroughly trained model is more likely to be able to correctly predict program behaviour.
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There are primarily two distinct techniques for defining predictive, order-exclusive models from
observed behaviours: statistics and artificial intelligence. These techniques are discussed in the fol-
lowing sections.
Statistics
The initial paper on intrusion detection by Anderson (1980) proposed a simple statistical averaging
technique for the comparison of observed behaviour with the trained model: summing the squares of
the differences between observed and trained program interactions14 .
Much previous research has proposed the application of different statistical methods to the task of
predicting the probability of an observed behaviour occurring in the profile. These methods include:
• Mean and standard deviation (Denning, 1987).
• Multivariate (Denning, 1987; Javitz and Valdes, 1994; Anderson et al., 1995).
• Markov process (Denning, 1987; Warrender et al., 1999; Maxion and Tan, 2002).
• Time series (Denning, 1987; Kohout et al., 2002).
• Histogram (Endler, 1998).
• Probability distribution (Eskin, 2000; Eskin et al., 2000).
All of these statistical methods utilise a metric to convert a program’s observable behaviour (its
program interactions with model basis-terms) into a numerical score suitable for statistical processing.
The numerical quantity generated from the PBM basis-terms can be either a collection of multiple
individual program interactions, or a simple translation from one interaction only to a numerical value.
For example, a metric may collect multiple system-call interactions into a metric which represents
their frequency (Warrender et al., 1999) or rarity (Ju and Vardi, 2001), or a metric may simply translate
the basis-term interaction to a numerical value based on a static lookup table (Forrest et al., 1994).
14 A trained statistical program behaviour model is sometimes referred to as a statistical “profile”.
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The assumption made by statistical PBM techniques is that the real distributions of program be-
haviour metrics follow standard statistical distributions. Depending on the particular metrics and
distributions chosen, this can lead to poor precision in the PBM (Lunt, 1993; Endler, 1998).
The run-time analysis of program behaviour for training statistical program behaviour models,
also introduces the potential for false-alarms due to training limitations or difficulties (Endler, 1998).
These limitations arise from the potentially wide and unknown range of program execution paths, as
discussed in section 2.2.3.
When making a comparison between modelled behaviour and an observed behaviour, a statistical
PBM technique provides a measure of the probability that the observed behaviour is part of the model.
This value is continuous between 0 and 1. In contrast, order inclusive PBM techniques, due to their
formal nature, provide a discrete output of 0 or 1. The use of this continuous value requires the specifi-
cation of a threshold value, which enables its translation to an usable discrete result. A threshold value
defines the probability (between 0 and 1) at which behaviour can no longer reasonably be considered
part of the model. That is, the chosen threshold value distinguishes conforming and non-conforming
behaviour.
The initial development of statistical behaviour models were applied to representing users’ be-
haviour more commonly than programs’ behaviour (Anderson, 1980; Lane, 1999). These models are
commonly self-modifying and slowly incorporate new observations which fall below the threshold
value (and are considered distinct from those in the model) into their definitions. While this technique
can work for users who may change their behavioural habits slowly, changes to the behaviour of a
program tend to occur in more discrete steps. For example, the introduction of a new version of the
program, or the reconfiguration of the program to function in a different way.
Statistical PBM techniques have two choices in this scenario, discard the existing model and totally
retrain, or set the threshold value to recognise much more unlikely behaviours as part of the model.
Each choice has negative impacts on accuracy and performance: discarding a model requires training
of a new model from scratch, while setting a higher threshold value increases the possibility of false-
acceptance errors.
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Artificial Intelligence
Artificial intelligence techniques attempt to simulate the problem solving and learning abilities an
intelligent being exhibits when perform functions (Frank, 1994). Human beings can quickly learn to
perform a range of functions from working examples. Artificial intelligence (AI) PBM techniques
similarly attempt to ‘learn’ the behaviour of programs, based on training examples.
Two types of AI techniques are commonly applied to PBM:
• Artificial neural networks (Ghosh et al., 1998, 1999; Ghosh and Schwartzbard, 1999).
• Rule-based induction (Lee et al., 1997; Lee and Stolfo, 1998; Lee et al., 1999).
Artificial neural networks aim to simulate the biological behaviour of a brain, through a series of
highly interconnected processing elements (Anderson and McNeil, 1992; Braspenning et al., 1995).
The specific type of neural network most commonly applied to PBM is called back propagation
(Ghosh and Schwartzbard, 1999). Back propagation networks are provided with a set of values to
input elements, the values are processed and passed onwards according to the current element’s con-
nections. The total transformation applied to these input values is determined by the processing char-
acteristics of each element, and the weighting of the connections between elements. Once the values
have been passed to designated output elements, the network’s processing is considered finished, and
the results are gathered.
Rule-based induction uses specialised algorithms called machine learning algorithms to find pat-
terns in training information (Cohen, 1995; Domingos, 1996). In the field of PBM, these algorithms
identify patterns that the observed program behaviour follows. Patterns are identified during observa-
tion of the program behaviour, and are discarded when an observed behaviour is contradictory. After
processing, the only patterns that remain are those that are never contradicted by observed behaviour,
and become the rules which represent the program’s behaviour. For example, a rule might be gen-
erated from the system-call analysis of a program executing on the SunOS operating system which
states: a vtrace call occurs 5 calls after a vtimes (Lee et al., 1997). This rule might then be considered
representative and defining of the program’s behaviour.
AI techniques must, like statistical techniques, manipulate the result of comparisons between mod-
elled and observed program interactions into a form that is representative of the result. This is easily
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achievable for neural networks given the flexibility of their implementation, and requires that the re-
sults of all output elements are consolidated appropriately. For rule-based inductive models, decisions
are required about which and how many of the rules must remain unbroken, if observed behaviour is
to be considered conforming.
The use of AI techniques for order exclusive PBM, as with statistical techniques, is heavily de-
pendent on thorough training examples. However, an additional complication for AI techniques is the
necessity to be provided with examples of what is not a program’s behaviour, in addition to what is
(Ghosh and Schwartzbard, 1999). This is necessary to discard patterns which commonly occur in all
program behaviour. For example, given understanding of the meaning of the behaviours involved, it is
logical that all programs perform a open system-call before a read or write one. However, AI does not
have this understanding and so will identify this as a pattern of a the particular program’s behaviour.
Many such common and meaningless patterns can potentially be identified and result in a needlessly
complicated AI representation.
To prevent this, an AI technique must be provided with training examples which show this occur-
ring for behaviours which are specified as being not from the program being represented. Adequate
training is more difficult to provide for AI techniques, while its absence can impose limitations on
their performance.
2.3.3 Partially Order Inclusive
The order inclusive finite automata and formal grammar PBM techniques commonly weigh precision
against simplicity. A more precise technique, such as PDA, is less simple and has more operational
overhead. These characteristics result from the amount of information these techniques maintain; not
only what a program does, but when must be represented.
Frincke et al. (1998) propose a partially ordered PBM technique which optimises the maintenance
of when program interactions occur: ordering information is only maintained for those interactions
whose order is important and defining. In representing a partially ordered program behaviour model as
a state machine, this optimisation reduces the number of transitions that must be maintained for state
sequences that include unordered interactions. For example, consider the FSA shown in Figure 2.11
(provided by Frincke et al. (1998)) which strictly represents the ordering of a program’s interactions.
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s3
s2
s4
s1
s5
touch
touch
touch
chmod
mail
mail
chmod
cp
cp
Figure 2.11: Strictly Ordered Automaton with Order Unimportant Event
In this FSA the state ‘s4’ represents the program state just prior to performing the ‘touch’ interac-
tion. This interaction is unordered, with the restriction that it occurs before the ‘mail’ interaction after
state ‘s3’. Thus, this example FSA15 is forced to represent the sequences:
touch → cp → chmod → mail
cp → touch → chmod → mail
cp → chmod → touch → mail
Frincke et al. (1998) recognise that this model can be simplified by better representing the un-
15 This automaton is non-deterministic and suffers from the impossible path problem described in the previous section. The
automata allows recursive sequences, in which circular transitions are allowed but are not representative of the program’s
behaviour. For example, cp→ touch→ chmod→ touch→ mail.
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ordered nature of the ‘touch’ event. The partially ordered FSA is shown in Figure 2.12. This automa-
ton is augmented with information on the restriction of the unordered event: the state ‘s4’ is restricted
to occurring before the state ‘s3’ has been passed.
s3
s2
s4
s1
s5
touch
mail
chmod
cp
[before s3]
Figure 2.12: Partially Ordered Automaton
By augmenting the representation of specific program behaviour interactions to capture their un-
ordered nature, partial ordering can offer reduced complexity from strictly order inclusive represen-
tations. Partially ordered representations, whilst presented here, have not received much attention
by other PBM researchers. Regardless, partial ordering is adopted in this study to optimise program
behaviour interactions16 .
16 Refer to section 3.2.3 for more details
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2.3.4 Summary
This section detailed the different techniques used to represent program behaviour models. These
techniques define different ways a PBM technique’s selected basis-terms are maintained to provide
a representation of a program’s behaviour. Proposals in previous research can be categorised into
three different types of PBM technique; order inclusive, order exclusive, and the relatively recently
developed, partially order inclusive.
Order inclusive PBM techniques represent behaviour by simulating the order and sequence of
changes in a program’s state. Program states are distinguished by basis-term interactions. Ordered
PBM techniques often employ state machines, such as finite state automata, for representation. For
example, UML collaboration diagrams (Martin, 1997) are used by software developers to understand
the interaction between internal program components. Ordered PBM techniques can be generated
either by examining a program’s behaviour during run-time, or beforehand by static analysis.
The difficulty in order inclusive PBM techniques is getting a level of precise representation with a
model that is of low enough complexity to be practical for the chosen application. The most demand-
ing application is arguably that of real-time anomaly-detection systems used in computer security.
Initially proposed non-deterministic finite state automata were found to be too imprecise while the
next formal class of precision, push-down automata (according to the Chomsky hierarchy (Chomsky,
1956)), where found to be too complex for real-time applications. The recent development of a Dyck
representation has been reported to solve the problem of compromising precision and complexity, but
such results have not yet been independently corroborated. Additionally, Dyck representation requires
permanent modifications to the original program.
Order exclusive PBM techniques do not simulate the behaviour of a program, and hence offer
little assistance to understanding. These techniques allow comparisons between observed program
behaviour and the behaviour represented by a model. This limits their usefulness to primarily com-
puter security applications. Order exclusive program behaviour models are commonly trained by
run-time analysis of program behaviour. The models are limited in their precision by both the thor-
oughness of such training examples (the training examples coverage of potential program behaviour)
and exposure to examples of impossible program behaviour. Ensuring both a sufficient quantity and
coverage of training examples can be a difficult task.
47
An optimisation of order inclusive techniques seeks to reduce their complexity, by identifying
specific program behaviour interactions whose order is unimportant. These techniques are considered
partially order-inclusive. The more flexible ordering of these interactions can then be captured in a less
complex fashion. Partial order-inclusive techniques often share a large portion of their characteristics
with order inclusive techniques.
In summary, the discussed categories and techniques for representing program behaviour have
varying characteristics. These characteristics affect the potential performance of the technique. The
following section details PBM technique performance, how it is indicated, and what it signifies.
2.4 Performance
There are different performance measurements and characteristics for PBM techniques. To review, a
PBM technique utilises a particular set of chosen basis-terms (elements with which a program inter-
actions) to represent program behaviour in a fashion that is usable for the intended application, most
commonly software development or computer security.
Two characteristics affect the performance of PBM techniques:
Accuracy : how well a model exactly represents a program’s behaviour.
Complexity : how difficult a model is to use.
Both these characteristics are critical to a high performance PBM technique and are discussed in
the following sections.
2.4.1 Accuracy
The accuracy of a PBM technique indicates how well a model represents a program’s behaviour and
can be determined by two measures. These two measures are precision and focus, which cover both
potential errors made by PBM technique comparisons: false-alarms, and false-acceptances. Recall
that false-alarms occur when a PBM technique incorrectly identifies observed behaviour as not con-
forming, while false-acceptances occur when a PBM technique incorrectly identifies observed be-
haviour as conforming.
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Precision
The precision of a PBM language has previously been measured by the average-branching factor
metric defined by Wagner (2000); Wagner and Dean (2001). The branching factor metric is only ap-
plicable to ordered PBM techniques and is defined as the number of distinct program behaviour inter-
actions17 that are acceptable from any point (state) in the model. For example, for a non-deterministic
finite state automaton the branching factor for each state X , is the number of unique states linked to it
by transitions which stem from X .
In considering what the branching factor represents for PBM applied to computer security, Wag-
ner (2000) proposes that a small branching factor leaves an attacker with smaller choice of future
interactions that will evade detection. He also proposes that the branching factor for all program
states be averaged to provide a model-wide measure of precision. It is however acknowledged that the
average-branching factor metric does not adequately reflect potential areas of high branching within
the model.
The precision for a wider range of PBM techniques (partially ordered and unordered alike) can also
be measured by the number of false-acceptance errors made during its use (Eskin, 2000; Sekar et al.,
2001a; Ghosh and Schwartzbard, 1999). False-acceptance errors can occur for many reasons (partially
dependent on the particular PBM technique), though they most commonly occur when the models’
definitions of program interactions being compared are similar, but the actual behaviour represented
is distinct.
To recap, the precision of a PBM technique can be indicated by two measurements: the average-
branching factor as defined by Wagner (2000); Wagner and Dean (2001), and the number of false-
acceptance errors made. Higher average branching factors (limited to applications within the field of
computer security) and more false-acceptance errors indicate lower model precision.
Focus
The focus of a PBM technique refers to the technique’s ability to correctly focus on equal defining
behaviours and ignore irrelevant differences. The focus of a PBM technique represents the com-
plement of its precision: the two measures together provide a complete view of a PBM’s precision
17 System-calls are used as the basis-terms for Wagner and Dean’s work.
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performance.
The focus of PBM techniques can be measured by the number of false-alarm errors made during its
use. False-alarms errors are also the complement of false-acceptance errors. A false-alarm error can
occur for many reasons, depending on the particular PBM technique employed. It commonly occurs
when the definitions of program interactions being compared are distinct, but the actual behaviour
represented is the same. High false-alarm rates have historically been the main downfall of PBM
techniques applied to anomaly-detection systems (Ghosh and Schwartzbard, 1999).
High false-alarm rates often indicate inadequate training in order exclusive PBM techniques. An
order exclusive model cannot correctly identify equivalent behaviour if there exist equivalent program
execution paths that were not analysed during training. For an order inclusive PBM technique model,
a high false-alarm rate often indicates that too many details were discarded to reduce complexity.
The adoption of static analysis and ordered PBM techniques by researchers in the field of computer
security has been reported to reduce the false-alarm rate to 0 (Wagner and Dean, 2001). This is an
important and valuable characteristic of recent order inclusive PBM techniques.
2.4.2 Complexity
The complexity of a PBM technique can be measured by its time and space requirements. These
two computational complexity measures are used to quantify the effects of complexity on program
performance, and can be used similarly for PBM techniques.
The more complex a PBM technique is, the less efficient it is at representing program interactions.
Reduced efficiency results in more space being occupied by its models, and in using these models to
make comparisons taking longer. The time and space complexity of computer programs and PBM
techniques is often measured both practically and theoretically.
Time complexities are most often measured by isolating the time spent by the PBM technique
application performing its intended function. For example, consider anomaly prevention systems:
during the execution of programs, the PBM technique must make comparisons between observed
behaviour and modelled behaviour. These real-time comparisons add to the program’s execution time
and thus, a comparison between the time taken by the program when its behaviour is being observed,
and when it is not, provides an indication of the PBM technique’s time complexity (Wagner and Dean,
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2001; Giffin et al., 2002).
More specific time measurements may be drawn from only the time taken to make the comparisons
by the PBM technique within the anomaly prevention system (Feng et al., 2004). In the case of order
exclusive PBM techniques, time measurements can also be provided to indicate the required training’s
complexity.
Space complexities can be measured simply by examining the amount of storage space used by a
PBM technique. This space can be in terms of:
Hard disk storage : employed for long-term uses of a model, such as representing it on the computer
system.
Memory storage : employed for short-term uses of a model, such as that required by a PBM appli-
cation to make comparisons.
In addition to practical measures, theoretical asymptotic analysis of complexity such as big-O
notation (Weiss, 1999) can be used to indicate the rate at which the complexity of a model grows
as the program size grows. This rate is commonly noted as a function of the number of program
interactions modelled (Feng et al., 2004).
2.5 Summary
The performance section discusses the metrics by which PBM techniques’ performance is quantified.
These metrics are categorised by two aspects of PBM techniques: accuracy, and complexity.
Accuracy is indicated by two measures: precision and focus, which can be taken by the number of
false-acceptance and false-alarm errors respectively. Another more application-specific metric exists,
called average-branching factor, which quantifies the scope within which an attacking program can
function without being detected by an anomaly-detection system.
The complexity of a PBM technique is measured by the computational time and space it requires,
and by the asymptotic notation in terms of program interaction quantities. Time requirements can
be measured for applied PBM techniques by the time taken to use a PBM technique: either to make
comparisons between the model and observed behaviours, or to generate a model. Space requirements
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can be measured by the amount of long-term hard disk space, and temporary memory occupied by a
PBM technique for the same uses.
In summary of this chapter, program behaviour modelling is pervasively used in the planning
phase of software development, and in the detection of computer security intrusions. These different
applications of PBM utilise distinct basis-terms, and distinct techniques for representation. Despite
these differences however, metrics exist to quantify and compare PBM performance.
This chapter identifies several promising characteristics for improving PBM performance. They
are:
Abstract Basis-Terms : Application-level program interactions, are suggested to successfully en-
capsulate low-level program behaviour into a more meaningful, and human comprehensible
event.
Partially Order Inclusive Definition : specialized FSA, are reported to reduce the complexity be-
low that of an order inclusive technique, whilst including the information needed to maintain
excellent precision, when it is warranted.
Whilst both these characteristics are well recognized, currently no PBM technique utilizes both.
The following chapter develops the proposed innovative technique for program behaviour modelling,
which incorporates both abstract basis-terms, and a partially order inclusive definition.
Chapter 3
LOGICAL ENTITY ABSTRACTED PROGRAM BEHAVIOUR MODELLING
The PBM technique proposed by this study is termed Logical Entity Abstracted Program Be-
haviour Modelling (LEAPBM). The LEAPBM technique represents the innovative employment of
two key concepts discussed in the background review from the previous chapter:
Flexible Abstraction of Basis-Terms : the computer system components that the LEAPBM tech-
nique uses to define program behaviour are flexible, and variably abstract. Where previous
techniques have employed static terms for the definition of models, the LEAPBM technique
introduces another layer of abstraction. This additional separation allows a modeler to vary the
level of abstraction, of the terms in which a LEAPBM model is defined.
The concept of abstraction has received substantial attention from researchers in the field of
PBM. The identification of abstractions has previously demonstrated improvements in PBM
applied to computer security through misuse intrusion detection systems (Lin et al., 1998; Lin
J., 1998; Ning et al., 2001).
Partially Ordered Finite State Automata : the internal representation of program state employed
by LEAPBM takes the form of a modified state machine. This state machine definition is
based on a finite state automaton, with modifications to allow flexibility in representing program
behaviour whose ordering is not critical (Frincke et al., 1998).
Additionally, LEAPBM has the following characteristics regarding application, generation, and
applicability:
Application to Computer Security : the primary application domain for the LEAPBM technique
is computer security, more specifically, an anomaly-prevention system. This signifies that the
LEAPBM technique represents the entire behaviour of a program, and that it focuses primarily
on the interaction of the program with external computer system components.
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Static Analysis Generation : the generation of a LEAPBM model is performed statically, prior to
execution, via analysis of the program source-code. This concept is also utilised by several other
recent PBM techniques and removes the potentially tedious requirement of run-time training
during model generation (Wagner and Dean, 2001; Giffin et al., 2002; Murthy, 2003).
Modern Programming Language Support : the LEAPBM technique understands the additional
programmatic structures of more modern programming languages, such as C++, Java and
Smalltalk. The C programming language has previously been the principal focus of PBM tech-
niques as it is used to define the interface between programs and the commonly employed
system-call basis-terms.
A LEAPBM model, being primarily applicable to computer security, captures the behaviour of a
program in terms of its interactions with external abstract concepts. This focus on a program’s external
behaviour makes the LEAPBM technique ill suited to application in the field of software development,
as it provides little understanding of the interactions between internal program components or their
design.
The LEAPBM technique allows the flexible definition of model basis-terms. That is, a LEAPBM
model defines both what a program interacts with, and how it interacts with it. The suggested basis-
terms for a LEAPBM are the abstract concepts in terms of which a program’s behaviour is defined, and
are called Logical Abstract Entities (LAEs). The definition of a particular program and how interacts
with a defined set of LAEs is termed a LEAPBM model.
A LEAPBM model must incorporate or reference LAE definitions to identify the basis-terms it
employs. These LAEs are a critical prerequisite which allow a modeler to take advantage of the
flexibility the LEAPBM technique offers.
This chapter details the LEAPBM technique, its constituent components, overall structure, the
definition of the flexible abstract basis-terms, two definition formats, and the procedures by which a
LEAPBM model can be generated and processed. Finally, specifications are provided for software
applications of the LEAPBM technique.
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3.1 Design Methodology
The innovative design of the LEAPBM technique was devised after analysis of the concepts currently
utilized in PBM, and their short-comings. The first key innovation (enabling the flexible definition
of PBM basis-terms as part of the model definition) grew out of identification of the potential for
abstraction to target the PBM definition.
This design decision was made based on the logical assumption that enabling targetting to occur
on a per-model basis, will facilitate better performing models. This assumption is supported by Sekar
et al. (1999), who suggest an advantage in enabling tailoring of abstraction, and is logical as each
model can be tailored to utilize the best representative terms.
The second key concept of providing partial order inclusive optimizations to the FSA model rep-
resentation, is a result of several factors:
Goal of this study ; to enable improved human comprehensibility. This goal necessitates the rejec-
tion of any elements of a modelling technique which lead to complexity or opacity.
Indicated optimizations in a review of previous literature Frincke et al. (1998), with a notable point
being overcoming the exponential growth of FSA paths with model growth.
Simple trials of modelling programs in the experimental test domain1. During these trials the ben-
efits of partial order inclusion on model size were verified, and an apparent improvement in
human comprehensibility was observed.
3.2 Logical Abstract Entities
The flexible basis-terms for the LEAPBM technique are called Logical Abstract Entities. LAEs form
the foundation of a LEAPBM model, and are defined to reflect the abstract external concepts a pro-
gram interacts with. These external concepts take the form of software libraries utilised by programs.
A software library is a store of functionality provided by the computer system. Although typically
libraries encapsulate lower-level calls into a more powerful, and abstract, set of functions, the system-
call kernel interface can also be considered a software library.
1 Refer to chapter 4.1.
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The decision to define LAEs in terms of software libraries was driven by the application of
LEAPBM to computer security, and the fact that software libraries provide the interface between a
program and the underlying computer system.
LAEs are defined in terms of the external software library components. Multiple, logically-related
LAEs can be grouped to form LAE sets. LAE sets are referenced by LEAPBM models to identify the
abstract external interactions will be used to define a program’s behaviour.
The definition of LAEs borrows heavily from the object-oriented design paradigm, which allows
the composition of behaviour and data into meaningful constructs called classes. LAE classes are
composed of both methods, and properties. Methods and properties are the object-oriented terms
commonly given to functions, and variables respectively, that form part of an object. As the LAE
class definition draws from object-oriented design, it is capable of capturing newer object-oriented
libraries in addition to older simpler software libraries.
The terms used to define the LAEs used by a LEAPBM model are the programmatic elements
of software libraries. After these elements’ definitions have been captured by a LAE set, they can
be used to define pseudo-object-oriented LAE class structures. LAE class structures do not provide
some object-oriented functions: inheritance, polymorphism, and distinctions between class and in-
stance members. LAE classes consist only of logical groups of methods and properties. It is via
interactions with these abstract LAE methods and properties that a LEAPBM model captures a pro-
gram’s behaviour.
3.2.1 Software Library Terms
The terms in which a LAE is defined are the various elements of both traditional and object-oriented
software libraries: functions, variables, methods and properties. LAEs are potentially required to refer
to any software library, within a selected programmatic domain. The domain for this study is the C++
programming language.
Each type of C++ software library element must be able to be represented by a LAE class, in
order to be used as a basis-term for a LEAPBM model. The software library elements, and their
details, are recorded as a preliminary step in the generation of LAE classes. Maintaining an internal
representation of each software library element simplifies the potentially numerous references to them
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in the definition of LAE classes.
The components of a software library are defined in a programming header file. In object-oriented
programming languages, a number of different elements can be defined by software libraries:
1. Functions and methods2.
2. Variables and properties3 .
3. Extended variable and property types.
4. Object classes.
5. Exceptions.
Functions and Methods
Software library function and method call definitions include the call’s name, argument details, and
both normal and exceptional return types. These definitions have a standard structure: every function
or method call has a name, a return variable type, a set of argument variable types, and a set of
exceptional return variable types. Each part of this structure is captured in the LAE representation.
An object-oriented method call has one additional complication: its association with an object class.
Both function and method call definitions can refer to extended variable types via their return
values, or argument variables.
Variables and Data Members
Software library variables and properties are also defined in the library header files, and can exist in a
number of places in a software library:
1. Simple variables.
2 C++ terminology for class functions is member functions
3 C++ terminology for variables is data members, while variables associated solely with object classes are termed static
data members
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2. Function and method arguments.
3. Function and method return values.
Simple variables can also exist in several places: within different classes as class or instance prop-
erties, and within different namespaces (including the global namespace). Any of the variables or
properties used in a software library can be of primitive or extended types. Primitive types are in-
trinsically understood by C++ programming language compilers, while extended types require further
representation.
Extended Variable and Property Types
The types of variables used in a software library can be extended beyond the standard set of value types
understood by C++ programming language compilers, termed primitive types. Non-primitive or ex-
tended variable types can be added to a software library through several programmatic constructs such
as structures, unions, and object classes. Extended variable types are often defined to add meaning to
maintained data. For example, the number 24 means little in isolation, but when part of a structure
called ‘Person’ and associated with a variable called ‘Age’, it becomes meaningful information.
The set of extended variable types is dynamic, and likely to vary between software libraries. The
potential complexity and variation in the semantics of each variable type is too large to translate
to a format which could easily be internally captured by a LAE definition. Extended variable type
semantics are best represented in the same way they are defined: computer software. To achieve this,
LAEs refer to specialised external software components called plug-ins.
Plug-ins are defined to capture the semantics of non-primitive variable types employed in a soft-
ware library. Plug-ins are referenced by a LAE definition but are external to it. They require pack-
aging, distribution with the LAE if it is transferred, and configuration on the target operating system.
Plug-ins should be dynamically loaded by a LEAPBM application and used to compare observed
values with modelled values concerning extended variable types. The interface with plug-ins is stan-
dardised and occurs though the checkValues method call, which is defined in C++ as:
bool checkValues(void *aValue, std::string byteValue);
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The first argument to checkValues() specifies a pointer to the variable value that has been ob-
served during a program’s execution. The second argument is the string-formatted value present in
the LEAPBM model. The checkValues() function returns a boolean value indicating whether the two
values match. This function must be implemented by all plug-ins, and be accessible via a LEAPBM
application. The responsibility for plug-in loading, configuration and communication is placed on the
LEAPBM application developer.
Object Classes
Software library object classes provide logical groupings of behaviour and data. Behaviours are de-
fined in methods, while data is stored in properties. These groupings provided by software library
object classes can potentially be used as a guide for the definition of the program’s LAE set. This is
encouraged if the software library object classes reflect the abstract concepts understood by a program.
Capturing the object class structures in a LAE is only one option and is not a requirement. LAEs
can refer directly to the methods and properties they contain.
Exceptions
Exceptional returns from software library functions are specialised object classes, designed to repre-
sent potential run-time errors and mistakes in program execution. Exceptional returns are an important
software library element to capture in a LAE, as they can identify different program execution paths.
Exceptional returns are distinguished by their names.
Summary
To summarise, the software library terms utilised in the definition of a LAE are:
methods and functions : their parameters, and their normal and exceptional return values.
Variables and properties : their types, and association with an object class.
Extended non-primitive types : their semantics are captured in external software components called
plug-ins. Plug-ins are accessible via a standardised checkValues function interface.
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Exceptions : their names.
These software library terms are represented as part of a LAE to allow the definitions of other
LAE elements, to easily refer to software library elements.
3.2.2 LAE Classes
A LAE class is a pseudo-object-oriented construct, designed to contain logically associated abstract
methods and properties. Methods and properties are logically associated if they concern the same
abstract concepts. A LAE class represents both the data, and behaviour, of the concepts understood
by a program, while a set of LAE classes represent the terms used to model a program’s behaviour.
A LAE class is instantiated in a LEAPBM model. Each instance of a particular LAE class can
then refer to distinct abstract concepts of the same type. For example, a program with a graphical user
interface can reasonably be expected to understand the abstract concept of a button, but is also likely
to have more than one button. In this example, a ‘Button’ LAE class can be defined, and ‘Button’
instances created for each button in the program.
3.2.3 LAE Methods
A LAE method is defined within a LAE class, and defines a behaviour involving the abstract concept
the LAE class represents. For example, consider the abstract concept of a GUI program’s buttons.
A method of one of these buttons might be ‘draw’, in reference to the behaviour of a program in
displaying such a button.
An abstract LAE method can also encapsulate multiple interactions with software library terms.
Abstract concepts that require multiple program interactions are thus represented as a single, abstract
program interaction. This allows more flexibility and power in the definition of LAE methods.
Each LAE method maintains the sequencing and order in which the software library interactions
it encapsulates occur. The internal structure which is used to represent these interactions is a modified
finite state automaton, similar to the structure used to represent a program’s abstract interactions in a
LEAPBM model. LAE methods’ FSA represent individual software library interactions as states, and
the sequence in which such states occur is reflected transitions that connect states in ordered pairs.
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Figure 3.1: LAE Method FSA Example
The software library interactions that can be used in the definition of a LAE method are: method and
function calls, and variable and property assignments.
For example, consider a LAE method which encapsulates a sequence of software library method
calls: a single Y call, followed by any number of B calls, then a call to K , and finally a Z call. This
sequence can be illustrated as shown in Figure 3.1.
Any potential sequence of software library method calls in older programming languages (such as
C) can be represented in this simple manner. The possible program behaviour that a LAE method’s
internal FSA is required to represent is complicated by the C++ programming language. The C++
programming language additionally enables exceptional return types from functions and method calls.
Exceptions are often used to distinguish between program execution paths, each of which must be
represented in the FSA.
Exceptional transitions between a LAE method’s states are identified with the exception that
causes them. This identification allows transitions which result from exceptional returns to be dis-
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Figure 3.2: LAE Method FSA with Exception Example
tinguished from the single transition which results from a normal return. Continuing the example
from Figure 3.1, Figure 3.2 illustrates an exceptional return Exception1 from state B which causes
the software library interaction K to be skipped.
The FSA structure used to define a LAE method is designed to correctly represent any potential
sequence of C++ software library interactions, as a single abstract interaction.
Multiple, unconnected sequences can also be maintained in a LAE method FSA. Additional tran-
sitions and states can be added with no requirement that all states must be linked. For example, the
FSA specified in Figure 3.1 can be extended with states H and R and transition H → R, as shown in
Figure 3.3. This allows multiple software library method interaction sequences to be encapsulated in
the one FSA specification, and allows for multiple equivalent definitions of LAE methods.
An additional complication for LAE methods is the potentially unrestricted order in which the
software library interactions they encapsulate can occur. That is, situations exist where a software
library calls are important to a program’s behaviour, but when the calls occur during a program’s
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Figure 3.3: Multiple Sequence FSA Example
execution is of little or no importance.
In cases where encapsulating such a software library call is required, the LAE method is given the
special flag unrestricted. This flag denotes the order-irrelevance of the LAE method. As a result, the
order of program interactions with such a LAE method is not considered in determining its confor-
mance with the LEAPBM model. Any additional conditions for the unrestricted behaviour of LAE
methods, are maintained within its definition.
3.2.4 LAE Properties
A LAE property encapsulates an atomic data attribute of the abstract concept represented by a LAE
class. That is, a LAE property represents a single piece of a LAE class’s data, and the sum of a LAE
class’s properties represent all of its data. LAE properties are associated with a single LAE class, and
are defined in terms of software library variables and properties.
Data is maintained or used in variables and properties within a software library. As previously
discussed, data is commonly used in variables, function or property arguments, and normal return
63
values. In the case of object-oriented programming, some variables contained within object classes
are not directly accessible but rather are accessed via special methods termed ‘getters and setters’.
The behaviour of these methods is respectively: to get the value of the data and return it, and to set
the value of the variable passed as an argument. Ergo, a data term of concern to an object-oriented
software library can be utilised in method arguments and return values, while not being maintained
anywhere accessible.
A LAE property definition lists the places within a software library where data is used that consti-
tutes an abstract LAE class’s property.
3.2.5 Summary
To summarise, Logical Abstract Entity classes’ methods and properties provide the terms used by
a LEAPBM model to define program behaviour. LAEs classes capture the abstract concepts under-
stood by a program in abstract behaviours (termed methods) and data (termed properties). These
methods and properties are defined in terms of software library elements. LAE classes group these
abstract methods and properties into pseudo-object-oriented classes, which can then be instantiated
by LEAPBMs to represent a program’s interactions with specific examples of its understood abstract
concepts.
3.3 LEAPBM Models
LEAPBM models are built upon the abstract concepts understood by a program, which become the
model’s basis-terms. Before a model can be generated, these concepts must be identified and specified
in LAE classes. LAE classes define abstract behaviours and data in terms of more concrete software
library elements. The previous section provides more details concerning the definition of LAE classes.
After a set of LAE classes for a LEAPBM model have been defined, a program’s behaviour can
be represented in terms of its interactions with these basis-terms. LEAPBM represents the order
and sequencing of program interactions with a structure based on finite state automata. However,
before any definition of program interactions, a LEAPBM model is required to identify the program
it concerns, and the portions of the program’s behaviour it represents.
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3.3.1 Program Identification and Representation Boundaries
A LEAPBM model identifies which program and which segments of the program’s execution it repre-
sents. The LEAPBM technique facilitates representation of program segments to represent potential
situations where is it not necessary or optimal to model a program in its entirety.
To avoid confusion in matching LEAPBM models to the programs they represent, models refer to
programs via the following:
Host : the Internet address or domain name of the machine which executes the program. This identi-
fication is however not always possible as often programs can be executed on numerous distinct
computer hosts.
File : the absolute path of the file on the operating system where the program code resides. This
rather coarse and rudimentary identification of the program file could in future be handled by a
checksum value.
The identification of program representation boundaries is achieved with special states that form
part of the LEAPBM model’s FSA. These states signify the commencement and termination of
LEAPBM representation of a program’s behaviour, and are termed entry and exit states respectively.
These states refer to execution points in programs, and form the beginning and end respectively, of
the LEAPBM model’s FSA.
There can be multiple entry and exit points for a given program allowing flexibility for programs
with varying control flow paths. Once the program has been identified and LEAPBM representa-
tion boundaries established, the program’s behaviour is defined by the remainder of the LEAPBM’s
modified FSA.
3.3.2 LEAPBM Interaction Finite State Automata
The sequence and ordering of a program’s LAE interactions is represented in a LEAPBM model by a
FSA-based structure. Each state in this FSA represents either a method call, or a property assignment
interaction with a LAE instance. Each transition identifies an ordered pair of states and defines an
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one-way progression between them. These transitions represents individual steps in the sequence of
program behaviour4 .
The following discussion detail the specialisations of the finite state automata construct (originally
composed solely of states and transitions) to the task of LEAPBM interaction sequence definition.
States: LAE Interactions
A state in the LEAPBM model’s interaction FSA represents either a call on a LAE method, or the
assignment of a value to a LAE property5 . The representation of the LAE interaction holds references
to LAE method call or LAE property assignment. Within the model the method calls and property
assignments are maintained according to the LAE instance. This provides centralised storage of the
use of LAE instances during program behaviour, and is discussed more in the subsequent section 3.3.3.
Transitions: Pathways between Interactions
A transition in the interaction FSA represents a pathway between two states: a source state and a
target state. By distinguishing between source and target, the LEAPBM model FSA’s transitions are
unidirectional.
Transitions whose source state represents a LAE method call, are required to distinguish between
normal, and exceptional returns. Thus, multiple transitions can exist between a given pair of states and
are distinguished by the return from the source state’s LAE method call. Contrastingly, interactions
representing LAE property assignments only require one pathway definition.
Flexible Order Importance
Potential situations exist in program behaviour, where the importance of interactions’ order varies.
These situations must be represented by the LEAPBM finite state automaton structure. As previ-
ously discussed, when the order of a LAE method is unimportant, it is flagged unrestricted. In the
LEAPBM model’s FSA-based structure, program interactions with unrestricted LAE methods are
4 This is similar to the FSA structure employed in the definition of LAE methods; with the distinction that states represent
interactions with LAE instances, instead of with software library elements.
5 Fetching the value of a LAE property does not affect the behaviour of the external computer system and is therefore not
represented
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not maintained. The algorithms which generate and process a LEAPBM FSA should understand the
flexible order of these unrestricted LAE methods.
Other situations exist where the order of a program’s interactions is only unimportant when com-
pared to a subset of other program interaction sequences. That is, within some groups of program
interaction sequences, the order in which interaction sequences occur has no impact on the behaviour
they represent. Each such interaction sequence subset is defined as a logical block, instead of explic-
itly defining all the potential acceptable pathway combinations. Understanding of this flexible order
importance block forms part of the LEAPBM generation and processing algorithms.
Additionally, each interaction sequence in this block can be limited in the range of number of times
it can be performed. If a particular sequence has not been performed a specified minimum number
of times, the processing algorithm is designed to disallow any subsequent transitions. Similarly, if a
sequence has been performed the maximum number of times, the processing algorithm is designed to
disallow its further use.
This logical block structure (coupled with design modifications to the processing and generation
algorithms) represents program situations when different sequences within a subset may be performed
both in any order and different numbers of times.
Summary
This section describes the LEAPBM modified finite state automaton used to represent the sequence
and ordering of program interactions. To review, these interactions occur with LAE class abstract
methods and properties. States within the LEAPBM FSA maintain a reference to the details of the
particular LAE method call, or property assignment which are stored centrally according to LAE
instance. This storage of the details of program’s interactions is detailed in the following section.
The main distinction between the LEAPBM technique and standard finite state automata is the
identification of subsets of program interactions whose order is flexible. Representing these flexible
interactions requires modification to the LEAPBM FSA and processing and generation algorithms.
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3.3.3 LAE Instances and Use
The details of how a program interacts with LAE methods and properties are stored according to each
LAE instance. These details are then referred to by the interaction FSA, which allows the implemen-
tation of the FSA to be lightweight, as no details of LAE interactions are maintained.
Within a LAE instance, each distinct LAE method call interaction made by a program is repre-
sented. This representation stores which LAE method was called, and any property value assignments
made as part of its use. Implicit value assignments to LAE properties occur if their source software
library terms (parameter, argument, or return value) are used during the LAE method.
Both implicit and explicit LAE property value assignments store which property is set, and the
value it is set to. A property’s value can either be a constant, or the value of a property of another LAE
instance. This allows LEAPBM to correctly capture inter-relationships between run-time specific
values.
The LEAPBM representation of property assignment values is less powerful than the approach
proposed by Giffin et al. (2004, 2005), which utilises a data-flow diagram to simulate the changing
values of variables during program execution. The LEAPBM technique does however, allow for the
specification of ranges of values, and sets of values for LAE properties. It is expected that this will
allow optimisation and generalisation of an automatically generated model, to make it more widely
applicable.
With multiple instances of a single LAE class, some way of distinguishing between them is re-
quired. This is achieved through identification of key LAE class properties, whose values are unique
for each LAE class instance. This simple technique is commonly employed in database systems to
uniquely identify data. For example, if a LAE class ‘Person’ exists, the key properties might be the
person’s name, and date of birth.
3.3.4 Summary
To summarise, LEAPBM definitions of program behaviour are specified in terms of LAE instances,
and a program’s interactions with them. The sequence of interactions is maintained in a FSA-based
structure, while the details of each interaction are maintained with the LAE instance they utilise.
This section describes the various components that are used by the LEAPBM technique: the LAE
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set definition, the LEAPBM model finite state automata, and the LEAPBM model LAE instance
usage. Building upon this understanding of the different components of the LEAPBM technique, the
following section describes two formats in which a program’s model using the LEAPBM technique
can be defined.
3.4 Definition Formats
There are potentially many definition formats for the LEAPBM technique. Any format which can
define a modified finite state automaton (or the equivalent formal grammar), and a list of object in-
stances and utilisations. Finite state automata are often used to define program behaviour models, as
are formal grammars. Contrastingly, previous representations of object instances have primarily been
utilised for software development. The LEAPBM technique employs elements of these techniques
from fields of computer security, and software development.
Adopting the representation of object instantiations and utilisations for the purposes of PBM, and
extending the representation of directed graphs to reference this information, is the primary distinction
between a LEAPBM definition format, and existing PBM techniques. Two distinct formats are defined
for the LEAPBM technique in the following sections.
3.4.1 Diagrams
Diagrams are a form of specifying information which is primarily human consumable. The diagram-
matic representation of LEAPBM models is designed to allow a human to quickly comprehend a
program’s behaviour, and to provide all the details concerning LAE usage for more thorough scrutiny.
The definition of the set of LAE classes employed by a LEAPBM model as diagrams does not
assist in this goal, as the information it provides (the structure of the LAE instances) can be implic-
itly gathered from the LAE instance usage information. Thus, a LEAPBM model diagram does not
include any LAE class definitions. Such a definition involves potentially numerous and complex ref-
erences to software library terms. The primary purpose of LAE definitions is to simplify and combine
such terms into more meaningful constructs. Providing a human consumer with the complex definition
of meaningful LAE properties and methods is overly verbose and unnecessary.
The diagrammatic format of LEAPBM models occurs in two parts: the interaction FSA, and the
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use of LAE instances. The interaction FSA is heavily based on the representation of a finite state
automaton, with extensions to incorporate the additional LEAPBM requirements:
• Defined program representation boundary entries and exits.
• Multiple distinct pathways between states.
• Flexible order importance.
• References to LAE instance utilisations.
The basis for LEAPBM FSA symbols is standard UML notation. For example the entries and
exits are illustrated as filled and concentric circles respectively, similar to UML state-chart and activity
diagrams.
The LAE object usage part of a LEAPBM diagram, requires the specification of object instances
and their use in a diagrammatic format. Although several UML diagram types—collaboration, se-
quence, activity—are designed to represent interactions with objects of a software system, none allow
maintenance of sufficient interaction details. This is potentially due to the exclusive application of
UML modelling techniques to software development, and the fact that exact details of changes to
object instances are unknown at this time. The diagrammatic definition of LAE object usage, while
employing a layout similar to UML class diagrams, has no exact basis in existing work.
Interaction FSA Representation
A LEAPBM interaction FSA has four additional requirements beyond a standard FSA:
1. Program representation boundaries.
2. Multiple pathways distinguished by exceptional returns.
3. Order flexibility.
4. LAE utilisation referencing.
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federation.create
federation.join
atttribute.getHandle objectClass.getHandle
objectClass.publishobjectClass.subscribe
Figure 3.4: Standard Finite State Automaton
These additional requirements are integrated into an example diagram over the following pages.
Figure 3.4 shows a segment of a standard finite state automaton diagram. This particular segment
represents the initial behaviour of a distributed simulation program. The states in this FSA identify
the LAE interactions made by a program. For example, the first state labelled ‘federation.create’
represents an interaction with an unknown element ‘create’ of the ‘federation’ LAE class.
The extension to recognise the entries and exits from the LEAPBM are shown in Figure 3.5.
Symbols for entry and exits from based on those from UML activity diagrams are used: a black
filled circle, and two black concentric circles respectively. Additionally, the program representation
boundaries are identified in terms of internal program function calls.
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federation.create
federation.join
attribute.getHandle objectClass.getHandle
objectClass.publishobjectClass.subscribe
main(int, char**)
Figure 3.5: Entries Extended Finite State Automaton
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Figure 3.6 shows the directed graph further extended to distinguish between multiple pathways for
the different returns from the LAE methods represented by states. An exceptional return is identified
by a named transition, with the exception in a smaller italicised font. Normal returns are not labelled.
In Figure 3.6 the two previously indistinguishable transitions between the ‘federation.create’ and
‘federation.join’ states become associated with different LAE method returns: one is a normal return,
the other is a ‘FederationExecutionAlreadyExists’ exceptional return.
In order to optimise FSA and account for flexibility in the importance of states’ order, further
extensions are made to represent logical blocks within which order is flexible. In the case of the
example FSA there are two interactions with unrestricted LAE methods: ‘object.getHandle’ and ‘at-
tribute.getHandle’. Unrestricted interactions are not defined as part of a LEAPBM diagram format.
Their presence is implicit given an understanding of the application domain, and inclusion in the
LEAPBM diagram format adds complications for little gain. Thus, the states representing these inter-
actions are removed, along with any transitions to or from them.
There also exists in this case a subset of interactions within which order is unimportant. This
subset consists of the ‘objectClass.subscribe’ and objectClass.publish’ interactions and is defined as
a logical unordered block. The starts of unordered blocks are represented by shaded circles while
exit transitions from within unordered blocks to outside are represented by dashed arrows. This is
illustrated in Figure 3.7.
In the Figures 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 no details are maintained about the LAE interactions made at
each state. These details are maintained separately, and referenced by the FSA states appropriately.
Figure 3.8 illustrates the FSA extended to maintain these references: each state identifies the LAE
instance name, LAE interaction name and type of interaction it represents in colon-separated pairs:
〈LAE instance name〉 : 〈interaction name〉〈interaction type〉
For LAE method call interactions the ‘interaction type’ is two parentheses “( )”, while for LAE
property set interactions the ‘interaction type’ is an assignment operator “=”. For example, the ‘fed-
eration.create’ LAE method call on a LAE instance is represented as:
fed XA : create Fed()
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main(int, char**)
federation.create
federation.join Exception
FederationExecutionAlreadyExists
attribute.getHandle objectClass.getHandle
objectClass.publishobjectClass.subscribe
Figure 3.6: Multiple Pathways Extended Finite State Automaton
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main(int, char**)
federation.create
federation.join Exception
FederationExecutionAlreadyExists
objectClass.publishobjectClass.subscribe
Figure 3.7: Flexible Order Extended Finite State Automaton
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main(int, char**)
fed_XA : create_Fed( )
fed_XA : join_Fed( )
FederationExecutionAlreadyExists
class_OB : publish_OB( )
Exception
class_OA : subscribe_OA( )
Figure 3.8: LAE Interaction Referenced Extended Finite State Automaton
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The details of the LAE object usage referenced by the states in a finite state automaton, such as
Figure 3.8, are maintained in a separate structure. This structure is termed the LAE object usage
section of a LEAPBM diagram.
LAE Object Usage
Diagrammatic definition of LAE objects’ usages is required to represent the details of both method
call and property assignment interactions. As previously discussed, a method call interaction can also
contain implicit property assignments.
Each LAE object instance is maintained individually as a rectangular box split into three vertically-
stacked sections, in much the same fashion as a UML class diagram:
The top section : identifies the LAE class of the object and the name assigned to it in bold font with
the format:
〈name〉 : 〈object class〉
The middle section : represents the property set interactions made with the LAE instance in the
following format,
〈interaction name〉 : 〈LAE property name〉 = 〈value assigned〉
The bottom section : represents the method call interactions made with the LAE instance, and any
included LAE property value assignments, in the following format:
〈special f lag〉〈interaction name〉 : 〈LAE method name〉
→ 〈LAE property name〉 = 〈value assigned〉
→ 〈LAE property name〉 = 〈value assigned〉
The ‘special flag’ element present in the bottom section is used to identify the method call inter-
actions which create and destroy the LAE object instance. The flags for instantiation and destruction
take the same form as finite state automata entries and exits: a black filled circle, and two concentric
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create_Fed : create
  −> name = XA
  −> FEDfile = MA.fed
fed_XA : federation
timeTo10 : requestedTime = 10
Figure 3.9: Example LAE Instance Usage Diagram
circles respectively. Figure 3.9 illustrates this format for an example LAE object instance represent-
ing a distributed simulation object and a subset of its typical usage. Each distinct LAE instance for
a LEAPBM model is illustrated in a similar fashion. Their arrangement is at the discretion of the
modeler but a general recommendation is to keep the LAE instance usage structures in one area and
in proximity with the interaction FSA states which references them.
3.4.2 XML
The representation of LEAPBM models in an XML format provides a definition which is easily
utilised by computer software. By complying with XML specification standards, a LEAPBM model
can be easy manipulated, consumed, and transferred by computer software. For the same reasons, the
definition of LAE classes is also provided in XML format. Unlike the diagrammatic format detailed
in the previous section, XML definitions are primarily for computer consumption and are therefore
need not consider the potential impact on human comprehension of including details.
An XML definition of a LEAPBM represents each portion of both LAE classes and LEAPBM
model definition, as discussed in sections 3.2 and 3.3. The structure of an XML document is hierar-
chical, which can easily be used to represent a LEAPBM model. XML elements provide containers
within which other ‘children’ XML elements can be stored. By logically associating some LEAPBM
elements with others, an XML document can define a LEAPBM model. For example, LEAPBM FSA
transitions are associated with the LEAPBM FSA state identified by their source.
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The attributes of each XML element maintain the direct properties of each LEAPBM element. For
example, an XML element representing an interaction with a LAE instance has attributes to maintain
the name of the LAE instance, and the name and type of the interaction.
The XML Document Type Definition (DTD) format is designed to specify the allowable XML
elements and their structure and attributes in an XML document (Refsnes, 2006). The LEAPBM
DTD describes the format for each LEAPBM segment.
XML Example: LAE Method Call Interaction
Consider the previous example of a program’s interaction with the ‘create Fed’ method call on the
‘fed XA’ LAE federation object instance. This interaction is shown in the first state of Figure 3.8.
Figure 3.10 shows the XML element which represents this interaction and identifies the represented
LEAPBM portions. This XML definition also identifies each XML element to enable referencing
between LEAPBM portions.
<laeinteraction
    id="create_fed_XA"
    lae_id="fed_XA"
    methodcall_id="create_Fed">
</laeinteraction>
    destination_type="LAEINTERACTION"/>
<exception
    laeexception_id="FederationExecutionAlreadyExists">
</exception>
    destination_id="join_fed_XA"
<pathway
<pathway
    destination_id="join_fed_XA"
    destination_type="LAEINTERACTION/>
Interaction
Interaction Attributes
Exceptional method return and pathway
Pathway for normal method return
Figure 3.10: LAE Instance Interaction XML Element
The laeinteraction XML element shown in Figure 3.10 has several attributes:
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id : identifies the unique name given to the interaction.
lae id : in reference to the LAE involved.
methodcall id : in reference to the LAE method call involved.
The first sub-element defines the FSA transition, termed a pathway, that follows the normal re-
turn from the LAE method call. This transition leads to another LAE interaction state of the FSA
whose name is ‘join Fed XA’. The next element defines the same pathway for the LAE method call’s
exceptional return FederationExecutionAlreadyExists. These attributes and pathway sub-elements
constitute a valid ‘laeinteraction’ XML element.
The following section details the algorithm for generating a LEAPBM model (in any definition
format) from a program’s behaviour.
3.5 Generation Algorithm
The procedure for generating a LEAPBM model definition for a program, requires the expert identifi-
cation of LAEs, and the definition of a program’s behaviour in terms of interactions with them. This
procedure can be only partly defined as a computer algorithm. Although standard techniques exist for
defining computer algorithms in the interests of brevity the generation algorithm is described here in
plain English.
A LEAPBM is generated in a number of stages:
1. Capturing the definition of a software library’s elements.
2. Expertly identifying LAEs in terms of software library elements6 .
3. Analysing program source for the flow and usage of LAE interactions.
In some cases however, not all of these stages must be performed. If the set of LAEs which
describe a program’s behaviour have previously been defined, during the generation of a LEAPBM
6 This identification is currently performed by a human modeler.
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for a similar program, stages 1 and 2 may be skipped. In this case the generation algorithm starts at
stage 3, described in section 3.5.3.
The expected time taken to generate a LEAPBM model is expected to depend greatly on the pro-
gram being modelled, and the complexity of the basis-terms chosen to define its behaviour. However,
executing all stages manually (performed as part of this study7) took around 60 man hours.
3.5.1 Stage 1 - Capturing Software Library Elements
The definitions of software library terms are captured to allow the definition of LAE classes. Capturing
these elements requires the replication of the definition of software library elements: method calls,
functions, properties, variables, and exceptions. Although object class constructs often provide a
guide for the definition of LAEs in stage 2, they are not required to be referenced and are therefore
not captured.
A software library method call definition in the C++ programming language has several elements
which must be captured:
• The name of the call.
• Each argument name.
• Each argument type.
• The order of arguments.
• The type of value normally returned.
• The possible exceptional returns.
This can be achieved by string parsing of the definition in the software library header. Figure 3.11
shows how each element of an example string is parsed by the algorithm.
7 Refer to section 7.5.2.
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RTI::AttributeHandle
Normal return value type
Possible exceptional returns
RTI::RTIambassador::
   getAttributeHandle (
      RTI::ObjectClassHandle    whichClass
   )
throw (
   RTI::ObjectClassNotDefined,
   RTI::NameNotFound,
   RTI::FederateNotExecutionMember,
   RTI::ConcurrentAccessAttempted,
   RTI::RTIinternalError
)
      const char                            *theName,
Method call name
Argument parameter types
Argument parameter names
Argument parameter order
Figure 3.11: Parsing Software Library Method Call Definitions
Variables in C++ software libraries can be of both primitive and non-primitive, or extended types.
In order for a LEAPBM model to make use of extended types their semantics are captured in ex-
ternal software components called plug-ins, and accessible via a standard function interface8 . Each
variable’s name and type are captured in this stage of the LEAPBM generation algorithm.
A software library variable definition takes the general form:
〈variable type〉〈variable name〉
The variable name can be followed by parenthesis to indicate the instantiation of an object where the
variable type is an object class. This variable format is parsed to identify the name and type as shown
in Figure 3.12.
8 Function definition: bool checkValues(void *observedValue, std::string modelValue).
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RTIfedTime    timeStep  (1);
Variable name
Variable type
Figure 3.12: Parsing Software Library Variable Definitions
3.5.2 Stage 2 - Identifying LAEs
Stage 2 of this procedure groups together the captured software library elements to define LAE classes.
This definition requires the knowledgeable identification of abstract program concepts, and the soft-
ware library elements that best represent them. The LEAPBM model generation algorithm currently
excludes this portion of the generation procedure. Section 3.2 also discusses the identification and
definition of LAEs and provides a general guide to assist a human being to perform this process.
This process is expected to be performed by a human with expert knowledge of the software
library, and the program domain it is used in. Requiring expert knowledge for the generation of LAEs
is acceptable for several reasons:
1. For each domain the LAEs can be reused indefinitely after initial definition.
2. The onus for model generation is expected to fall on the software developer, as is the case
with other similar propositions, such as Model Carrying Code (Sekar et al., 2001b). It is also
reasonable to expect that the developer of software understands the software and its domain.
Although this stage cannot be implemented as a simple computer algorithm, some computing
technologies may be applicable to this task, such as expert systems and optimisation.
Expert systems are a possibility to perform this generation stage, given its emphasis on expert
knowledge of the domain, in the appropriate selection of LAE classes. However, fully exploring this
possibility is beyond the scope of this study.,
Optimisation is another technique which could potentially be employed in this stage of the LEAPBM
generation algorithm. Optimisation attempts to iteratively find the best solution to a problem, as in-
dicated by a function reflecting the ‘cost’ of a selected solution. Thus, in order to use optimisation
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for the task of identifying LAE classes, a cost function would have to reflect the performance of a
LEAPBM model that utilises a set of LAEs.
This requirement appears unrealistic, as it requires thorough run-time experimentation to test the
accuracy and complexity performance for multiple LEAPBM models. The high computational and
time cost of this experimentation, coupled with it being required for each individual iteration, means
that optimisation is unlikely to be useful for automated LAE identification. Conclusive investigation
of this hypothesis is however, beyond the scope of this study.
3.5.3 Stage 3 - Recording Program Behaviour Flow and LAE Usage
Once the LAEs have been defined, the program LAE class interactions can be analysed, and defined in
the LEAPBM model. This analysis occurs statically on the program source code to ensure inclusion
of all the program’s potential execution paths. The generation of a LEAPBM from a program’s source
code has parallels with the function of program compilers: LEAPBM generation takes a definition of
program behaviour and transforms it into a different usable form (Wikipedia, 2006b). This function,
and the stage of the generation algorithm it represents, can be implemented as computer software.
The first step for this stage of the generation algorithm is to analyse all the program’s execution
paths for LAE interactions. During this analysis both the interaction FSA and LAE object usage of
the program are defined.
LAE interactions are identified by the program’s use of software library elements which form part
of the definition of a LAE method call or property. The identification of a program’s LAE interaction
results in the following steps:
1. The details of the interaction are stored with the LAE instance it occurs on.
2. A new state of the interaction FSA is created to represent the interaction.
3. Transitions are created from the previous state or states in the execution path to the newly
created state as required.
Each of these steps is discussed in more detail below.
84
Step 1 - LAE Object Usage Details
The details of a program’s interaction with a LAE object instance are recorded in the LAE usage
section of the LEAPBM, within the LAE object instance used. This is determined by instance match-
ing, as discussed in section 3.3.3. A unique key, which is derived from details of a program’s LAE
interactions, is associated with each LAE instance. This allows the reverse lookup of the exact LAE
instance associated with a program’s LAE usage. If a new key value is encountered, a new LAE in-
stance is added to the object usage representation, and the LAE interaction being stored is flagged as
a constructor.
The interaction’s details are stored after the LAE instance matching. These details always include
a unique name allocated to the LAE interaction for referencing purposes, but otherwise differ between
the two interaction types:
Property set : details the specific property being set and the value it is being set to.
Method call : details the LAE method being called, and includes the details of the (unnamed) prop-
erty set interactions it may implicitly involve through arguments or return values.
Step 2 - New Interaction FSA State
In this step a new interaction FSA state is created to represent a program’s LAE interaction. The new
state is named in reference to the LAE interaction’s whose usage details were stored in step 1. This
new state also maintains a reference to:
• The particular LAE instance.
• The LAE method or property that was utilised.
Step 3 - New Interaction FSA Transition
The creation of a new interaction FSA state represents how the program’s LAE interaction may occur
in relation to existing LAE interactions. While the majority of these transitions are created to link the
state created in step 2 with the state that was created before it, there exist some special cases. Two
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such special cases involve the presence of conditional, and looping program constructs surrounding
the program source that defines a LAE interaction.
In the case of a conditional construct, each distinct outcome pathway is traversed separately, after
which the analysis returns to the state at which the conditional construct was encountered. This state
becomes the source for the transition which links to the states that represent the alternate conditional
execution pathways. This results in a branching of the interaction FSA at this point, as illustrated in
Figure 3.13. This example illustrates a conditional construct encountered in the program behaviour
control flow after the identification of the LAE interaction ‘A’. The first execution pathway is traversed,
during which further LAE interactions ‘H’ and ‘I’ are identified and processed using steps 1-2 of the
generation algorithm. At this point the analysis returns to the ‘A’ state and the traversal for the second
execution pathway begins, resulting in another transition linking ‘A’ to the new state ‘R’.
Immediately following the complete traversal of a conditional construct, the final states in each
outcome control flow path become the source for new transitions to a subsequent state. In the rare
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case where an outcome of a condition was traversed and no LAE interactions were identified, the final
state is also considered to be the initial condition state.
The identification of a new LAE interaction after a conditional construct results in converging of
the interaction graph at this point as illustrated in Figure 3.14. This example illustrates the completion
in analysis of the conditional construct from Figure 3.13. After the conditional construct, another LAE
interaction ‘Z’ is identified. At this point the final states of each outcome path, ‘I’ and ‘T’, become
the source states for two transitions linking the end of the conditional construct with the next state.
The second special case for the addition of new transitions to the interaction FSA, occurs when
a looping construct is encountered. In this scenario the looped execution pathway is analysed, and
then a transition is created from the last state in the looped execution pathway, to the first state.
This transition captures the nature of the loop construct, which is to perform the same control flow
pathway multiple times. This is illustrated in Figure 3.15 which shows an example loop construct
encountered after the LAE interaction ‘Z’. The looped execution pathway is traversed during which
the LAE interactions ‘C’ and ‘V’ are identified. The generation algorithm steps 1-2 are performed
on these new LAE interactions. At this point the looped execution pathway has been traversed and
the special-case looping transition is created, linking the last state ‘V’ with the first looped state ‘C’.
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Following the complete traversal and representation of a looping construct, the final state in the looped
pathway becomes the source for transitions to subsequent states.
3.5.4 Summary
The LEAPBM generation algorithm requires the expert identification of LAEs in terms of software
library elements, which currently requires human involvement. The stages before (capturing the soft-
ware library elements) and afterwards (analysing program source for LAE usage) can be defined as
algorithms which can be implemented as computer software. Implementation of the generation algo-
rithm is beyond the scope of this study.
3.6 Processing Algorithm
The task of processing a LEAPBM model refers to gathering program behaviour observations, typi-
cally from a running program, and comparing them with that represented by the model. The procedure
for fulfilling this task can be represented and implemented as a computer algorithm. As previously,
for simplicity and brevity this algorithm is defined in plain English terms.
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The algorithm for processing a LEAPBM model involves comparing the LAE interactions, their
constituent software library elements, and the order in which they occur, with those of the observed
program behaviour. As these comparisons are performed potentially for each program step, the ef-
ficiency of this algorithm significantly contributes to the overall performance of the LEAPBM tech-
nique.
The functions enabled by the comparisons between observed and modelled program behaviour,
depend upon the application of the model:
In an anomaly-detection system : a matched program behaviour is allowed to execute, and a non-
matching behaviour is used to alert a system administrator to the possibility of misuse of the
computer system.
In a software development environment : a non-matching behaviour alerts software developers to
the incorrect implementation of a program specification.
The comparison algorithm is processed for each software library interaction requested by the
program which constitutes part of a LAE interaction. The algorithm determines whether the requested
interaction matches any behaviour represented by the model and occurs in several stages:
1. Identifying the allowable LAE interactions.
2. Identifying the interaction’s software library elements.
3. Checking the software library element’s type and names.
4. Checking the software library element’s data values.
3.6.1 Stage 1 - Identifying Allowed LAE Interactions
The first and most significant step in the processing algorithm is to identify the program’s LAE inter-
actions which are allowed by the model. How this is achieved depends on whether or not the entire
definition of the current LAE interaction has been performed by the program. That is, whether all
the software library elements which represent the LAE interaction associated with the current state
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in the LEAPBM model’s FSA, have been appropriately used by the program. If the current state’s
LAE interaction’s definition has not been completed, then the program is not allowed to progress to a
subsequent FSA state.
If the current state’s requirements have been fulfilled, then the model may continue along the be-
haviour paths defined by the model’s FSA transitions. The transitions from the current state represent
these allowed behaviour paths, and identify the states linked to the current state, which represent the
next allowed LAE interactions. This is illustrated in Figure 3.16. Additionally, there are special cases
for allowable software library LAE interactions:
Unrestricted interactions : which are part of the LAE classes utilised by the LEAPBM must also be
checked. Unrestricted interactions are allowed to be performed from any point in a program’s
behaviour, within the restrictions specified in their definitions.
Unordered blocks : require the checking of other sequences if the current state is the end of a set of
states within an unordered block. Each sequence within an unordered block may be performed
after any other sequence, within the restrictions specified in their definitions. For example, Fig-
ure 3.17 shows a LEAPBM interaction FSA whose current state ‘L’ is at the end of a sequence
90
L
P
U
Current State
Figure 3.17: Interaction FSA Leaving Unordered Group
in the unordered block. From ‘L’, and in addition to the states it has transitions to, the states ‘P’
and ‘U’ are allowable LAE interactions, as they represent the start of other sequences within
the same unordered block.
The following stages 2, 3 and 4 are performed for each LAE interaction identified in this stage.
The first LAE interaction which matches the requested program behaviour is adopted by the model
and becomes the current state in the LEAPBM model’s FSA.
3.6.2 Stage 2 - Identifying Allowed Software Library Elements
The second stage in the processing algorithm is to identify the software library elements which must
be checked against the program request. This is performed using the list of LAE interactions identified
in stage 1.
For each LAE interaction, the next software library element in their definition—from the last one
processed—represents the allowed software library interaction by the program. In the case that a new
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LAE interaction is being examined, this will be the first software library element in the definition of
the LAE interaction represented by the FSA state.
The list of potential software library elements is created and utilised in the subsequent stages 3
and 4.
3.6.3 Stage 3 - Checking Type and Name
This stage checks for matches between the type and name of the software library element requested
by a program, and those in the list provided by stage 2.
The type of request indicates whether it is a method call or property set interaction. The types
represented by each listed software library element are compared with the type of the software library
element observed. If these types mismatch, then the current list element is discarded and the next
element checked. If the types match, then the names are checked.
The name of the request indicates the specific method being called, or property being set. The
name of each software library element (of the right type) in the list of allowable elements is checked
with the name of the observed software library element. Each non-matching name element is dis-
carded from the list and the next element is checked. If the names match, then the processing al-
gorithm proceeds to stage 4, otherwise a negative result for the comparison between observed and
modelled behaviour is returned.
3.6.4 Stage 4 - Checking Data Values
This stage compares the data values used in the program’s observed software library element, with
those of each element in the list provided by stage 2. For the software library elements of LAE
property assignments, the data value refers to the value being assigned; while for those of LAE method
calls, the data value refers to either arguments or return values.
LEAPBM specifies the data values for allowed software library elements as strings. It is the
function of specially written plug-in software, termed checkers, to correctly interpret this string, and
compare it with the data value from the observed program behaviour. In some special cases the data
value will represent a link to another LAE instance property value. In this case the actual value of the
LAE instance property is substituted in place of the reference before the comparison takes place.
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Another special case occurs if the software library element is part of the definition of an unre-
stricted LAE interaction. No data values are maintained for such interactions, and the comparison is
automatically deemed matching.
3.6.5 Summary
The LEAPBM processing algorithm can easily be implemented by computer software. The processing
algorithm identifies the program’s next allowable interactions with software library elements, from the
LEAPBM model FSA, and the LAE object usage details. This set of software library elements is then
compared with the observed program behaviour element. If the observed is an element in the list, and
with matching data, then it is deemed part of the model, and the model’s view of the current point of
execution advances appropriately.
The procedure described by this algorithm is performed for each comparison between observed
and modelled program behaviour. This will commonly occur repeatedly for most applications of
LEAPBM, making this algorithm a crucial component for a LEAPBM application, and influential in
determining its time complexity and performance.
3.7 Application Specifications
The LEAPBM technique can be implemented within a specified software application. This appli-
cation’s specifications provide high-level definitions of the functionality required to apply LEAPBM
models to the task of detecting anomalies in program behaviour. The functions required of a LEAPBM
application are:
1. Loading XML LEAPBM definitions.
2. Maintaining an internal representation of a LEAPBM.
3. Loading and gathering observed program interactions.
4. Processing comparisons between observed and modelled behaviour.
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Function 1: Loading XML LEAPBM Definitions
A LEAPBM application must be capable of loading a model from an XML definition. This requires
the loading and parsing of an XML-formatted text document, and identification of its element tree’s
attributes and values. Fortunately, existing software libraries such as the libxml2 library9 provide this
functionality. After parsing, the program behaviour defined in the XML document is loaded into an
internal application structure.
Function 2: Maintaining Internal LEAPBM Representation
A LEAPBM application must maintain the model of a program’s behaviour (loaded from an XML
file) in an internal structure to ensure efficient access. Efficient access to the model during processing
is crucial to the time performance of the LEAPBM application. The XML definition of a LEAPBM is
verbose and not well-suited to fast access.
Function 3: Gathering and Loading Observed Program Interactions
A LEAPBM application must specify and employ a format by which observed behaviours can be
defined. In the case that the observations of program behaviour are gathered by the LEAPBM appli-
cation itself10 the observation format can be simply an internal program definition. In the case that the
observations of program behaviour are made by an external software component and provided to the
LEAPBM application, this format is open to definition, but must be consistent between the observing
software and the LEAPBM application. Although no standard format currently exists, it is hoped that
the Internet Engineering Task Force’s Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (Curry et al.,
2004) will be extended to incorporate host-based program behaviours.
Function 4: Perform Comparisons
A LEAPBM application must perform comparisons of individual observed program interactions with
a loaded program behaviour model. These comparisons are performed according to the processing
9 libxml2 is available for download from: http://xmlsoft.org/downloads.html.
10 This case is adopted for this study.
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algorithm defined previously in section 3.6. Each observed behaviour is compared with the next al-
lowable interactions defined by the LEAPBM model FSA. A positive result indicates that the observed
interaction is part of the model.
3.8 Summary
The Logical Entity Abstracted Program Behaviour Modelling technique provides an innovative ap-
proach to representing the functionality of computer programs. This approach enables flexible abstrac-
tions for the definition of program behaviour. The terms used to describe behaviour in a LEAPBM
model represent abstract concepts, are pseudo-object-oriented, and are specified in terms of software
library’s interactions. This is a distinct departure from existing PBM techniques which describe be-
haviour in terms of a fixed set of interactions, commonly low-level operating system function calls.
LEAPBM models can be defined in several formats including modified finite state automata di-
agrams and the eXtensible Markup Language (XML). These formats are respectively best suited to
human, and computer software consumption.
The first time a program employing a new set of abstract concepts is modelled, the abstract con-
cepts used by the program must be expertly identified and specified in LAE classes. Subsequent
models utilising the same abstract concepts may reuse this specification and can be generated entirely
by computer software.
Processing a LEAPBM involves checking the modelled behaviour (in terms of these abstract con-
cepts) and matching the defined software library interactions with those observed for a program. How
the results of these comparisons are handled depends on the specific LEAPBM application.
The following chapters detail LEAPBM’s application to anomaly detection and prevention, and
the investigation of its relative performance compared with an existing PBM technique.
Chapter 4
INVESTIGATION OUTLINE
Models abstract the complexities of systems to improve understanding, predictions, and devel-
opment. In the case of computer programs, models are used to abstract often complex source code
definitions and allow more simplified investigation and analysis of the program’s behaviour.
To recap the discussion in section 2.4, how well a model represents a system can be measured
in two ways: accuracy and complexity. These two measures allow comparisons between PBM tech-
niques: that utilise different basis-terms to identify program interactions, and that utilise different
techniques to represent the interactions. Accuracy and complexity respectively quantify the degree to
which a model correctly represents a program’s behaviour, and the simplicity of a model definition.
Accuracy can be measured by quantifying precision and focus errors. A precise model dis-
tinguishes program behaviour with similarities in the irrelevant details, and produces fewer false-
acceptance errors. A well focussed model equates program behaviour with differences in the irrelevant
details, and produces fewer false-alarm errors.
Complexity can be measured by quantifying a model’s time and space requirements. A more com-
plex model occupies more space, is harder to understand, and requires more time to make comparisons
with. Practical measurements can quantify complexity from working examples, and theoretical anal-
ysis can indicate the rate of complexity growth.
This study utilises both practical examples and theoretical analysis to measure accuracy and com-
plexity. The following sections discuss the domain of these practical examples and the specific PBM
techniques this study investigates.
.
4.1 Domain: High Level Architecture Distributed Simulation
The domain selected for this investigation is the distributed simulation architecture: the High Level
Architecture (HLA). The HLA is a specification which provides intercommunication between sim-
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ulation components with potentially heterogeneous implementation characteristics. For example, a
simulation written in the C programming language executing on a Sun SPARC computer, can interop-
erate with a simulation written in the Java programming language executing on a Windows computer.
4.1.1 Background
The HLA’s task is to enable the distribution and interoperation of computer program simulations.
Simulations capture the functionality of the systems they represent, similar to the function of a model.
The distinction between simulation and model comes from temporal awareness: a simulation has
an understanding of time and defines changes to a system that occur as time progresses, where a
model does not. Simulations represent systems upon which efficient experimentation or testing is
unfeasible, whether it be due to cost or time requirements. A simulation is designed to be more easily
manipulated and altered than the system is represents, while as closely as possible representing the
systems behaviour. For example, simulation is often used in the development of systems for which
the production of real prototypes is not feasible, such as aircraft.
Different types of simulations exist. Analytical simulation, enable the investigation of a system’s
performance or behaviour. Analytical simulations are often used in the development of systems,
and aim to provide analysis capabilities with less overhead than the production and deployment of a
true prototype. This use of simulation is widely applied to various manufacturing and engineering
industries.
The second type of simulation is used to provide an environment in which human beings may gain
experience and expertise. Such an environment is termed a virtual simulation, and is used to provide
humans with access to, and training within, an environment which represents a potentially dangerous
or otherwise unavailable system. War and combat simulations are employed by the defence industry
in order to train personnel; flight simulations are used to train aviators; and the medical industry is
beginning to adopt simulation for training doctors and surgeons in dangerous and difficult operations.
In both these types of simulations, accuracy plays a vital role. Accuracy refers to the level of
correctness with which a simulation represents the real system: a highly accurate simulation offers a
correct representation of system behaviour.
With ongoing advances in performance and processing ability, computer systems have become a
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powerful tool for simulation. Computer systems allow quicker analysis of system parameters than
previous simulation methods (such as scale models), and also offer highly immersive training envi-
ronments. Computer simulations are however limited by the following (Wharington et al., 2002):
Computational load : Highly accurate simulations, both training and analytical, require a potentially
substantial amount of computational processing power. Training simulations involve detailed
real-time graphical processing, while analytical simulations employ potentially complex engi-
neering calculations.
Development cost : Accuracy has a positive correlation with the time and effort required to devel-
oping a simulation. The more accurate the simulation, the more time and effort it requires for
development.
Limited reuse : The limitation incurred through large development times could be offset by good
reuse. Reuse refers to harnessing existing simulations. Unfortunately, poor initial standardisa-
tion and widespread ad-hoc development of simulations means the ability to reuse the majority
of existing simulations is limited.
Distributed simulation architectures, such as the HLA, attempt to address these limitations. These
architectures enable the division of monolithic simulations into smaller portions which interoperate.
Each portion can then be executed on its own computer, dispersing the computational load and har-
nessing greater total computational resources.
In stand-alone computer simulations, there is no guarantee of an existing built-in interface to other
software. That is, often simulations are developed as single computer programs which perform all the
processing required internally, and are without communication channels for interoperation with other
simulation components. This is a significant barrier to increasing reuse of simulations and reducing
development time. In contrast, distributed simulation components are all required to communicate
with other components. Thus, distributed simulations are guaranteed to have a communication chan-
nel which allows other future simulation components to communicate with an existing component.
Distributed simulation architectures, such as the HLA, provide standardised services for this com-
munication and interoperation. Successful interoperation between distributed simulation components
allows faster development of new simulations, by enabling the reuse of existing components.
98
The HLA is the most recent example of a distributed simulation architecture, and is the domain for
this study. The Defence Modelling and Simulation Office (DMSO) of the United States Department of
Defence developed the HLA standard (DMSO, 1998) which enables interoperability between simula-
tions with heterogeneous operating systems, programming languages, and hardware platforms. HLA
was designed to address the shortcomings of previous distributed simulation architectures such as
Distributed Interactive Simulation (DIS) (IEEE, 1995), Aggregate Level Simulation Protocol (ALSP)
(Wilson and Weatherly, 1994), and Simulation Network (SIMNET) (Miller and Thorpe, 1995).
HLA defines a standard software library interface, to which all simulation components are writ-
ten. Coordinating and facilitating communication between a group of interoperating HLA-compliant
simulation components is the responsibility of the Run-Time Infrastructure (RTI) software. The RTI
is comprised of two distinct components:
RTIEXEC : The RTI Executive is responsible for coordinating and delivering communication be-
tween LRCs.
LRC : The Local RTI Component is the means for communication between the individual simulation
component and the RTI, and is present at each computer.
HLA-compliant simulation components are termed federates, while a group of federates cooper-
ating to simulate a system is termed a federation. Each federation has an understanding of what is
being simulated that is provided by a configuration file termed the Federation Object Model (FOM).
Each federate’s individual view of the simulation is termed its Simulation Object Model (SOM). The
FOM defines the objects, attributes, interactions and parameters which exist in the federation; from
which the SOM defines the subset employed by each federate. The FOM is also required to define
the standardised object model used for the management of a federation called the Management Object
Model (MOM).
All federates inform the RTIEXEC of the FOM portions they produce and consume, which is
termed publication and subscription respectively. The RTI then coordinates communication such that
for each object type, only subscribed federates are delivered information updates, and only publishing
federates are allowed to produce information updates.
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While constituting the most recent and significant effort towards interoperable, high-performance
and reusable simulation, the HLA standard is not without imperfections. Numerous deficiencies in
the standard have emerged since its release (Wharington et al., 2002):
Poor FOM Agility : The HLA specification allows for future requirements of simulations by en-
abling flexibility in FOM and SOMs. This provides extensibility, but also introduces other
interoperability issues. A federate designed to run in one federation using one object model,
will not easily work in another using a different object model. An ideal federate, that will eas-
ily operate with distinct FOMs is termed FOM agile. FOM agile federates are difficult and
expensive to develop.
RTI Interoperability : The specification of the HLA makes no mention of the low-level data formats
or protocols for communication between RTI components. This also raises interoperability
issues and often means that, despite the standardised program interface, federates can only
interoperate if they are using the same implementation of the RTI.
Security : The ease with which the HLA enables connectivity between simulation components, com-
bined with the lack of authentication and access control measures, raises security concerns.
The open communication provided by HLA raises issues of proprietary or sensitive informa-
tion theft, and with the integrity of simulation-dependent development and training procedures.
These concerns are exacerbated by the substantial use of HLA within the military and industrial
sectors. The HLA standard provides no assurances for security.
Of these deficiencies, HLA security can potentially be improved upon by an anomaly-prevention
system. An anomaly-prevention system for the HLA could be used to restrict the behaviour of feder-
ates to previously authorised models. Utilising the HLA as a test domain for the LEAPBM technique
offers the additional benefit of development towards such a system. A LEAPBM application for the
HLA could be developed to act as an anomaly-prevention system, which offers benefits to the HLA
community by improving security.
4.1.2 Suitability for Investigation
The HLA provides a good domain for this investigation for a number of reasons:
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• Suitable size and complexity.
• Distinct functional components.
• Commonly used in industry.
• Diverse range of system functionality utilisation.
• Simplified control of investigation environment.
The HLA programs used in the following investigations are of suitable size and complexity: they
are larger than trivial, and smaller than overwhelming. Additionally, the composite and distributed
nature of a HLA federation means that while the federation in total may be quite meaningful and
complex, the attention can be easily be placed on smaller and simpler individual federates.
The HLA distributed simulation environment is widely used for simulations: for a number of years
all U.S Department of Defence simulations have been required to be HLA-compliant. HLA programs
typically make use of a wide range of a computer system’s functionality including:
Data access and storage : both long-term on hard disk drives and in short-term memory. Federates
use hard disk storage for saving stages of federation execution and configuring new federations,
while temporary memory is used for processing simulation functions.
Varied interactivity : with human users. Federates can be both ‘human-in-the-loop’ in the case of
virtual simulations, and entirely procedural in the case of analytical simulations.
Network communication : between HLA federate programs. This communication is facilitated by
the HLA’s RTI software.
This varied use of a computer system enables thorough and meaningful tests for program be-
haviour models.
The distinct portions that constitute a HLA federation, and the ability to modify each portion in
isolation, simplifies control of the environment used for the following investigations. Figure 4.1 shows
the topology of a HLA federation with four federates.
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Figure 4.1: High Level Architecture Federation Topology
Each HLA federate can be modified or replaced without any changes required to the remaining
federation components, which simplifies control over the investigations’ test environment. An alter-
ation to a federate can easily influence the federation’s behaviour. Thus, a federation’s result should
be checked to determine equivalent or distinct behaviour.
4.1.3 Test Environment
The HLA test environment used for this study is composed of two main components:
1. The RTI distribution.
2. The federation.
There are multiple HLA RTI distributions available to suit a range of purposes: from research
and development into RTI optimisation, to high-performance simulation. However, currently none
are both (Stratton et al., 2004; Givens, 2000):
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• Certified by the central HLA authority, the United States Department of Defence Modelling and
Simulation Office (DMSO).
• Freely available in a fully-functional state, for research purposes.
In the past DMSO released to the public a distribution of the HLA RTI to promote interest in
the technology. This distribution is commonly termed the RTI-NG, or DMSO RTI, and has been
released in a number of versions. The specific version termed 1.3-NGv5 is the basis of this study’s
test environment.
The HLA federation chosen for this study is called the Air Traffic Operations (ATO) federation.
This study focuses primarily on the Aircraft Manager (ACM) federate, which represents the move-
ments and state (including position, speed, direction and mechanical state) of aircraft objects within
an international airline service. A full description of the entire ATO federation and its constituent
federates is available in Appendix A.1.
Unfortunately, these federates have not undergone conformance testing, and do not have HLA-
compliance certification. This is acceptable for several reasons:
1. The ATO federation explores a range of HLA functionality, and constitutes a sizable program,
with approximately 20,000 lines of source code.
2. The task of writing a HLA simulation is very time consuming. This task is not within the scope
of this study. The ATO federation is taken from an existing source to reduce the time required
for development that is peripheral to the goals of this study.
3. In order to achieve HLA compliance certification, a number of steps must be taken Loper et al.
(1997); Woldt and Burkhart (1999); Burkhart et al. (1998); Andrews et al. (2006):
1. Initiation : Federate developer submits a test application and requests information on the
testing process, which is then provided by the Certification Agent (CA).
2. Documentation Testing : Federate developer submits documentation that reflects the object
model, and HLA services, employed by the federate. This documentation is checked for
incorrect formatting and inconsistencies.
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3. Organise Run-time Test : Federate developer and CA swap the files and information nec-
essary to conduct a live test of the federate, and determine a date and time to conduct the
test.
4. Live Testing : During a live test of the federate, the CA tests that the federate fulfils its
documented object model and interface responsibilities.
This procedure is potentially lengthy and halted as it requires regular correspondence, and is
controlled manually. For this reason, obtaining HLA certification for the ATO federation is not
viable.
4. The federates in a federation impact and influence each other, thus for an entire federation to be
guaranteed HLA compliant, each participating federate must have HLA certification.
5. The tedious HLA compliance procedure is justifiable for large meaningful simulations which
will be reused time and again. Even if such industrial-scale simulations were available, they
would likely require resources beyond those available for this study, and complicate the testing
procedures.
To summarise, this study’s HLA test environment consists of the DMSO RTI distribution version
1.3-NGv5, and the Air Transport Operations federation. This RTI was chosen due to its availability,
and the federation selected due to its substantial use of HLA functionality, availability, and suitable
scale.
4.2 Subject Systems
The subject systems being investigated are: a LEAPBM application architecture for the HLA called
Matis, and an implementation of the STIDE PBM technique (which utilises system-call basis-terms).
Matis is developed as part of this study to enable investigation of the LEAPBM technique, while
STIDE is provided by the Computer Immune Systems research group at the University of New Mex-
ico. The Computer Immune Systems group are also responsible for the initial use of system-call
basis-terms for PBM (Forrest et al., 1996; Hofmeyr et al., 1998; Warrender et al., 1999). These two
subject systems and their selection for this investigation are discussed in the following sections.
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4.2.1 Matis: LEAPBM Application Architecture
The implementation which forms the software artifact through which LEAPBM is investigated in this
study is called Matis. Matis is an anomaly-prevention system for the domain of HLA distributed
simulation, and is implemented in the Linux operating system (Siever et al., 2005). Matis determines
whether an interaction requested by a HLA federate conforms to an existing LEAPBM model of
federate behaviour. The tasks which Matis is responsible for are:
1. Capturing the federate’s behaviour requests.
2. Checking that this requested behaviour conforms to the model.
3. Performing the federate’s behaviour in the event that it conforms to the model.
4. Stopping the federate’s behaviour in the event that it does not conform.
Development Methodology
The development of Matis was largely influenced by previous work as part of the Distributed Simu-
lation Interposition Library Infrastructure (DSILI) project (Wharington and Andrews, 2002; Andrews
et al., 2002a,b). The DSILI project employed interposition to capture and manipulate federate be-
haviour. The knowledge and expertise gathered as junior lead developer on this project was instru-
mental in shaping the design of Matis.
The most prominent point of departure from previous work however, is in the manipulation re-
quired by Matis. Matis is utilizes the LEAPBM technique to make comparisons of behavioural con-
formance with a model of federate behaviour, with the resulting manipulation either dropping the
behaviour entirely, or performing it unchanged.
The implementation of the LEAPBM technique employs the Boost Graph Library (BGL)1 in
representing the ordered FSA as a directed graph. The decision to utilize the BGL as the basis for the
LEAPBM model was influenced by several factors:
1 The Boost Graph Library (BGL) is a software library designed to provide an extensible abstract interface for graph
problems, and is available from http://www.boost.org/libs/graph/.
105
Trials : Trial ‘from-scratch’ implementations of FSA identified the substantial complexity and de-
velopment required to generate a representation powerful enough to express LEAPBMs.
Simplification of implementation : The BGL abstracts many subtleties of FSA, and provides a sim-
ple storage and access facility.
Extensibility : Through use of a templated implementation, the BGL provides extensibility. This
extensibility was necessary in order to represent the unrestricted, and blocks of unordered in-
teractions supported by LEAPBM.
The development of HLA LAEs and an example HLA LEAPBM model was performed in con-
junction with that of Matis. The development of the HLA LAEs was simplier than anticipated, due
to the pseudo-object-oriented nature of the HLA. The HLA, though not providing a object-oriented
programmatic interface, does group portions concerning logically related concepts. For example, the
interface methods updateObjectAttributes, changeAttributeTransportType, and requestClassAttribute-
ValueUpdate all refer to the attributes of a simulated object.
Thus, each HLA LAE class is a translation of a logically related concept, and LAE methods are a
FSA representation of the individual interface methods required to perform the function represented.
In most cases these FSA have a single vertex representing a single HLA interface method.
The application of Matis specifically to the HLA enabled iterative development of LEAPBM’s
LAE requirements. The HLA domain is complex and developing the example HLA LEAPBM model
repeatedly raised new requirements of the LEAPBM technique, and that Matis HLA implementa-
tion. Each such requirement was analyzed, and the more general form of complication it represented
deduced. LEAPBM, and Matis were then extended to incorporate this additional complexity.
This iterative development methodology was repeated until LEAPBM was capable of representing
HLA program behaviour, and Matis capable of performing the required tasks.
Capturing Federate Behaviour via Interposition
HLA functionality is provided to federates by the Run-Time Infrastructure (RTI) software library,
which enables federates running on different computers to communicate. The DMSO RTI is the
software about which the Matis HLA anomaly-prevention system is designed. The technique which
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enables Matis to fulfil its first responsibility is called interposition. Interposition allows transparent
access to the interactions between a program and a software library through the following steps (Jones,
1993):
1. Creating a software library with an identical interface to the one being interposed. The interface
of a software library is defined in the programming header files that accompany it.
2. Ensuring that the calls made by the program go to the interposing library. This is achieved in
different ways for different operating systems.
Capturing a program’s software library interactions as they occur, via interposition, requires no
modifications to programs’ source code. This means that interposition also allows the capture of
behaviour of programs distributed in binary form.
In the case of the Matis HLA anomaly-prevention system the interposition steps are fulfiled as
follows:
Step 1 : A software library is created which provides the same interface as the DMSO RTI software
library. The interface of the DMSO RTI software library, in addition to being defined in the
associated header file, is discussed in detail in the documentation accompanying its release
(DMSO, 2002).
Step 2 : The Matis software library is given preferential treatment through configuration of the Linux
operating system dynamic linker program (Free Software Foundation, 2005). The dynamic
linker program (ld) matches and links the software libraries requested by a program with those
available on the computer system at the beginning of a program’s execution.
Successful interposition of the Matis software library in place of the DMSO RTI software li-
brary allows Matis to intercept a program’s requests for HLA behaviour and fulfils task 1 of a HLA
anomaly-detection system. Once a program’s behaviour request has been captured it is checked for
conformance with the LEAPBM behaviour model.
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Checking Requested Behaviour Conformance
Each time a federate program interacts with a HLA distributed simulation, it makes a method call
on the interposed DMSO RTI software library. These calls are captured as described above. The
LEAPBM model, with which Matis is configured, is then used to check the conformance of the fed-
erate’s requested behaviour.
This conformance is achieved as per the LEAPBM processing algorithm described in section 3.6.
The result of this algorithm is a boolean value indicating conformance or non-conformance.
Performing Conforming Behaviour
If the captured federate request conforms to Matis’s LEAPBM model, the behaviour is performed
on behalf of the federate. Performing behaviour in the interposed DMSO RTI software library is
more complicated than simply performing the appropriate interaction with the HLA software library
method or property. Due to the interposition of this library, such an interaction would be directed
by the dynamic linker to Matis’s interposing software library, as occurred with the initial captured
interaction. This results in a circular reference.
To avoid this, the dynamic link loader software is used to determine how to directly access the
method or property from the interposed DMSO RTI software library. Once this has been determined,
the federate’s behaviour request can be performed by direct use of the DMSO RTI software library
functions.
The successful interaction with the interposed DMSO RTI software library allows Matis to per-
form the federate behaviours which conform to the LEAPBM model, and fulfils task 3.
Blocking Non-conforming Behaviour
If the captured federate program behaviour request does not conform to the model then the behaviour
is blocked and prevented from being performed. This task is a relatively simple matter of ignoring
the behaviour, assuming the configuration of the dynamic loader software can not be circumvented or
bypassed. The dynamic loader configuration can potentially ensure all interactions with the DMSO
RTI software library are directed to the interposing Matis library, however if this configuration can
be bypassed the program can get direct access to the DMSO RTI software library and perform non-
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conforming behaviour.
Ensuring that the dynamic loader configuration cannot be bypassed, requires additional operating
system configuration, which is beyond the scope of this study.
Anomaly Reporting
When a federate program has finished executing, the Matis architecture provides a report of its anoma-
lous behaviour. Each program requested behaviour that is part of the program’s interaction graph that
is determined to be anomalous is counted and given as a percentage of the total number of calls
requested. In addition, the number of anomalies is reported at the end of a federate’s execution.
This report is necessary to this investigation as it quantifies any accuracy errors made by the
LEAPBM application.
HLA Logical Abstract Entities
Logical Abstract Entities (LAEs) which represent HLA abstract concepts, are required to allow LEAPBM
models for federates to be generated. The LEAPBM technique is designed to provide flexibility in the
specification of LAEs, in order to capture a potentially wide range of abstract concepts. A side-effect
of this flexibility is an infinite range of possible LAEs that can be specified for a given software library.
This infinite range is a result of the limitless number of potential LAE classes and class elements
(method and properties), and allowable multiple reference to software library elements. A software
library with methods and function calls totalling k, can have
∑
∞
i=1 k! distinct LAE method calls.
However, it is likely that of these potential LAE classes and class elements, only a much smaller
number properly and logically collect software library terms to represent abstract concepts.
For the HLA software library, as for all software libraries, there will be a number of proper and
logical specifications, which define LAEs to represent abstract HLA concepts. It is expected that
the choice of the LAE classes’ specifications within this set, will have an insignificant effect on a
HLA program’s LEAPBM model’s performance. Thorough investigation of this expectation would
require the automated generation of a number of LAE sets using HLA software library elements, and
measurement of the relative performances of models using them as basis-terms. Such an investigation
is beyond the scope of this study.
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The specification of the HLA LAEs used in the following investigations draws from expert un-
derstanding of the HLA distributed simulation domain. The HLA LAEs were specified to reflect the
different abstract concepts upon which HLA federates operate. These LAEs are:
Federation : A group of interoperating programs simulating a system. This is important as a LAE as
it provides context for a federate’s execution.
Object class : A particular type of object of concern to a simulation, is necessary as it is used to
determine a federate’s participation in the simulation.
Attribute : A particular object variable, is a LAE as it is used to refine a federate’s participation, and
defines the accuracy of its simulation.
Object instance : A specific object representing an individual entity in the simulated system, is
important as it provides a representation of a federate’s responsibility.
Interaction class : A particular type of instantaneous message sent between federate’s, is important
as it is used to determine a federate’s participation.
Parameter : A particular interaction message’s variable, is a LAE as it refines a federate’s participa-
tion, and defines the accuracy of its simulation.
Synchronization point : A specific instant in a simulation time, is a LAE as it define’s how a federate
cooperates in the management aspect of distributed simulation.
These LAEs are represented in a format based on UML class-diagrams, shown in Figure 4.2.
This format discards some information, most noticeably the mappings to software library elements
for each LAE method and property. It is designed only to provide an overall picture of the available
LAEs and their contents.
Summary
The architecture which applies the LEAPBM technique in this study is an anomaly-prevention system
for HLA distributed simulation, called Matis. Matis is implemented as per the specifications for a
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Figure 4.2: High Level Architecture Logical Abstract Entities
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LEAPBM application defined in section 3.7, it understands the XML definition of LEAPBM models,
and provides comparisons between observed and modelled program behaviour.
The Matis application has the following features:
• Transparent interposition for federate programs.
• XML model format consumption.
• Anomaly detection and prevention.
Matis utilises interposition to transparently observe and control the behaviour of federate pro-
grams. This behaviour is checked for conformance to a model of behaviour: conforming behaviour is
performed by Matis on behalf of the federate, while non-conforming behaviour is blocked.
4.2.2 STIDE: Existing Modelling Technique
The Sequence TIme-Delay Embedding (STIDE) technique for PBM was derived from previous work
by Forrest et al. (1994, 1997) and D’Haeseleer et al. (1996) on applying immunological techniques
to computer security. They discovered that short sequences of system-calls serve as a good basis
for distinguishing between program behaviours. The resulting STIDE technique uses these short
sequences of system-calls, organised as finite state automata, to model a program’s behaviour.
STIDE models are generated by training based on the set of observed system-calls made by a
program. Each such STIDE model can be described by a series of finite automata. To generate these
finite automata from a sequence of observed system-calls, a window of a size k is slid across the
sequences, creating a series of unique sequences of length k. Take the illustrative example provided
by Hofmeyr et al. (1998): given the observed sequence of system-calls:
open, read, mmap, mmap, open, read, mmap
A window where k = 3 slid across this sequence will generate the k length sequences:
open, read, mmap
read, mmap, mmap
mmap, mmap, open
mmap, open, read
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readopen
read
mmap
mmap
mmap
mmap
mmap open
open read
Figure 4.3: Example STIDE Finite Automata: Length 3
These series of sequences of length 3 are then modelled as finite state automata, or trees, to enable
efficient processing for each distinct initial system-call (Hofmeyr et al., 1998). This is illustrated in
Figure 4.3.
The particular k value chosen has been noted to have an impact on the ability of STIDE to identify
anomalous behaviours. A value of 6 was deemed the minimum value necessary to capture commonly
occurring anomalies in privileged UNIX programs, though the STIDE development group also use
k = 10 in certain experiments (Hofmeyr et al., 1998). Both k values are tested in the course of this
study.
Suitability for Investigation
STIDE is a good choice as the existing PBM technique to evaluate the LEAPBM technique proposed
by this study for a number of reasons:
1. Both STIDE and LEAPBM employ finite automata-based techniques to model program be-
haviour.
2. STIDE is one of the only mature PBM technique freely available.
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3. STIDE is a commonly used existing PBM technique for evaluating new proposals.
The use of finite state automata to represent a program’s behaviour by both STIDE and LEAPBM
potentially simplifies comparisons of models generated by the two techniques. While not all seman-
tics of the finite automata are shared between STIDE and LEAPBM, both techniques focus on the
program interactions and associate each individual interaction with an automaton state. This distin-
guishes the LEAPBM and STIDE techniques from the majority of other PBM techniques that employ
FSA to model program behaviour, which most commonly associate program interactions with FSA
transitions. This similarity between LEAPBM and STIDE models further simplifies comparisons
concerning attributes of two FSA, such as the number of states and their average-branching factor.
STIDE is one of the only PBM technique that is both mature enough to be applied to a fully
functional anomaly-detection system2 and freely available3 .
Other more sophisticated techniques for the modelling of program behaviour have been developed
by several research teams. Two common characteristics of these proposals are their inclusion of
arguments to system-calls, and the use of static analysis to overcome training limitations. These
techniques and the reasons they were not used in this study are:
Sekar et al. (2001b) have developed a technique called Model Carrying Code (MCC) which employs
static analysis, and an extended finite state automaton (EFSA) structure which maintains state
variables and system-call arguments (Sekar et al., 2001a; Venkatakrishnan et al., 2002; Sekar
et al., 2002). The MCC technique has been demonstrated to date, via integration into the Redhat
Package Manager software to produce RPMshield (Venkatakrishnan et al., 2002).
While this software demonstrates MCC to be effective in ensuring security against malicious
mobile code, it unfortunately does not appear to constitute an anomaly-detection system that is
suitable for modelling HLA distributed simulation federate programs.
Wagner (2000) propose a statically analysed technique which also maintains a simple representation
2 The process Homeostasis (pH) Linux kernel extension is freely available from World Wide Web:
http://www.scs.carleton.ca/ soma/pH/.
3 Available via download from the Computer Immune Systems Group at the University of New Mexico from World Wide
Web:http://www.cs.unm.edu/ immsec/systemcalls.htm.
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of the arguments to system-calls (Wagner, 2000; Wagner and Dean, 2001). Personal corre-
spondence from Dr. Wagner notes the immaturity of his proposal making it unsuitable for
comparison.
Giffin et al. (2002) have developed a technique based on a Dyck model which maintains system-call
arguments, and additionally, automatically generates models of the software libraries used by a
program (Giffin et al., 2004, 2005). Results of this technique are in previous publications, report
positive progress towards solving the problem of compromising precision and complexity. The
publication of results indicates that a software implementation has been developed. Although
no specific details are given, it seems likely this implementation forms a part of the Wisconsin
Safety Analyzer software (World Wide Web: http://www.cs.wisc.edu/wisa/).
This software is unfortunately not freely available, potentially due to its use of commercial
software: GrammaTech CodeSurferTM , and DataRescue IDA ProTM .
The STIDE technique has been used as the basis for comparisons of numerous PBM proposed
techniques in previous research (Lee et al., 1997; Debar et al., 1998; Ghosh et al., 1999; Eskin, 2000;
Sekar et al., 2001a; Maxion and Tan, 2002; Tan et al., 2002a,b). Evaluating the LEAPBM technique
with STIDE potentially provides a common baseline from which predictions can be made about the
relative performance compared with other techniques proposed in previous research. These previ-
ously proposed techniques are not suitable for comparison as they are uniformly unavailable in a
implementation suitable for the task of HLA anomaly-detection.
4.3 Investigations
The goal for PBM techniques, including those employed by an anomaly-prevention system, is to
provide the highest possible accuracy while maintaining usable performance. The following investi-
gations utilize the investigation environment outlined in this chapter to examine the comparative accu-
racy and complexity of the LEAPBM and existing STIDE PBM techniques. This environment is the
HLA distributed simulation domain, running a simple air traffic operations simulation, and concerns
the Matis software artifact developed during this study, and the existing STIDE PBM implementation.
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The first two investigations concern the comparative model accuracy; the first concerning preci-
sion, and the second concerning focus. These two investigations aim to compare the two opposite, and
complimentary factors of PBM accuracy. The LEAPBM technique is expected to be more accurate,
and exhibit both improved precision and focus. This expectation results from both its flexibility, and
ability to tailor models to the level of abstraction that best captures a program’s defining behaviour.
The final investigation compares the complexities of Matis and STIDE HLA models. The factors
of complexity investigated are size, speed, human comprehension, and generation. The LEAPBM
and STIDE techniques are expected to provide comparably small and fast program behaviour models,
while the human comprehension of LEAPBM is expected to be an improvement over STIDE.
Chapter 5
MODEL PRECISION INVESTIGATION
The accuracy of a program behaviour model depends, in part, on its ability to distinguish programs
with different behaviour despite irrelevant similarities. This is termed precision. A precise model
requires that enough details are maintained for each program interaction such that no other interaction,
no matter how similar, is considered equivalent. This chapter investigates the precision accuracy of
the PBM techniques STIDE and LEAPBM.
Precision can be quantified by two measures: false-acceptance errors, and average-branching fac-
tor. False-acceptance errors occur when a functionally distinct (but similarly implemented) interaction
is mistakenly identified as conforming to a model. The average-branching factor metric quantifies the
degree of freedom an attacker has in avoiding detection in a computer security application. The pre-
cision measure of accuracy is also detailed in section 2.4.1.
In this chapter, the cause of model precision problems in the existing PBM technique STIDE is
investigated, and the solution provided by LEAPBM is detailed. This solution is then demonstrated
by the Matis architecture, on a series of HLA distributed simulation federate programs. Finally, the
effect of the LEAPBM technique’s solution on the problem of precision is discussed, and suggestions
are made for future extensions to the solution to cover other types of programs.
5.1 Task Description
Ensuring that programs on a computer system perform only legal and safe behaviour improves secu-
rity (Sekar et al., 2001b). This is the aim of anomaly-prevention systems, which make comparisons
between observed program behaviour and models of verified behaviour.
Performance and precision accuracy are conflicting requirements of PBM techniques: a precise
technique requires the representation of the details of each program interaction, which increases its
complexity. An increase in complexity results in increased space and time requirements and conse-
quently reduced performance.
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Anomaly-prevention systems often operate simultaneously with the programs they monitor1. This
scenario requires high performance PBM techniques, to ensure minimal latency of program func-
tionality. By deduction, the PBM techniques used in existing anomaly-prevention systems may be
considered high-performance.
The majority of PBM techniques used in existing anomaly-prevention systems are defined in terms
of a program’s interactions with the operating system kernel. The system kernel provides a single layer
of abstraction to direct hardware access, and is accessible by a program via function calls termed
system-calls. The important behaviour of a program results in system-calls. Thus, defining behaviour
in these terms allow potentially excellent model precision. In addition, the set of available system-
calls is mostly generic between a large number of operating systems, which enables such techniques
to model a wide range of software.
In the interest of simplicity, and the performance improvements it provides, STIDE does not make
full use of the information of a program’s system-call interactions. The growth of the STIDE database
with relation to the number of system-call interactions generated by a program is shown to converge
for several programs, such as the rather large sendmail program. Sendmail executions, the total of
which involved over 1,500,000 system-calls, were able to be stored in a database of approximately
1500 elements (Forrest et al., 1996). STIDE’s view of an individual system-call program interaction is
limited to identifying which particular system-call was invoked. All values surrounding this system-
call, such as return values and argument values, are ignored. The reasoning behind the approach
adopted by STIDE is supported by observations by Sekar and Uppuluri (1999) who note that main-
taining additional information, such as variable values, can significantly increase the size of models.
The reduction in the details of system-calls represented in STIDE limits its precision, but facilitates
real-time performance. Precision is limited as interactions performing distinct behaviour become
potentially indistinguishable. For example, if the arguments to a write system-call are ignored the
PBM will be unable to distinguish between writing to a network socket for communication, and
writing to the system password file. The reduction in details represented by the STIDE PBM technique
is applied in a generic way: a given set of details are disregarded for each system-call made. No
concern or importance is given to any particular system-calls, whose details might be crucial to the
1 Anomaly-prevention systems which operate across relatively low speed network connections—such as that proposed by
Giffin et al. (2002)—have less demanding performance requirements.
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model precision.
The inflexible and unoptimised disregard of program behaviour details potentially reduces model
precision more than is necessary to ensure performance requirements are met. The task for LEAPBM
is to provide more precise program behaviour models while maintaining performance.
5.2 Flexible Model Basis
The systems in which PBM techniques are employed, such as anomaly detection and prevention
systems, demand high performance and therefore, low computational complexity. Although the level
of acceptable complexity is rising as the power of processing devices increases, increasing precision
while maintaining complexity will provide an overall improvement. The task of improving precision
while maintaining performance is fulfilled by LEAPBM, as a result of its flexibility in model basis-
terms.
The basis-terms of a PBM is the set of interactions made by the program, which are chosen to
indicate its behaviour. The basis-terms of the STIDE PBM technique is the set of interactions a
program can make with the system kernel. Contrastingly, the basis of LEAPBM models is flexible,
and can refer to the set of interactions a program can make with any software library. A program
whose definition is mostly in terms of abstract software library interactions can be modelled in terms
of them, while still allowing a program whose behaviour primarily involves direct interaction with
system-calls to be modelled by them.
Modern programs often do not interact directly with the system-library, but rather with more
abstract software libraries (Fre, 2006). Providing flexibility in the model’s basis, allows LEAPBM to
represent modern programs in appropriately abstract terms. The degree to which LEAPBM fulfils the
task description depends upon the LAE classes chosen for the basis of a particular program’s model,
and their correct specification in terms of software library elements.
5.2.1 Potential Choices
The software libraries utilised by a program, either directly or via intermediate software libraries,
can reflect the abstract concept choices for basis-terms of the program’s LEAPBM model. For ex-
ample, HLA federate programs make direct calls to HLA software libraries which then mediate calls
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to CORBA software libraries. This mediation of calls continues through different software libraries,
typically decreasing in abstraction, until the system kernel is called and results in use of the computer
system hardware.
The system kernel library, which provides the set of system-calls, is the least abstract software
library on a given computer system and forms the root of the tree from which all other software
libraries stem. That is, all calls on other software library functions typically result in a system-call.
Combinations and aggregations of system-calls are logically encapsulated, into more meaningful and
abstract functions. Software libraries are groups of such abstract functions. Powerful programs can
be more quickly developed by utilising existing software libraries and the abstract behaviour they
provide.
The number of system-library calls made by modern programs is much larger than the number of
more abstract software library calls performed as shown in Table 5.1. The investigation into simple
GUI and HLA programs’ abstract and system-call library usage is detailed in Appendices C.1 and C.2.
Program Abstract Library Calls System-Library Calls
Simplest GTK Program 4 590
HelloWorld HLA Federate 332 24918
Table 5.1: Comparative System and Abstract Library Call Usage
The flexible basis for LEAPBM models allows the abstraction of behaviour (and system-calls) that
is present in software libraries, to be utilised to simplify a model. Appropriately choosing software
libraries for the basis-terms of a LEAPBM model can result in a reduction in the number of program
interactions which must be captured. This potentially has the following effects:
• The model’s computational complexity is reduced.
• More information can be stored for each program interaction without substantially increasing
computational complexity.
• The complexity of the decision-making algorithms is increased to make use of the additional
information.
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• More detailed information about each program interaction enables a more precise modelling
technique.
A full investigation of LEAPBM’s effects on model complexity is undertaken in Chapter 7.
5.2.2 Selection Considerations
The selection of abstract concepts to use as the basis-terms for a program’s LEAPBM model is im-
portant. Modern programs often employ numerous software libraries, resulting in more choices for
this selection. Mediated software library calls (those made by direct program software library calls)
are typically more numerous again.
The software libraries whose behaviour abstractions best match those of concern to the program,
should be selected as the basis for the LEAPBM model. For example, the primary concern of HLA
federates is the abstract concepts of federations, simulated objects, their data and time. These concepts
are defined in the HLA software library, which is therefore an appropriate selection of basis for a HLA
federate LEAPBM model.
While often the selection of LEAPBM basis-terms will follow the program’s direct software li-
brary calls, this requires careful consideration in all cases for the following reasons:
• Programs can make direct use of multiple software libraries which may not all represent the
program’s abstract concepts.
• Software libraries, just like programs, have different versions with potentially vastly different
behaviour.
• Software libraries used by a program are potentially defined in terms of other libraries whose
behaviour is also used directly by the program. The simplicity of utilising the single, lower-level
software library as the basis for a model must be weighed against the additional abstraction
provided by the more powerful, high-level software library.
• Programs can internally encapsulate calls to distinct software libraries into abstractions, though
this commonly occurs externally in software libraries. The custom internal abstractions can
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potentially make the most suitable basis for a LEAPBM, however the definition of which will
refer to multiple distinct software libraries.
The improvements to precision that careful selection of LEAPBM basis-terms provides, are demon-
strated in the following section.
5.3 Demonstrations
The improvements in model precision by enabling the flexible selection of a model’s basis are demon-
strated against the STIDE technique. Anomalous HLA federate behaviours are compared against
models of normal behaviour to test the precision of STIDE and LEAPBM techniques. Anomalous
federate behaviour is created by modifications to the functionality of a particular HLA program.
For this experiment, the ATO test federation’s ACM federate was modified to produce three func-
tionally distinct versions with the following modifications:
ACM Without Time Regulation : termed ACMWTR, this ACM version does not perform the im-
portant ‘time regulation’ HLA distributed simulation behaviour. This means that the federate’s
events are not sent in a time-ordered fashion, with unpredictable effects on causality and reduc-
tion in simulation repeatability.
ACM With Additional Subscription : termed ACMWAS, this ACM version requests additional in-
formation from the federation on all the simulated objects. Such behaviour could be considered
an attack on the confidentiality of the simulation, and could be used in an attempt to steal sen-
sitive or propriety information about the systems being simulated (Andrews et al., 2002a).
ACM With Distinct Data Model : termed ACMWDDM, this ACM version performs the same sim-
ulation for a Bus, as an ACM federate does for an Aeroplane. This ACM federate’s behaviour
was modified to employ an object model for a Bus simulation which included renaming multiple
Aeroplane specific attributes, and altering the simulation logic to reflect a Bus’s behaviour.
These three modified ACM versions represent different modifications to its HLA-related be-
haviour: ACMWTR has an interaction removed, ACMWAS has additional interactions, and ACMWDDM
has similar interactions with different argument values.
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PBM Technique Comparison Execution Behaviour
LEAPBM 1 ACM
2 ACMWTR
3 ACMWAS
4 ACMWDDM
STIDE: Sequence Length 6 5 ACM
6 ACMWTR
7 ACMWAS
8 ACMWDDM
STIDE: Sequence Length 10 9 ACM
10 ACMWTR
11 ACMWAS
12 ACMWDDM
Table 5.2: Precision: Observations of ACM Model Comparisons
To demonstrate the improvements in precision LEAPBM offers over the STIDE technique, each
of these federates is compared with the model for the ACM federate. The design of the investigation
is more fully discussed below.
Design
It is hypothesised, that the flexible nature of the LEAPBM technique will allow it to more precisely
differentiate between the ACM federate, and modified ACM versions, than the STIDE system-call
technique. In order to test this hypothesis, models of the ACM federate were generated for both
LEAPBM and STIDE. These models are not included here for brevity, but are present in Figures 7.1
and 7.2 respectively. Comparisons of each federate version’s execution behaviour with the ACM
model, are then observed for each technique as shown in Table 5.2. It is expected that the LEAPBM
technique will exhibit better precision and correctly distinguish between the similar, yet functionally
distinct versions of the ACM federate.
Observations 1, 5 and 9 are control observations which compare the same model and execution
behaviours to ensure the PBM technique is functioning correctly. Each of these observations should
result in 0 anomalies identified.
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Execution Create Federation Sync Point Achieve Order
1 Yes First
2 Yes Second
3 Yes Third
4 No First
5 No Second
6 No Third
Table 5.3: STIDE ACM Model Generation Combinations
Method
The investigation comparisons specified in Table 5.2 were performed on the computer detailed in
Appendix B, using the ATO HLA federation detailed in Appendix A.1.
The STIDE model for ACM was generated (trained) based on the run-time analysis of multiple,
consecutive executions of the ACM federate within the ATO federation until. This training was per-
formed until the model converged. To ensure a working range of behaviour was used to generate the
model, these multiple executions varied in terms of:
• Whether the ACM federate created the federation execution: yes or no.
• The order in which the ACM federate achieved the first synchronisation point: first, second or
third.
These are the only two inputs into the federate’s execution, and multiple federate executions for
each combination of values, as shown in Table 5.3 were used in the generation of the STIDE model.
Figure 5.1 shows the growth of the number of 6 length and 10 length sequences in the STIDE
models in terms of the number of system-calls executed by the ACM federate during this model
generation.
The LEAPBM models were generated manually using static analysis, based on the source code of
the ACM federates. The methods required for the model generation of the LEAPBM and STIDE PBM
techniques are distinct, with different usability characteristics. Refer to Chapter 7 for a qualitative
analysis of these techniques.
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Figure 5.1: STIDE Model Generation Convergence
Results
The results observed for the comparisons listed in Table 5.2 are shown in Table 5.4.
From Table 5.4, comparisons 1, 5 and 9 correctly show practically 0% of anomalous behaviour
identified during the comparison between a federate and its model for both the LEAPBM and STIDE
PBM techniques. Comparisons 2-4, 6-8 and 10-12 highlight the increased precision accuracy the
LEAPBM technique provides over STIDE: 84.84% versus 6.5% and 0.06%, 94.62% versus 0% and
0.04%, and 99.18% versus 0% and 0.04%. The LEAPBM technique identified a higher percentage of
anomalous behaviour, for each version of the ACM federate with distinct HLA functionality.
These comparisons show the relative poor precision accuracy offered the STIDE technique for the
test Air Transport Operations HLA federation. These result supports the hypothesis that the LEAPBM
technique is able to more precisely differentiate between the similarly implemented, yet functionally
distinct HLA federate programs more effectively that STIDE.
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Technique Comparison Behaviour Anomalous %
LEAPBM 1 ACM 0.00
2 ACMWTR 84.84
3 ACMWAS 94.62
4 ACMWDDM 99.18
STIDE: Sequence Length 6 5 ACM 0.00
6 ACMWTR 6.49
7 ACMWAS 0.00
8 ACMWDDM 0.00
STIDE: Sequence Length 10 9 ACM 0.03
10 ACMWTR 0.06
11 ACMWAS 0.04
12 ACMWDDM 0.04
Table 5.4: Precision: ACM Comparison Results
5.3.1 Further Investigation: STIDE Differentiation of HLA Federates
The very low percentage of anomalous behaviour identified by the STIDE technique for distinct ACM
federate behaviours, as reported in Table 5.4, raises the question: Given a STIDE model trained on a
HLA federate which implements a reasonable portion of possible HLA functionality, can the STIDE
technique identify any different HLA federates’ behaviours?
In order to answer this question, the model for the ACM federate, which implements portions of
5 of the 6 sections of HLA functionality2 , was compared with three completely unrelated and vastly
different test federates:
1. The FAQ test federate utilised in the DSILI project (Wharington and Andrews, 2002).
2. A modified version of the FAQ test federate implemented to be as simple as possible.
3. The HelloWorld test federate provided with the DMSO RTI distribution.
Each of these federates’ behaviour is substantially different from the ACM, and does not include
interoperation with other federates. The FAQ federate creates a federation, joins, subscribes to an ob-
2 The ACM model represents use of ‘Federation Management’, ‘Declaration Management’, ‘Object Management’, and
‘Time Management’, but not ‘Ownership Management’ or ‘Data Distribution Management’.
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Technique Comparison Behaviour Anomalous %
LEAPBM 1 FAQ DSILI 100.00
2 FAQ Low-Level 100.00
3 HelloWorld 100.00
STIDE: Sequence Length 6 4 FAQ DSILI 1.01
5 FAQ Low-Level 1.07
6 HelloWorld 0.13
Table 5.5: Precision: STIDE HLA Federate Differentiation Results
ject class, advances time 10 times, then resigns and destroys the federation. The HelloWorld federate
is slightly more complicated, in addition to the behaviour of the FAQ federate, it registers an object,
and updates its attribute values as it advances time. Even the most complicated test federate, Hel-
loWorld, is distinct from the ACM federates in numerous ways: publishing interactions, discovering
objects, reflecting attribute values, sending interactions, and receiving interactions. The FAQ federate
is further distinct from both: it does not publish an object class nor register objects.
Each of these federates’ executions were compared using the STIDE model with sequence length
of 6, as in the previous section this showed better precision than sequence length 10. The same
comparisons were also performed using LEAPBM to confirm its ability to identify the large functional
differences. The results are shown in Table 5.5.
As shown in Table 5.5, the STIDE PBM technique identifies the FAQ federate, whose functional-
ity is vastly different from ACM, as only performing approximately 1% anomalous behaviour when
compared with the model of the ACM federate. From these results, it would appear unlikely that the
STIDE technique can precisely differentiate any HLA federate programs, from a model of a reason-
able portion of HLA behaviour.
5.3.2 Average-Branching Factor
The average-branching factor metric, defined by Wagner (2000), is designed to provide an intuitive
view of a PBM model’s precision by highlighting the functional options available to an attacker during
a program’s execution. This is indicated by the amount of branching3 that occurs during a finite
3 Branching occurs when a single state has multiple transitions which lead to distinct states.
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state automaton. The branching factor of a state X is the number of distinct states linked to X , by
transitions whose source is X . The average-branching factor for a finite state automaton is then the
sum of branching factors for all states divided by the number of states.
The average-branching factor can be easily compared for both the STIDE and LEAPBM tech-
niques for the models of ACM behaviour. The STIDE technique calculates the average-branching
factor internally and maintains its value with its models. For the LEAPBM technique the average-
branching factor was calculated as per the definition described above. The results are shown in Ta-
ble 5.6.
Technique Details Avg. Branching Factor
LEAPBM Including unrestricted interactions 12.31
Excluding unrestricted interactions 1.31
STIDE Sequence Length 6 1.73
Sequence Length 10 1.50
Table 5.6: Precision: Average-Branching Factor Results
Table 5.6 shows two average-branching factors for the LEAPBM technique. These factors either
include, or exclude the set of potential order unrestricted interactions for each state in the interac-
tion FSA. Order unrestricted interactions most typically constitute unimportant and unrestricted pro-
gram behaviour4 , and thus, have no impact on the important (security related) program behaviour the
average-branching factor is designed to represent. For this reason the average-branching factor for
LEAPBM should exclude unrestricted interactions. Thus, these results indicates that the LEAPBM
average-branching factor of 1.31 compares favourably with the two STIDE values of 1.73 and 1.50
for sequence lengths 6 and 10 respectively.
5.4 Discussion
The results provided in this investigation indicate that, when applied to High Level Architecture dis-
tributed simulation federate programs, the LEAPBM technique provides greater precision accuracy
than the STIDE technique. For the comparisons between normal ACM federate functionality, and
4 In this case they constitute helper HLA interface methods that have no impact on a simulation.
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three modified ACM federate with anomalous behaviour, the STIDE technique identified an average
1.1% anomalous behaviour. For the same comparisons the LEAPBM technique identified an average
92.88% anomalous behaviour.
Additionally, using the average-branching factor metric, the LEAPBM technique’s ACM model
value of 1.31 constitutes an average improvement of 23.28% over the STIDE technique’s values of
1.73 and 1.50.
Only once did STIDE identify a substantial percentage of anomalies: using a sequence length
of 6, and comparing a modified version of the ACM which is not time regulated resulted in 6.49%
anomalous behaviour identified (comparison 6). This apparently uncharacteristic precision of STIDE
for this comparison is potentially explained, by the impact time regulation has on federate behaviour.
The simulation events of a federate that is not time-regulated are not delivered in time-order.
Therefore, the causality of these events in terms of simulation time is not guaranteed, and simulation
repeatability suffers. In order for a non-regulated federate behaviour to be consistent between multiple
executions (such as the ACMWTR federate in the prior demonstrations) the execution ordering and
timing of the federate must be controlled. In this investigation however, the execution ordering is
purposefully varied to cover a range of acceptable execution orderings, as shown in Table 5.3.
The altered execution ordering and timing of the ACMWTR federate during the demonstrations
effects the order in which the simulation progresses. This alters the behaviour of the ACMWTR
federate and results in STIDE identifying an uncharacteristic high percentage of anomalous behaviour.
The improved precision accuracy of the LEAPBM technique, with appropriate LAE identification
and when applied to HLA distributed simulation, indicates better identification of anomalous fed-
erate behaviours. This results in a lower rate of false-acceptance errors in a system that utilises the
LEAPBM technique, and has potentially positive implications for industries using the HLA distributed
simulation:
• The arduous verification procedure for HLA federates can be augmented by constant run-time
checking to provide quality assurance.
• The potential for information theft is reduced.
• The integrity of simulated training and developments is improved.
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Further investigation into the ability of STIDE to identify anomalies in any HLA federate’s be-
haviour, given a model of reasonable HLA functionality, highlights the poor precision performance of
STIDE within the HLA distributed simulation domain.
It appears reasonable to state that STIDE has difficulty identifying anomalous HLA behaviour.
This is due to the unchanging definition of the HLA software libraries between federates, and the fact
that the differences in their use, while obvious at the application-level, become highly obfuscated in
the resulting low-level system-call sequences. As it is these sequences upon which STIDE bases its
model, the resulting poor performance is not unexpected.
5.4.1 Limitations
This investigation has quantified the comparative precision accuracies of STIDE and LEAPBM in the
identification of anomalous HLA federate behaviour, for the example ACM federate. Importantly,
the LEAPBM models used in this investigation were created with appropriate LAEs to represent
HLA concepts. The identification of appropriate LAEs is crucial to the performance of the LEAPBM
technique, but cannot be guaranteed as it relies on the domain-specific expertise of the modeler. This
is an important limitation to these results.
While HLA simulations can be considered distributed applications, the results of this investigation
may not be echoed in other distributed applications. The HLA is relatively distinct amongst distributed
applications in that it has no standardised communications format. Other distributed applications are
potentially better modelled using other, network-based techniques.
The federates used in this investigation, while implementing a substantial portion of the available
HLA functionality, are not of an industrial quality, and have not received official certification for HLA
compliance. This was unavoidable given the prohibitive effort and cost involved in obtaining such
compliance, as discussed in section 4.1.3. As a result, these results cannot be generalised to all HLA
federates without extended investigation.
5.4.2 Extensions
Several extensions would greatly benefit this investigation:
• Investigation using certified, industrial HLA federates. This extension would require either
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access to existing certified federates, or sufficient time and resources to develop and compliance
new federates.
• Further investigation of the limits of the STIDE technique to HLA PBM. Specifically, investi-
gating whether a STIDE model of a program’s HLA functionality S, will match with any other
HLA program utilising a subset of S.
These extensions would provide useful further insights into the precision accuracies of LEAPBM
and STIDE, when applied to HLA distributed simulation federate programs.
Chapter 6
MODEL FOCUS INVESTIGATION
The accuracy of a program behaviour model depends in part, on its ability to correctly equate
equivalent program behaviour with different implementations. This is termed focus. A well focussed
model requires that the specification of a program interaction is general enough that any behaviour
which produces an equivalent result will be equatable, no matter how different in programmatic defi-
nition. This chapter investigates the focus accuracy of the STIDE and LEAPBM PBM techniques.
Focus accuracy can be quantified by the frequency of false-alarm errors. These errors occur when
a functionally identical interaction with definition differences is mistakenly identified as anomalous.
This measure is also detailed in section 2.4.1.
In this chapter, the cause of model focus problems in the existing STIDE PBM technique is ex-
amined. The solution provided by LEAPBM is detailed and its implementation is explained, and
then demonstrated. This demonstration is performed by the Matis architecture, on a series of HLA
distributed simulation federate programs. Finally suggestions are made for extending LEAPBM’s
solution further to cover other types of programs.
6.1 Task Description
Ensuring that programs on a computer system perform only legal and safe behaviour improves secu-
rity (Sekar et al., 2001b). This is the aim of anomaly-prevention systems, which make comparisons
between observed program behaviour and models of verified safe behaviour.
The focus accuracy of a PBM technique depends on its ability to provide general definitions of
behaviour, which cover the potentially numerous ways a given behaviour may occur in terms of pro-
gram interactions. For low-level programs interactions, such definitions can occupy substantial space,
and increase model complexity which reduces performance.
As previously discussed, poor performing PBM techniques result in increased latency for systems
that apply them. Performance is important to anomaly-prevention systems as they often function
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simultaneously with the programs they control. Thus, PBM techniques with poor performance are
likely unusable in anomaly-prevention applications.
The basis-terms of the PBM technique used in the existing pH anomaly-prevention system are a
program’s interactions with the system kernel via system-calls. Typically for system-call-based PBM
techniques, a substantial program behaviour requires multiple system-calls, as individual system-calls
often perform atomic and unsubstantial functionality. There are potentially many groups and config-
urations of system-calls for achieving any given behaviour. For example, writing the string ‘Hello
World’ to the screen could be achieved by a single call such as write(0, “Hello World”, 11); , or by
any series of calls individually printing parts of the string in sequence, such as write(0, “He”, 2);
write(0, “llo W“, 5); write(0, “orld”, 4);.
A well focussed system-call-based PBM technique requires an understanding of every potential
group of system-calls which perform a program behaviour. This requirement increases the technique’s
complexity, as it ideally requires all distinct groups of system-calls to be represented for each program
behaviour. This quickly becomes impractical for modern programs, which perform thousands of
system-calls per second. The resulting increase in model complexity would result in a consequential
loss of performance, and usability.
To maintain the performance required of anomaly prevention applied PBM techniques, not all
functionally identical system-call sequences are guaranteed to be represented by the model. This
incomplete definition of program behaviour limits the focus accuracy of system-call-based PBM
techniques. The task for LEAPBM is to provide better focussed program behaviour models while
maintaining performance.
6.2 Multiple Path Encapsulation
Current system-call-based PBM techniques, most often, do not maintain all potential combinations of
interactions which represent a program behaviour, due to the performance requirements. The perfor-
mance impact of maintaining these combinations is a result of the large number of such interactions
made during a program’s execution, and the potentially large number of combinations of system-calls
which are equatable (Sekar et al., 1999). Some recently developed PBM techniques address this issue
by optimising the maintenance of system-call interaction combinations about more abstract events
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(Lin et al., 1998; Lin J., 1998; Ning et al., 2001). This maintains performance while allowing some
combinations to be represented, but does not guarantee the total set of equivalent combinations is in-
cluded. Generating and representing the complete set of functionally equivalent system-call sequences
for a specific event is potentially intractable:
• Calls with no effective functionality can be added,
• Unimportant ordered calls can be reordered.
• Single calls can be divided into multiple equivalent calls.
The focus accuracy of system-call-based PBM techniques suffers as a result of not representing
some or all equivalent interaction combinations. The task of improving focus accuracy while main-
taining performance is fulfilled by LEAPBM as a result of its abstraction of low-level functionality.
LEAPBM is not forced to maintain the low-level interactions of a program. Instead, LEAPBM
allows its basis-terms to be tailored to directly represent appropriately abstract behaviours. This ab-
straction can encapsulate many low-level interactions and thus, encapsulate their equivalent groups
and combinations. The degree to which LEAPBM fulfils its task depends upon how well this en-
capsulation via abstraction results in the indirect representation of programs’ equivalent low-level
interactions.
6.2.1 Encapsulation via Abstraction
The LEAPBM technique enables the encapsulation of groups and combinations of system-call in-
teractions by abstraction. A LEAPBM model’s ideal basis, is the abstract concepts understood by a
program that can be defined in terms of the software libraries used by the program. The LEAPBM
technique maintains the complete set of equivalent abstract interaction combinations for a program’s
behaviour in order to provide focus accuracy, while remaining suitably simple. However, the larger
the set of equivalent interaction combinations, the more complex and less usable a model becomes.
The number of possible combinations that result in equivalent behaviour depends, in part, on the
number of individual interactions which compose a program’s abstract behaviour. As demonstrated in
the precision investigation (Chapter 5), LEAPBM reduces the number of program interactions which
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define behaviour by using more abstract interactions as a model basis. The potential focus accuracy of
the LEAPBM technique is thus potentially improved due to the encapsulation of equivalent low-level
interaction combinations via abstraction.
The number of equivalent interaction combinations is also influenced by:
• The degree to which combinations of interactions can be composed into a single interaction
with equivalent behaviour.
• The divisibility of single interactions into combinations of interactions with equivalent be-
haviour.
• The degree to which the order of interactions is important to the behavioural equivalence.
These effects on the number of abstract behaviour interactions represented by LEAPBM further
determine its potential focus accuracy.
Interaction Composition
The degree to which a combination of program interactions can be composed, to form a single equiva-
lent program interaction, is expected to be minimal. Such a composition would simplify the program’s
source code definition, and would likely have been identified during the design phase of the software’s
development process.
The unlikelihood of the composition of abstract interactions reduces the number of equivalent-
behaviour interaction combinations for a LEAPBM model, and potentially improves its focus accu-
racy.
Interaction Divisibility
The behaviour of an interaction most often depends on the data it utilises, which take the form of
specified parameters and program variables. The same interaction can perform different functions
dependent on this data. An interaction is divisible if this data can be divided into smaller constituent
portions, and used by other interactions to affect the same behaviour.
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The degree to which abstract data is divisible is determined in part by the presence and impor-
tance of information inherent in the structure of the data. Structured data is commonly employed by
modern object-oriented programs. Structured data is divisible down to a series binary values by a
process commonly known as serialising or marshalling (Jordan and Russell, 2003). During serialis-
ing information about any structure of the data is potentially lost, such as the endianness of the data
(Wikipedia, 2006c). The constituent serialised values of structured data are not necessarily equivalent
to the data itself, due to this potential lost of format and structure information. The importance of this
information loss determines if data with structure is divisible.
Information lost during the serialising of structured data can be considered unimportant if there
exist other interactions which appropriately consume portions of the serialised data, to produce the
original behaviour. These interactions complement the lost information through intrinsic understand-
ing of the serialised data’s structure and meaning. The presence of such interactions is determined by
the specific abstract behaviours involved (provided by a software library) and cannot be predicted.
The divisibility of abstract interactions is potentially reduced over that of system-call interactions,
due to the more common use of structured data and the resulting additional, but not necessarily met,
requirements for divisibility. System-call interactions use only unstructured primitive values, with no
inherent structure, which results in more likely divisibility.
The decrease in the divisibility of abstract interactions reduces the number of potential multiple
definitions of behaviour required in a LEAPBM. This reduction allows for increased focus accuracy.
Order of Interactions
The importance of the order of individual interactions in constituting identical behaviour varies from
critical to none, as previously introduced in sections 2.3.3 and 3.3.2. This variation affects the number
of interaction combinations of equivalent behaviour, which must be maintained by a well focussed
PBM technique. In any situation when the importance of the order of individual interactions is not
critical, it is probable that multiple combinations of interactions will be required to represent them.
Program behaviours in which the order of interaction is of critical importance, cannot be equivalently
reordered. Representing critical ordered program behaviours requires only a single combination of
interactions.
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Moderate importance occurs when the order of a set of interactions is unimportant within a sub-
group of program interactions. For example, a HLA federate can be considered to have identical
behaviour, irrespective of the order it declares its object subscription and publication intents.
When the order of interactions is of no importance, it means interactions can occur at any point
and have identical effects on program behaviour. For example, a HLA federate can legally request
the RTI’s integer handles for simulation objects at any point in its execution, subsequent to joining a
federation execution.
The requirement to capture this varying degree of order importance often necessitates modifica-
tions to PBM techniques. The LEAPBM technique exemplifies this.
6.2.2 Order Importance Modifications
The abstract encapsulation of low-level program interactions in the LEAPBM technique reduces the
need for multiple behaviour definitions, but does not remove it entirely. The abstract program interac-
tions maintained by LEAPBM models, can occur in situations where their order is of moderate or no
importance. In these situations multiple definitions are required to represent the abstract interaction
combinations that result in a particular behaviour. These multiple definitions must be as concise as
possible, in order to minimise their impact on a model’s performance and usability.
LEAPBM models define sequence combinations of interactions as finite state automata. This
means that the same interaction can be defined once as a state, with different sequences employing
this interaction represented by various transitions to and from it. Take for example, the combinations
of interactions: ABC , ACB, and ABB. The definition of these three combinations that would
otherwise require 9 states only requires 3 states, and 5 transitions. This results in a likely saving of
model complexity, as a smaller representative FSA is possible.
This is in contrast with the STIDE technique which redefines states. STIDE’s redefinition of states
simplifies the processing algorithm, and is not overly expensive as each state require only 1 byte of
storage. A LEAPBM state requires substantially more than 1 byte for storage, as it stores more details
of the interaction it represents.
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Moderately Important Order
In some cases the order of program interactions is only moderately important. These situations occur
when a block of interactions occur at a point in a program’s behaviour, but the ordering of sequences
within it is irrelevant to the resulting behaviour. LEAPBM provides a specific definition for this
situation. Instead of all potential pathways to and from each sequence being explicitly defined, the
interaction sequences are logically grouped together. Every such sequence within the block which has
not been performed as required can then be performed before or after every other interaction. This
reduces the number of pathways represented and the required LEAPBM FSA transitions.
Let nG be the number of sequences in such a block, and pun and pop be the minimum number
of pathways required for unoptimised and optimised models respectively. Then pun = nG.(nG + 2),
because each interaction sequence has a pathway to each other interaction including itself, at least
one pathway to and one pathway from an interaction external to the each sequence1 . Contrastingly,
pop = 2 (for LEAPBM models), because only one pathway is required to the block, and one pathway
from the block.
Unimportant Order
In some cases, the order of a program’s interactions is irrelevant to the defining behaviour. These
situations occur when interactions exist that can occur at any point in a program’s execution. While
it is likely that the majority of such interactions will have no impact on the behaviour of a program,
in some cases they do. LEAPBM provides the ‘unrestricted’ flag for such interactions and maintains
them separately to FSA-based structure. LEAPBM defines no pathways to such interactions, but
checks for these calls during processing, failing the existence of explicit FSA transition pathways.
This reduces the number of pathways defined in the model, but adds additional complexity to the
model’s processing algorithm.
Adopt the previous definition of pun and pop, let nT be the total number of interactions defined by
a model, and let nU be the number of interactions whose order is unimportant. Then pun = nT .nU ,
as each interaction in the model must have a pathway to each order-unrestricted interaction, and vice
1 This is also the number of pathways which must be checked by the model processing algorithm in both optimised and
unoptimised models.
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versa. However, pop = 0 (for LEAPBM models), because no explicit pathways to such interactions
are required.
Let cI be the increase in decisions required by the processing algorithm for stages in a LEAPBM
model, and adopt the previous definition of nU . Then cI ≤ nU , because a decision regarding order-
unimportant interactions is made only if explicit pathways from the current state are exhausted, and
only until a matching interaction is found. Thus cI < pun and the overall result is a reduction in
complexity.
6.3 Demonstrations
This investigation demonstrates the comparative focus accuracy of the existing STIDE technique and
the LEAPBM technique. In order to test the focus accuracy of STIDE and LEAPBM techniques, a
particular federate is modified to perform its function in a number of different ways. These modifica-
tions are performed both on the order of unimportant interactions and interaction divisibility.
For this experiment, the ATO test federation’s ACM was modified in three distinct ways:
ACM With Individual Updates : This modification to the ACM federate, which results in a sin-
gle federate version termed ACMWIU, is an example of interaction divisibility. The ACM
federate is responsible for updating 13 attribute values of aircraft object instances, which it
normally achieves by a single RTI::updateAttributeValues call. The ACMWIU version updates
the attribute values with 13 distinct RTI::updateAttributeValues calls. This has no effect on the
overall functionality of the federate, but does change its interactions.
ACM Publication-Subscription-Regulation-Constrained : This modification to the ACM federate
results in four federates, each of which performs two groups of unimportant interactions in
different orders. These interactions are the federate’s declaration of publication and subscrip-
tion intents, and the federate’s enabling of time regulation and constraint. This results in four
federate versions named after the order in which these interactions occur:
[PSCR]: Publication, subscription, constrained, regulation.
[PSRC]: Publication, subscription, regulation, constrained.
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[SPCR]: Subscription, publication, constrained, regulation.
[SPRC]: Subscription, publication, regulation, constrained.
ACM Handle Fetching Every time : This modification to the ACM federate, which results in a sin-
gle federate version termed ACMHFE, is an example of unimportant interaction ordering. The
integer handles for object classes, attributes and interactions are determined by the RTI at run-
time. A federate queries the RTI for the value of these handles, which can subsequently either
be stored and accessed locally (as occurs in most federates), or discarded and re-queried when
next they are needed. This ACM version re-queries the RTI each time it requires a handle for
an object class, attribute, or interaction class.
These three modifications are made on functionally unimportant implementation specifics (the
ordering of unimportant interactions and the divisibility of interactions based on data) and do not
affect federate behaviour. To demonstrate the comparative focus accuracy of the LEAPBM and STIDE
techniques, each of these federates is compared with the model for the ACM federate. The design of
this investigation is further discussed below.
Design
It is hypothesised, that the flexible nature of the LEAPBM technique will allow it to more correctly
focus on the equivalent ACM federate versions than the STIDE technique. In order to test this hypoth-
esis, models of the ACM federate are generated for both STIDE and LEAPBM. The comparisons of
each federate version’s execution behaviour, with the ACM model, are then observed for each tech-
nique as shown in Table 6.1. It is expected that the LEAPBM technique will exhibit better focus
accuracy, and correctly equate the functionally identical ACM federate versions.
Observations 1, 8 and 15 are control observations, which compare the same model and execution
behaviours to ensure the PBM technique is functioning correctly. Each of these observations should
result in 0 anomalies identified.
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Technique Comparison Execution Behaviour
LEAPBM 1 ACM
2 ACMWIU
3 ACMPSCR
4 ACMPSRC
5 ACMSPCR
6 ACMSPRC
7 ACMHFE
STIDE: Sequence Length 6 8 ACM
9 ACMWIU
10 ACMPSCR
11 ACMPSRC
12 ACMSPCR
13 ACMSPRC
14 ACMHFE
STIDE: Sequence Length 10 15 ACM
16 ACMWIU
17 ACMPSCR
18 ACMPSRC
19 ACMSPCR
20 ACMSPRC
21 ACMHFE
Table 6.1: Focus: Observations of ACM Model Comparisons
Method
The investigatory observations specified in Table 6.1 are performed on the computer detailed in Ap-
pendix B, using the ATO HLA federation detailed in Appendix A.1. The LEAPBM and STIDE models
generated for the precision investigation are reused for this investigation. For more information on
their generation, refer to section 5.3. The LEAPBM and STIDE models themselves are present in
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 respectively.
Results
The results observed for the comparisons listed in Table 6.1 as shown below in Table 6.2.
From Table 6.2, comparisons 1, 8 and 15 correctly show 0 anomalies detected during the compar-
ison between a federate and its model for both the LEAPBM and STIDE PBM techniques. Compar-
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Technique Comparison Behaviour Anomalous %
LEAPBM 1 ACM 0.00
2 ACMWIU 0.00
3 ACMPSCR 0.00
4 ACMPSRC 0.00
5 ACMSPCR 0.00
6 ACMSPRC 0.00
7 ACMHFE 0.00
STIDE: Sequence Length 6 8 ACM 0.00
9 ACMWIU 0.01
10 ACMPSCR 0.01
11 ACMPSRC 0.01
12 ACMSPCR 0.01
13 ACMSPRC 0.01
14 ACMHFE 0.01
STIDE: Sequence Length 10 15 ACM 0.00
16 ACMWIU 0.04
17 ACMPSCR 0.03
18 ACMPSRC 0.02
19 ACMSPCR 0.03
20 ACMSPRC 0.03
21 ACMHFE 0.03
Table 6.2: Focus: ACM Comparison Results
isons 2-7, 9-14 and 16-21 indicate that the focus accuracy of both the LEAPBM and STIDE techniques
is virtually identical. Both techniques correctly identified a low percentage of anomalous behaviour,
for modified ACM federate versions with identical defining behaviour.
It should be noted that the LEAPBM technique identified exactly 0% in all cases, while there was
some variance in the STIDE technique’s results, with around 3 times as much incorrect identification
of anomalous behaviour for STIDE of sequence length 10, as compared with the more commonly
used sequence length of 6.
These results do not support the hypothesis that the LEAPBM technique is able to better focus on
defining HLA federate behaviour and ignore implementation differences, than the STIDE technique.
They show that both the STIDE and LEAPBM technique’s perform well at equating equivalent HLA
federate behaviours with different implementations.
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6.4 Discussion
The results provided in the previous section indicate that, when applied to simple HLA distributed
simulation federate programs, both the LEAPBM and STIDE techniques provides excellent focus
accuracy. These results do not indicate however, that the LEAPBM technique provides substantially
better focus accuracy than the STIDE technique.
The excellent focus accuracy of both the LEAPBM (with appropriate LAE identification) and
STIDE techniques, when applied to HLA distributed simulation, can potentially result in a low false-
alarm rate for applications.
The focus accuracy of the LEAPBM technique, and its use of a FSA structure to represent the
sequence and order of program interactions, supports the claim by Wagner and Dean that such models
produce no false-alarms (Wagner and Dean, 2001).
The unexpected focus accuracy of the STIDE technique is logical when taking into consideration
the results of the prior precision investigation. The demonstrated inability of STIDE to distinguish
between distinct HLA federate behaviours, could also cause excellent focus accuracy results. Modifi-
cations to the federates which do not cause functional distinctions are likely to be less severe than those
that do. Thus, as modifications that do cause functional distinctions are not identified as anomalous
(as shown Chapter 5), it is reasonable that less severe modifications are similarly not identified.
6.4.1 Limitations
This investigation has quantified the comparative focus accuracies of STIDE and LEAPBM in the
identification of equivalent HLA behaviour, for the example ACM federate. This investigation em-
ploys the same federates and test environment as the previous precision investigation, and is bound by
the same limitations. These limitations are described in section 5.4.1.
6.4.2 Extensions
This focus investigation could be further extended using certified HLA federates, to confirm that the
trend of high focus accuracy for both STIDE and LEAPBM techniques applies to HLA federates in
general. As discussed in section 4.1.3, the use of certified HLA federates in this investigation was not
possible due to the prohibitive effort and cost required.
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An additional investigation could also examine the non-HLA functionality of the federate, and
its potential impact on the focus accuracy of these techniques when modelling HLA behaviour. For
example, two versions of a certified HLA federate could be created that load and save initialisation
data in different ways. This difference would have no effect on the HLA functionality of the fed-
erate, therefore the execution behaviours of both versions should match a single model of program
behaviour.
It is possible however that the STIDE technique may incorrectly identify anomalies between two
such federate versions, due to potential differences between the usage of the system-calls necessary
to load and save data.
Chapter 7
MODEL COMPLEXITY INVESTIGATION
The complexity of a PBM technique is an important factor in determining its usability. A tech-
nique’s complexity is indicated by the computational space required for storage, and the computational
processing required to both generate, and make comparisons with, a model. A modelling technique
that is overly complex becomes unusable by requiring excessive computational storage space or com-
putational processing time. This chapter investigates the complexities of the STIDE and LEAPBM
PBM techniques.
In this chapter, the levels of complexity for the existing PBM technique and the LEAPBM tech-
nique are quantified. The results indicate whether the increased accuracy of the LEAPBM technique1
occurs at the expense of increased complexity, and decreased performance. Comparisons between the
complexities of the two techniques are demonstrated both theoretically and practically for models of
HLA federate behaviour.
7.1 Task Description
Typical anomaly-prevention systems operate simultaneously with the programs they monitor, and
LEAPBM and STIDE are no exceptions. A PBM technique can become unusable if its complexity
significantly affects the performance of the application employing it. The complexity and performance
of both the STIDE and LEAPBM techniques is the topic of this chapter.
The measurement of the complexity of a PBM technique depends on the application which utilises
it. All existing work applying the STIDE technique utilises computer software as the sole consumer
of models, due perhaps to the large number states for the finite automaton2 and the little meaning
inherent in each state (Lunt, 1993).
1 As demonstrated in Chapter 5.
2 A sample HLA federate execution produced a finite automaton of over 2000 states as detailed in Appendix C.2.
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A driving motivation of this study is to make program behaviour models more easily understand-
able by a human, in order to augment the decision making processes in the fields that employ PBM,
such as computer security. Thus, in this investigation the complexity of a PBM technique is investi-
gated for both software and human consumers.
As discussed in Chapter 2, computational complexity can be practically measured in two ways:
the time taken to perform functions, and the storage space required for them. These measurements can
be taken respectively by: the time taken by a PBM application, and the storage space occupied by a
PBM model definition. Additional theoretical asymptotic analysis can be performed to augment these
practical examples, and give a view of the potential growth of complexity as the programs represented
grow.
The human interpreted complexity of a PBM model is subjective and much more difficult to quan-
tify than computational complexity. A brief discussion of the human comprehension for LEAPBM
and STIDE provides an intuitive comparison.
Chapters 5 showed improved accuracy for the LEAPBM technique compared to the existing
STIDE PBM technique. An increase in accuracy can often lead to an increase in complexity and
consequential reduction in usability. While the existing system-call based STIDE technique is of
small enough computational complexity to be applied to an anomaly-prevention application, its hu-
man comprehensibility is unknown. The task for the LEAPBM technique is to ensure its compu-
tational complexity is low enough to be usable, while attempting to improve the ease with which a
human can understand a program’s behaviour from its model.
7.2 Small and Fast Models
The STIDE system-call-based PBM technique has been shown to be practically usable for real-time
detection of anomalous program behaviour (Somayaji and Forrest, 2000, 2002). This practical im-
plementation demonstrates STIDE’s acceptable computational complexity in terms of both storage
space, and processing time. Although based on low-level system library function calls that occur
in large quantities, STIDE produces smaller models of program behaviour by defining fixed-length
sequences, and discarding all arguments to the system-calls.
The LEAPBM technique enables the arguments of abstract interactions to be represented, which
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would logically increase its complexity due to more information storage and processing required.
However, by allowing a model to take advantage of program abstractions, the number of program
interactions a LEAPBM technique represents can be much smaller. This reduction in the number of
program interactions modelled depends upon the appropriate selection of LAEs as the basis-terms in
which program behaviour is represented, and the inherent complexity of the program.
The reduction in the number of program interactions, enabled by LEAPBM’s flexible definition
of basis-terms, is expected to decrease the required processing time and storage space3. However, the
storage of interaction details, such as argument values, is expected to increase the processing time and
storage space. Thus, STIDE performs simple processing for a high number of program interactions,
while LEAPBM performs more complex processing for a typically smaller number of interactions.
This trade off is expected to result in similar overall computational time complexity.
An additional factor which primarily concerns the comparative space computational complexity
between STIDE and LEAPBM, is the definition of LEAPBM’s LAE basis-terms. This has no equiv-
alent in the STIDE technique as it uses a static map, provided by the operating system, to distinguish
between interactions. A LEAPBM model defines LAE class basis-terms, and how they occur in terms
of software library elements. This additional requirement increases the computational space complex-
ity of LEAPBM models. However, a set of LAE class definitions can be reused between models, and
thus, the increase in size complexity by including the LAE definitions, is shared by all the LEAPBM
models that use it. In the domain of HLA distributed simulation, many thousands of LEAPBM models
can make use of the set of HLA LAEs. Thus, limx→∞ f(x) = 0, where f(x) is the increased space
complexity as a result of HLA LAEs, and x is the number of HLA LEAPBM models.
Thus, STIDE maintains small amounts of information for a large number of generic program
interactions, while LEAPBM stores more information for a smaller number of interactions. This trade
off is also expected to result in similar overall computational space complexity.
7.3 Human Comprehension
An expected benefit of the LEAPBM technique is an increase in ease with which a model of program’s
behaviour can be comprehended by a human. Previous computer security PBM techniques have not
3 Specifically in security applications where each program interaction is compared with the model.
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aimed at making a model of a program’s behaviour humanly comprehensible.
It is proposed that enabling such comprehension could provide useful benefits to fields that apply
PBM techniques. In the case of computer security, human comprehension could enable a human
being to augment existing processes for examining the security impact of a program, such as anomaly-
prevention (Necula, 1997; Necula and Lee, 1998; Sekar et al., 2001b). Enabling the human verification
of program security could make this process more transparent and alleviate dependence upon software
testing tools.
It is expected that the reduction in the number of program interactions in a LEAPBM model can
enable a human to gather an overall understanding of the program’s behaviour. It is also expected that
the addition of details to a LEAPBM model will further enable human comprehension by providing
sufficient details to distinguish and understand individual program interactions. This expectation will
be briefly discussed for several models in the following demonstrations.
7.4 Model Generation
Models of program behaviour are typically generated either: manually by a human, or automatically
by a computer program. The trend among recent techniques has been towards automated develop-
ment in the interest of usability: automated model generation simplifies the requirements of PBM
applications and make them more usable.
STIDE model generation is automated. An execution of a federate is examined using a modified
version of the Linux strace utility which produces a STIDE formatted input file, which is then con-
verted to an internal database format by STIDE. However, the generation of STIDE models is more
complicated for HLA federate programs, than for the typical stand-alone UNIX programs it has pre-
viously been utilised for, such as sendmail and lpr. Due to the distributed nature of a HLA federation,
every other HLA federate must also be executed in a controlled manner for each training execution.
The generation of LEAPBM models is a hybrid of both automatic and manual: the vast majority of
the LEAPBM generation can be performed automatically, but the identification of new LAEs, and any
optimisations or generalisations to the model, require expert human input and are therefore performed
manually. Complete HLA functionality requires the definition of 10 LAEs, of which 7 are defined for
these investigations. Refer to Figure 4.2 for the definition of these LAEs.
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It is expected that the additional complication to the automated generation of STIDE models,
caused by the distributed nature of the HLA, will increase its complexity to a level comparable to that
of LEAPBM’s semi-automated model generation procedure.
7.5 Demonstrations
This investigation demonstrates the comparative complexity of the existing STIDE technique and the
proposed LEAPBM technique. These demonstrations examine practical results gathered from the ap-
plication of the LEAPBM and STIDE techniques in the previous precision and focus investigations.
These investigations utilised multiple versions of the Aircraft Manager (ACM) federate, which is part
of the Air Traffic Operations (ATO) federation. For more information on this federate refer to the pre-
vious investigations in sections 5.3 and 6.3, and the full ATO federation description in Appendix A.1.
The demonstrations also examine the theoretical asymptotic complexity, human comprehension
complexity and model generation complexity of the LEAPBM and STIDE techniques.
Design
It is hypothesised, that the reduction in the number of program interactions in a LEAPBM model will
offset the more detailed information that is recorded for each interaction, and result in complexity
that is comparable to the STIDE model of the same program. In order to test this hypothesis, the
processing time and storage space utilised by the LEAPBM and STIDE techniques for the previous
precision and focus investigations are compared. The use of the STIDE and LEAPBM techniques in
these investigations is shown in Tables 6.1 and 5.2.
It is expected that the LEAPBM and STIDE techniques will exhibit approximately equivalent
complexity, and not substantially affect the run-time of a program or occupy substantial storage space.
It is also expected that the LEAPBM technique will exhibit complexity growth that is comparable with
STIDE (and other) PBM techniques.
It is also expected that LEAPBM models are more easily human comprehensible than STIDE mod-
els. Thorough and correct measurement of human comprehensibility of program behaviour models is
beyond the scope of this study, however an explanation is provided of the improvements intuitively
expected for the LEAPBM technique.
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Finally, it is expected that model generation of HLA federate programs for the LEAPBM technique
is approximately as complex, and usable, as that for the STIDE technique. This hypothesis will be
tested by the brief qualitative discussion, of experiences with generating the ACM federate models for
the two PBM techniques.
Method
All observations conducted for this, and the previous precision and focus investigations were per-
formed on the computer detailed in Appendix B, using the ATO HLA federation detailed in Ap-
pendix A.1.
The STIDE and Matis applications include program functions to identify anomalous behaviour,
and other program constructs required to support this identification: the maintenance of the model in
memory, the loading of the model from a file, and capturing and returning program behaviours. Only
the functions responsible for identifying anomalous behaviour are measured in this investigation. For
example, the Matis implementation of the LEAPBM processing algorithm outlined in section 3.6.
The asymptotic analysis of the complexity of the two PBM techniques, also focuses solely on these
functions as their effect is most pronounced during program model growth.
The measurement of the algorithms for anomalous behaviour identification, was performed by
summing the number of CPU cycles which elapsed during the program function, and controlling all
other processes executing on the computer. For more details on the technique used to measure the
number of elapsed CPU cycles, refer to Appendix A.3.
The models used for this investigation were generated for the precision investigation, by the pro-
cedure described in section 5.3. These generation procedures are also qualitatively compared in the
following results.
Results
The results observed for the comparisons listed in Tables 5.2 and 6.1 are shown below in Table 7.1.
From Table 7.1, the LEAPBM detection times were longer than both the STIDE with sequence
length 6, and STIDE with sequence length 10. However all three techniques are insubstantial in terms
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LEAPBM STIDE 6 STIDE 10
Behaviour Total Detection Times (sec)
ACM 0.28 0.06 0.09
ACMWTR 0.17 0.07 0.09
ACMWAS 0.17 0.06 0.09
ACMWDDM 0.29 0.07 0.08
ACMWIU 0.60 0.07 0.10
ACMPSCR 0.18 0.07 0.09
ACMPSRC 0.25 0.07 0.10
ACMSPCR 0.20 0.07 0.10
ACMSPRC 0.20 0.07 0.10
ACMHFE 60.35 0.07 0.09
Avg. Increase in Execution Time (%)4
ACM Federate 0.0053 0.0014 0.0019
Table 7.1: Complexity: Detection Time of ACM Behaviour
of the percentage of total ACM federate execution time.
One interesting result is the LEAPBM’s detection time for ‘ACM Handle Fetching Every-time’,
which is substantially larger than all the other federate versions. After review of the LEAPBM pro-
cessing algorithm, this was discovered to be a result of the distinction between order unrestricted
interactions, and those interactions which form part of the internal LEAPBM FSA. The LEAPBM
processing algorithm checks the interaction FSA first and then, if the observed interaction does not
match, checks the order unrestricted interactions. For the intentional but atypical increased number
of unrestricted (HLA handle fetching) interactions in ACMHFE, checking the interaction FSA before
the unrestricted interactions incurs a heavy penalty.
This is acceptable for two reasons:
1. The ACMHFE federate is unusually modified, specifically for the purposes of this investiga-
tion. These modifications would not occur in a functional HLA simulation, as they needlessly
reduce performance. This point is highlighted by examples from the DSMO RTI programmers
guide DMSO (2002) and emphasised by performance considerations in the DMSO Federation
Checklists DMSO (1999).
4 The ACMHFE results not included in average % of execution time result.
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2. The majority of HLA federate interactions made, beyond initial configuration, are not unre-
stricted. While it would be possible to check for matches with unrestricted interactions before
the FSA structure, this would have a greater impact on the performance of most federates during
simulation.
Disregarding the ACMHFE federate detection times, these results show that the tested STIDE
techniques and the LEAPBM technique add less than 0.006% of the ACM federate program’s exe-
cution time to detect anomalies. This supports the hypothesis that the LEAPBM technique exhibits
approximately equivalent complexity to the STIDE technique, and insignificantly affect the run-time
of a program.
As additional verification of the reasonable time complexity for LEAPBM models, Feng et al.
(2004) report average system-call verification times for the more recent Dyck model for several pro-
grams: htzipd, gzip, and cat. On average, the Dyck model took 300, 415, and 289 microseconds to
verify each system-call by these programs respectively. Comparatively, the LEAPBM model for the
ACM federate takes on average 816 microseconds to check each HLA software library call. Although
the LEAPBM checks appear to take substantially longer for each call, the flexible abstraction it en-
ables means the number of calls that need to be checked is greatly reduced. This reduction factor is
anywhere from 75:1, as demonstrated in Appendix C.2, to 538:1, as observed during generation of
STIDE ACM model. Taking this reduction into account, these results indicate that compared to the
most recent development in system-call PBM techniques, the LEAPBM technique provides commen-
surate time complexity throughout the processing of an entire program.
The results for the storage space comparison for the STIDE and LEAPBM techniques were gen-
erated with the use of a standard compression utility. The model storage formats of the STIDE and
LEAPBM techniques are distinct and have different goals. The LEAPBM technique’s XML storage
of models is designed to enable future compatibility and promote data format interoperability. The
sizes of the models for these two techniques are therefore not directly comparable. To determine com-
parable, format-independent storage requirements, each model was compressed using Lempel-Ziv
coding5 . Table 7.2 shows the size of the models for the ACM federate for both STIDE and LEAPBM.
From Table 7.2, the storage space required for the LEAPBM technique, excluding the LAE class
5 As implemented in the GNU gzip utility.
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Technique Gzipped Size (bytes)
LEAPBM 5722
LEAPBM: Including LAE Classes 14158
STIDE: Sequence Length 6 5916
STIDE: Sequence Length 10 128665
Table 7.2: Complexity: Compressed Size of ACM Models
definitions as per previous discussion, is slightly smaller than the STIDE with sequence length 6
model. The largest model is the STIDE with sequence length 10 model. These results also show that
even if the HLA LAE class definitions are included in the LEAPBM model size, it is still 9 times
smaller than a STIDE model with sequence length 10.
In terms of the amount of storage available on a typical computer system however, all the models
are insubstantial. These results support the hypothesis that the LEAPBM technique exhibits approx-
imately equivalent complexity to the STIDE technique, and that both occupy insubstantial storage
space.
Theoretical analysis of the LEAPBM technique’s processing algorithm, indicates that the com-
plexity of processing models which employ the same LAE basis terms has O(i×p), using the follow-
ing definitions: let i be the number of LAE interactions made by the program, and let p be the total
number of program interactions with LAE properties. This is a linear big-O value, indicating that they
growth in complexity of LEAPBM processing is proportionate to the growth of the model.
The big-O value for system-call-based FSA models6: O(n), reported by Wagner and Dean (2001),
where n is the program’s number of system-call interactions. The theoretical complexity of the STIDE
technique’s processing algorithm is also of O(n) order, where n is the number of nodes in the FSA.
Thus, both LEAPBM and STIDE processing algorithms have linear orders of complexity.
6 Also called ‘callgraph’ models.
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7.5.1 Human Comprehensibility
In terms of human comprehensibility, a program’s model is considered in its entirety, given the like-
lihood a human would have little difficulty comprehending individual program interactions7 . It is
envisioned that human comprehension of an entire program behaviour model could also allow users
to check the correct behaviour of computer software.
Human checking of computer software behaviour is an exciting possibility. It could allow har-
nessing a human being’s intelligence, and pattern matching abilities, to augmenting existing computer
security processes, such as the identification of anomalous program behaviour. This ability has not
been proposed before, and would constitute an innovative contribution to the field of computer secu-
rity.
It is expected that the LEAPBM technique will offer improvements in human comprehensibility,
due to the smaller sized models expected as a result of enabling the flexible abstraction of program
interactions. The extent of this reduction in size is dependent on the appropriate level of abstraction
by the model’s basis-terms.
To demonstrate that the LEAPBM technique (with appropriately abstracted basis-terms) results
in smaller models than the STIDE technique, both technique’s models for the ACM federate were
automatically translated into FSA diagrams. These diagrams are shown in Figures 7.1 and 7.2.
Figure 7.2 for the STIDE technique, is zoomed out significantly to illustrate the overall complexity
of the model. The STIDE model (sequence length 6) is comprised in total of 6706 states, which occur
in 45 distinct automata. The LEAPBM model is comprised of 49 states, which occur in 18 logically
distinct blocks. For the example ACM federate investigated in this study, the sheer number of states
in the STIDE model is intuitively expected to be prohibitive to human comprehensibility, while the
LEAPBM model is comparatively much simpler.
Additionally, the LEAPBM model identifies the LAE instance and the name of the program in-
teraction which constitute each FSA state. Appropriate naming of the LAE classes during the model
generation can result in informative names for the resulting LEAPBM model interaction states, as
illustrated in Figure 7.1. Contrastingly, the STIDE technique names each FSA state according to the
7 Ease of human understanding individual program interactions is probable as it is necessary for the program’s develop-
ment.
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Figure 7.1: LEAPBM ACM Finite State Automaton
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internal operating system number assigned to each system-call interaction, providing little indication
of the behaviour STIDE models represent.
The substantially smaller number of interactions represented in a LEAPBM model, combined with
the more informative naming of interactions, intuitively suggests that the LEAPBM technique enables
more easily human comprehensible models than the STIDE technique. Conclusive investigation of
this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this study.
7.5.2 Model Generation
Comparisons between the complexities of the model generation procedures for the STIDE and LEAPBM
techniques, are unfortunately not straightforward given the difference in automation between the two.
The STIDE technique’s generation procedure is automatic but occurs at run-time, necessitating the
manual manipulation of the run-time environment. The LEAPBM technique’s generation procedure,
is semi-automated (and currently unimplemented) and occurs prior to run-time, based on static anal-
ysis of the program definition (source code).
STIDE Generation
A STIDE model of the ACM federate’s behaviour is generated for the precision and focus investiga-
tions. This involves a number of distinct run-time execution traces, as shown in Table 5.3. For each
distinct execution trace the following steps are required:
1. Start the HLA Run-Time Infrastructure program.
2. Wait for the HLA Run-Time Infrastructure program to initialise.
3. If the ACM federate was to create the federation execution start it, otherwise start the Air Traffic
Control federate.
4. Wait for the federation execution to be created.
5. Start the remainder of the federate programs.
6. Wait until all federate programs have initialised themselves.
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7. Begin the federates simulating in the appropriate order.
These steps are encapsulated in a Perl script program, which enables them to be executed re-
peatably and automatically. However, development of this script to control the executing timing of
multiple programs is time consuming. Additionally, it is required to be executed numerous times
before model convergence is obtained: approximately 102 times for sequence length 6, and 140 for
sequence length 10. For this study these executions each take over 8 hours on the laptop computer
detailed in Appendix B.
The ATO federation is small enough that it can be run on a single computer. However the limitation
of single computer power, and its driving motivation for distributed applications (such as the HLA),
means this is unlikely to always be the case. Training a STIDE model for a HLA federate that requires
additional computers is expected to be more complicated.
LEAPBM Generation
The LEAPBM model generation procedure, as detailed in section 3.5, requires manual effort by the
model developer to identify the LAEs to use as basis-terms in defining a program’s behaviour. Im-
portantly, this manual task is only required each time new LAEs are identified. For example, the
HLA LAEs identified and defined during generation of the ACM LEAPBM model could be used to
automatically generate LEAPBMs for other HLA federate programs.
It is potentially cumbersome that the LEAPBM technique requires manual effort in some cases.
However, this manual effort has parallels to the manual decisions which must be made with the STIDE
technique. That is, the STIDE technique requires the user choose the sequence length specification.
This choice, though much simpler than defining LAEs, also has an effect on the performance and
success of the STIDE technique.
A positive potential result of more intuitive human comprehensibility of the LEAPBM technique,
is that it allows both human verification and optimisation of the model after it has been generated.
Human verification provides an additional level of assurance regarding the correctness of the model.
While human optimisation of a LEAPBM model can potentially involve the generalisation of model
attributes, such as the interaction ordering and LAE usage data values, to be more representative of
those potentially occurring in future program versions.
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Comparison
Although the STIDE technique is automated, for the HLA distributed simulation test domain of these
investigations, it necessitates additional effort to control the execution sequencing of the other simu-
lation components. During this study, the development of a STIDE model for the ACM federate took
approximately 60 man hours, including the development of a script to control execution sequencing,
and the amount of run-time execution required to reach model convergence.
The LEAPBM technique’s generation algorithm has not yet been implemented in the Matis archi-
tecture, thus requiring completely manual definition of the HLA software library elements, the HLA
logical abstract entities, and the ACM federate behaviour. Given reasonable expertise in the HLA dis-
tributed simulation test domain and access to source code of the ACM federate, this procedure took
approximately 65 man hours, during the course of this study.
Of these 65 hours however, only approximately 10 were spent developing the HLA LAEs. This
would indicate that had the LEAPBM technique’s generation algorithm’s automated steps been imple-
mented in Matis, the time required to develop the LEAPBM model of the ACM federate would have
been only 10 man hours. Additionally, models for subsequent federates being automatically generated
with no manual effort required.
This brief qualitative comparison of the experiences with generating both STIDE and LEAPBM
models for the ACM federate supports the hypothesis that the generation of HLA federate programs
for the two techniques are of approximately equal complexity, and usability.
7.6 Discussion
It appears from these demonstrations that the LEAPBM technique does not place a greater burden
on computational resources, than does the STIDE technique. These demonstrations also intuitively
suggest improvements to human comprehensibility for the LEAPBM technique. Each of these aspects
affect the overall usability of a PBM technique.
The practical time complexities of the two techniques are both less than 0.006% of the program’s
execution time, while the models for the techniques can occupy less than 6Kb of storage space8.
This indicates approximately equivalent practical complexity. The fact that the complexities of both
8 Using the most common STIDE sequence length value, which is 6.
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the STIDE and LEAPBM techniques’ is of O(n) order, is reasonably expected to result in usable
LEAPBM applications, such as exist for STIDE (Somayaji and Forrest, 2002).
The generation procedure employed for the LEAPBM technique in this investigation was not au-
tomated, as the algorithm defined by the LEAPBM specification has not been implemented. Even
with the additional tedious manual tasks required, the total time taken to produce a LEAPBM model
is comparable with that required by the STIDE technique, although the STIDE technique was not
designed for examining programs that interact with multiple distributed software components. Addi-
tionally, control of geographically disparate programs would further complicate the STIDE generation
procedure.
An initial intuitive comparison suggests that the LEAPBM technique is more comprehensible by
a human than the STIDE technique. This is partially indicated by comparisons of the size of the
models: the LEAPBM FSA contains 49 elements in 18 logical sub-groups, compared with the STIDE
FSA which has 6706 elements within 45 logical sub-groups.
7.6.1 Limitations
This investigation has examined the comparative complexities of STIDE and LEAPBM in practice,
generation, and human comprehension. The practical results in this investigation were gathered using
the same federates and test environment as the previous precision and focus investigations, and are
bound by the same limitations. These limitations are described in section 5.4.1.
7.6.2 Extensions
Similar to the previous precision and focus investigations, this investigation could be suitably ex-
tended using certified HLA federates to confirm that the approximate equivalence of the STIDE
and LEAPBM techniques’ complexities, applies to HLA federates in general. As discussed in sec-
tion 4.1.3, the use of certified HLA federates in this investigation was not possible due to the pro-
hibitive effort and cost required.
This investigation provides some intuitive indications of the human comprehensibility of the
STIDE and LEAPBM techniques, based on personal experience. A more thorough empirical study is
necessary before any conclusive statement about their relationship can be made.
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Further investigation of the LEAPBM generation algorithm’s complexity using a computer soft-
ware implementation, would provide useful information and enable a more indicative comparison.
During this investigation, the generation algorithm had not been implemented, and model generation
was performed manually.
Chapter 8
CONCLUSION
This study proposes a new concept for the modelling of program behaviour: flexible abstraction.
Previous efforts concentrate on fixed concepts at varying degrees of abstraction, such as the audit data
provided by an operating system, or the program function calls to the operating system kernel. The
flexible abstraction technique proposed by this study is termed LEAPBM.
This study investigated the performance of this proposed technique compared with the existing,
freely available, STIDE technique. The STIDE technique bases its program behaviour models on
operating system kernel function calls and its models are defined as finite state automata. However,
STIDE is distinct from the LEAPBM technique in that it discards system-call arguments and utilises
run-time analysis for model generation.
The investigations conducted for this study examine the behaviour of High Level Architecture
distributed simulation programs; a domain distinct from those previously investigated. This domain
provides programs that are of suitable size, complexity and ranging functionality. The specific HLA
simulation which was examined is called the Air Transport Operations federation, and was developed
for educational purposes by the Australian Defence Science & Technology Organisation.
8.1 Contributions
The LEAPBM technique achieves the states goals of this study, and in doing so makes several contri-
butions. These goals are, improved accuracy while maintaining usable performance, improved human
comprehensibility, and the application of PBM to novel types of programs.
8.1.1 Accuracy
This study’s investigatory demonstrations indicate that the proposed flexible abstraction LEAPBM
technique can more precisely distinguish between similar program behaviours than the STIDE tech-
nique. This is an important ability for PBM techniques, and facilitates an important performance
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characteristic: the reduction of false-acceptance errors in their applications. For example, a more pre-
cise PBM technique employed in an anomaly-prevention system can better identify potential security
attacks, and therefore has better performance. Further investigation of the ability of STIDE to model
and compare HLA federate behaviour showed its poor performance at identifying anomalous HLA
functionality. The excellent precision performance of the proposed LEAPBM technique suggests its
suitability for correctly modelling more abstract and powerful programs than has been performed in
the past.
A high level of precision can however, be falsely exhibited by a technique which poorly focuses
on the functional equivalences of program behaviours. That is, if different program behaviours that
are similar in appearance are correctly considered distinct, the danger is that all program behaviours
will be considered distinct, even those that are functionally equivalent. The results of this study’s in-
vestigation on focus performance, indicate that the LEAPBM technique correctly equates functionally
identical program behaviours with differing definitions.
This study’s results indicate that the precision for the STIDE technique’s modelling of HLA feder-
ates is low. STIDE reports good focus performance, but exceedingly poor precision, which indicates
STIDE is poorly suited to distinguishing HLA federate behaviours with similar appearances but dis-
tinct functionality.
The improved precision and excellent focus performance of the LEAPBM technique, compared
to the existing STIDE technique, constitutes an improvement in accuracy.
Usable Performance
The supplemental goal of maintained complexity and performance for the LEAPBM technique is also
successfully demonstrated. This demonstration covered both practical examples of the tested ACM
federate, and theoretical asymptotic analysis of complexity growth. The practical and asymptotic
complexities of the LEAPBM technique compared with those of the STIDE technique, achieve the
supplemental goal of maintained complexity and performance.
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8.1.2 Human Comprehension
The results from this study indicate that the LEAPBM technique’s models for HLA programs contain
fewer elements. The intuitive and preliminary discussion of the comparative human comprehensibil-
ity of STIDE and LEAPBM models suggests that LEAPBM offers improvements. However, further
investigation is required to conclusively confirm or deny this preliminary indication. The complex
issues involved in accurately measuring the subjective metric of human comprehensibility, and exam-
ining models for a range of HLA federate programs, are beyond the scope of this study.
This result is intuitively expected to provide the second benefit (improved human comprehensibil-
ity) from this study’s research goal.
8.1.3 Modelling Novel Program Types
The second goal of this study was to investigate the modelling of new types of computer programs.
Prior research focuses strongly on only two types of programs: privileged computer server processes,
or Internet-borne mobile code. HLA simulation programs have aspects in common with prior re-
search, such as the privileged execution on powerful interconnected computers, and the inclusion and
understanding of multiple interoperating computers. HLA programs however, constitute a distinct
type of program compared with those examined by prior research: they are more recent developments
and employ more abstract and powerful software libraries than typical server processes. They are also
more substantial than the relatively small pieces of mobile code that get passed around the Internet.
This use of new types of programs in this study’s investigations achieves the second goal of this study.
8.2 Limitations
This study has several limitations, which stem from the specific details of the investigations under-
taken.
The unavailability or unsuitability of more recent, and potentially superior, PBM techniques (as
reviewed in section 4.2.2) to compare with the proposed LEAPBM technique is unfortunate. Although
the STIDE technique to which LEAPBM was compared might offer a common baseline for compari-
son with more recent techniques, it is impossible to know with any certainty how LEAPBM compares
to more recent PBM techniques.
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The lack of HLA certification for the ACM federate utilized in the investigations, limits the degree
of confidence with which the outcomes of this study can be expected to apply to other HLA federates.
However, this was unavoidable given the lack of access to certified HLA federates, and the high cost
involved in gaining certification.
The definition of the HLA domain-specific logical abstract entities, is limited by the definer’s
knowledge and understanding of the domain. This raises the possibility of poor LEAPBM perfor-
mance in certain environments, and necessitates expert knowledge for optimum performance. This
could prove an obstable for future corroboration of the results presented in this study.
The approach to flexible abstraction detailed in this study, utilises a program’s interactions with
software library elements as terms to define its behaviour. It is unlikely that this is the only conceivable
approach to flexible abstraction, and thus the demonstrated positive results cannot be said to apply to
all forms of flexible abstraction.
Despite these limitations, this study does have some potential implications. The following section
discusses these implications and outlines directions for future ongoing research.
8.3 Implications and Future Directions
The results of this study have a number of implications. Flexible abstraction for program behaviour
modelling has implications for computing fields that employ program behaviour models. The demon-
strated improvement in precision over an existing PBM technique implies the potential for improved
accuracy in PBM application fields, such as computer security. The precision accuracy of PBM in
computer security applications determines the amount of potentially dangerous program behaviour
that is mistakenly executed.
The use of LEAPBM in general computer security applications is dependent on addressing any
circumvention issues. Circumvention refers to the possibility that a LEAPBM application is bypassed,
resulting in uncontrolled access to the resources it protects. In the expected typical case, that a
LEAPBM model captures a program’s behaviour through its use of abstract software libraries, the
possibility of circumvention exists in a program directly utilising lower-level libraries1 .
A potential solution to this problem could employ existing techniques such as sandboxing (Gold-
1 Such as the operating system kernel library.
165
berg et al., 1996), to control the execution environment of a computer program and intercept all ex-
ternal function calls. Another possible solution is a low-level implementation which monitors the
dynamic loading of software libraries for application’s execution, and restricts those excluded from
the LEAPBM definition of a program’s behaviour. Either of these solutions are likely to necessitate
the additional requirement of LEAPBM models to represent all of a program’s external function calls.
These solutions could be a focus of future work on the application of the LEAPBM to the field of
computer security.
The LEAPBM technique also has possible application in the area of HLA security. The Matis ar-
chitecture, which implements the LEAPBM technique, was developed during the course of this study,
and is freely available for download from http://dsl.ballarat.edu.au. Matis has been demonstrated to
successfully identify anomalous federate behaviours that can indicate attempts to steal information.
This result is described in the precision investigation in Chapter 5 and specifically concerns the ACM
With-Additional-Subscriptions federate (ACMWAS). The ACMWAS federate was designed to sub-
scribe to all federation object classes and gather as much information on their simulation as possible.
Given the pervasive use of the HLA in military applications, and by military contracting companies,
this technique could potentially be used to deduce information about sensitive systems being simu-
lated. Matis’s demonstrated ability to identify and control this technique has positive implications for
these uses of HLA simulation.
The Matis architecture provides a basis upon which future developments could build to provide a
more mature HLA security system. It is likely that such a system would be distributed in itself, and
present on each computer involved in a HLA federation simulation. This distributed nature would
require the strict adherence to secure programming techniques, for any future system based on the
Matis architecture. The requirements of such a HLA security system have been previously explored
(Andrews and Stratton, 2002).
An additional application of the Matis architecture is in the compliance testing of HLA federate
programs. Current compliance testing procedures require dedicated testing by a Defence Modelling
Simulation Office appointed official Certification Agent. This dedicated and specific testing is time
consuming. The Matis architecture however is aware of all aspects of a federate program’s HLA
behaviour, thus it would appear possible that the Matis architecture could be used to provide on-going
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real-time verification of HLA federate behaviour’s compliance with HLA specifications. Recent work
by the author on this topic has resulted in a paper to appear in the European Simulation Interoperability
Workshop (Andrews et al., 2006).
An additional implication of this study concerns the human comprehensibility of program be-
haviour models. A preliminary comparison between the LEAPBM technique and the existing STIDE
technique, intuitively indicates a possible improvement in the human comprehensibility of HLA fed-
erate program behaviour models. This has important implications for the application of the LEAPBM
technique to both computer security and software development. If the intuitive results suggested by
this study prove accurate, and a LEAPBM model for a program’s behaviour can be reasonably com-
prehended by a human, it may be possible to incorporate an element of human analysis into both
computer security and software testing.
Considering a system such as that proposed by Sekar et al. (2001b), wherein a program carries
with it a model of its behaviour, a human could augment and potentially verify the automated com-
parison of the program’s behaviour with the computer system security policy. While a human user
cannot reasonably be expected to verify the security conformance of every program they execute on
a computer, providing another option and an additional check for security intrusions can only offer
improvements.
Considering the already mature application of PBM to software development, in its current spec-
ification a LEAPBM model is unlikely to be able to assist developers in planning internal software
behaviour. However, providing a developer with additional insight into the behaviour of a program
can only be of assistance in debugging, development and verification. Future research could also
investigate the potential for LEAPBM to encapsulate a program’s internal logical abstract entities,
in addition to the external ones present in high-level software libraries. Such internal LAEs could
potentially mirror some aspects of software development planning models, and be applicable to them.
Future research is needed to more conclusively determine the comparative human comprehensibil-
ity of LEAPBM models, and to investigate their use in enabling human analysis to augment existing
computer security and software development processes.
The LEAPBM technique itself has examined a type of program that is neither a privileged pro-
cesses running on a server system, nor a piece of mobile code being passed around the Internet. Such
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programs have not previously received substantial attention in previous research. This investigation
thus has implications for the use of PBM in more common computer programs. While this investi-
gation has exclusively examined LEAPBM applied to HLA distributed simulation programs, future
research could study its application to other types of programs. These investigations could examine
the LEAPBM technique applied to new previously unexamined programs, as well as privileged server
processes, mobile Internet-borne programs.
The LEAPBM technique itself could be the basis of interesting future developments and research.
A comparison between the LEAPBM implementation and more recently developed system-call-based
PBM techniques, such as those proposed by Giffin et al. (2002, 2004, 2005), and Sekar et al. (2001a,b,
2002), would provide further interesting insights into the relative accuracy and complexity of the
LEAPBM technique.
Additional extensions and developments to the LEAPBM technique, and an application architec-
ture such as Matis, could also be the basis for ongoing research. The LEAPBM generation algorithm
could be implemented, potentially along with a graphical application to simplify the necessary man-
ual definition of abstract basis-terms. This would then enable more direct and conclusive comparisons
between the generation complexity and usability of LEAPBM and other techniques. The LEAPBM
technique currently focuses specifically on the C++ programming language, but is capable of under-
standing the majority of concepts applicable to a wider range of languages. An interesting future
development would be the investigation of extensions to LEAPBM to cover other programming lan-
guages.
Finally, the LEAPBM technique borrows concepts, such as the composition of both data and
behaviour, from the object-oriented programming paradigm. This raises the possibility of further
extensions to the LEAPBM technique to include the remaining object-oriented concepts, the most
significant of which is inheritance. Such extensions could provide inheritance between LAE classes
and further improve the LEAPBM technique’s performance.
To summarise, the LEAPBM technique’s improved accuracy has implications for many applica-
tions that employ program behaviour models. It is also hoped that this study’s investigation of flexible
abstract will encourage ongoing research in this new and exciting direction. All of the data, pro-
grams and configurations files utilised and presented in this study are available for download, from
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the University of Ballarat Distributed Simulation Laboratory website at http://dsl.ballarat.edu.au.
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Appendix A
UTILISED SOFTWARE
A.1 Air Transport Operations Federation
The Air Transport Operations (ATO) federation is designed to simply simulate the behaviour of air-
craft. The ATO was written by Dr. John Wharington, Dr. Anthony Travers, and Dr. Lorenz Drack for
use in the HLA Short Course; developed by Maritime Platforms Division of the Defence Science &
Technology Organisation of Australia; and taught by the University of Ballarat in Victoria, Australia.
The ATO federation simulates the international flights of aircraft by an international airline service.
This federation is composed primarily of three federates:
1. Aircraft Manager
2. Air Traffic Controller
3. Fleet Manager
These federates simulate different portions of aircraft flight including, the physical aircraft object
characteristics, the airports at which aircraft land, and the planning of aircraft destinations.
The following sections detail what objects are simulated by the ATO federation, and the simulation
responsibilities of each federate.
Object Model
The ATO federation’s object model is a simple hierarchy, consisting of five object classes: Position,
Aircraft, Airport, Storm and Runway. This hierarchy is shown in the Figure A.1.
The attributes of the Position object class are designed to capture the location of an object instance
in a flat Earth space. They defined in the Position class and then inherited by the Aircraft, Airport and
Storm child classes.
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Figure A.1: Air Transport Operations Federation Object Model Hierarchy
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The Aircraft, Airport and Storm object classes represent simulation objects which exist in the flat
Earth space. Aircraft fly between Airports with fixed locations, while Storms exist and drift between
random locations.
Aircraft Manager Federate
The Aircraft Manager (ACM) federate is responsible for simulating the ‘Aircraft’ federation objects.
The ACM federate represents the Aircraft movements and state: position, speed, direction and me-
chanical state.
Air Traffic Controller Federate
The Air Traffic Controller (ATC) federate is responsible for simulating the ‘Airport’ federation objects.
ATC represents the Airport’s state and their interactions with ‘Aircraft’ objects during take-off and
landing.
Fleet Manager Federate
The Fleet Manager (FM) federate is responsible for several aspects of ‘Aircraft’ federation objects:
maintenance, refueling, and flight path planning.
A.2 STIDE
The Sequence TIme-Delay Embedding (STIDE) PBM technique was developed by the Computer
Immune Systems research group at the University of New Mexico, who are also responsible for the
initial use of system-call basis-terms for PBM (Forrest et al., 1996; Hofmeyr et al., 1998; Warrender
et al., 1999). The STIDE software is available for download from http://www.cs.unm.edu/ immsec/-
software/. In addition to this software, some additional work was required to get STIDE to perform its
functionality in real-time. This real-time processing was necessary to ensure compatible comparisons
with Matis, which also executes in real-time.
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A.2.1 Real-Time Processing Modifications
The real-time processing modifications made to STIDE, primarily concern the ways in which its input
data is gathered. The following steps were performed:
1. Version 4.5.9 of the strace utility was downloaded.
2. strace was modified to produce an output compatible with STIDE’s input data format; multiple
lines each with a process identifier, and the internal operating system number identifier for the
system-call used.
3. An operating system FIFO file object (First-In-First-Out) is created.
dave@vortex $ mkfifo acmrun.dat
4. Real-time output from the strace utility monitoring the executing federate is redirected to the
FIFO file.
dave@vortex $ sstrace -o acmrun.dat acmfederate/acm
5. STIDE is started and reads its input lines from the FIFO file as strace captures them directly
from the executing federate.
dave@vortex $ stide -d acm-seq10.db < acmrun.dat
A.3 CPU Cycle Measurement
The CPU cycle measurement is performed using the Read Time Stamp Counter (RDTSC) function
of Intel Pentium processors, which returns the current CPU cycles since power up. This function is
accessible directly from C++:
unsigned long long int x;
__asm__ volatile (".byte 0x0f, 0x31" : "=A" (x));
Measuring the RDTSC value at two points and subtracting the difference provides a highly accu-
rate indication of a program or function’s processor requirements.
Appendix B
LAPTOP COMPUTER
This appendix details the hardware used during the investigation performed by this study. The
laptop computer is an Acer TravelMate 4100 with:
• Intel Corporation Pentium M Processor. 1.73GHz and 2048KB Cache.
• 512MB Random Access Memory.
• 80GB Hard Disk Drive.
B.1 Operating System Configuration
The Operating System on the computer used during this study was the Gentoo Linux distribution, with
kernel version 2.6.12-r4 #10. The following packages are installed on this computer: sys-apps/slocate,
net-wireless/ipw2200-firmware, media-libs/win32codecs, media-sound/alsa-utils, sys-process/vixie-
cron, sys-libs/glibc, dev-db/postgresql, dev-db/phppgadmin, media-video/gxine, app-text/xpdf, www-
client/lynx, sys-kernel/linux-headers, media-gfx/sodipodi, dev-libs/boost, app-arch/rpm, dev-java/sun-
jdk, dev-libs/xerces-c, dev-tcltk/expect, app-emacs/nxml-mode, sci-visualization/gnuplot, app-emacs/php-
mode, media-gfx/xfig, app-editors/vim, media-fonts/corefonts, net-misc/telnet-bsd, net-irc/xchat-systray,
net-wireless/wepdecrypt, app-arch/sharutils, net-wireless/wpa supplicant, net-wireless/ipw2200, media-
libs/xine-lib, sys-boot/grub, www-misc/gurlchecker, net-wireless/aircrack, net-dialup/rp-pppoe, net-
www/apache, media-sound/xmms, media-gfx/gimp, x11-base/xorg-x11, net-misc/dhcpcd, gnome-
base/gnome, net-ftp/ftp, net-wireless/wireless-tools, app-office/openoffice-bin, dev-tex/latex2html, dev-
util/strace, app-arch/unrar, app-admin/syslog-ng, app-editors/nano, x11-misc/xscreensaver, media-
gfx/graphviz, dev-util/cvsd, sys-kernel/gentoo-sources, media-fonts/sharefonts, app-text/tetex, media-
video/xine-ui, net-im/gaim, net-wireless/wepattack, x11-drivers/ati-drivers, dev-php/mod php, net-
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irc/xchat, net-p2p/azureus-bin, net-firewall/iptables, app-text/dos2unix, app-text/rpl, dev-libs/libxml2,
dev-php/php, sys-libs/libstdc++-v3. www-client/epiphany, x11-drivers/synaptics and dev-util/argouml.
Appendix C
ADDITIONAL DEMONSTRATIONS
C.1 Simple GTK Program System Call Usage
The most basic program that can be built Gimp Tool Kit (GTK)1 graphical user interface software
library, as per the tutorial available at http://www.gtk.org/tutorial/c58.html was implemented on the
computer system described in Appendices B and B.1.
#include <gtk/gtk.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[]){
GtkWidget *window;
gtk_init (&argc, &argv);
window = gtk_window_new (GTK_WINDOW_TOPLEVEL);
gtk_widget_show (window);
gtk_main ();
return 0;
}
This program source was compiled using the command line specified in the same tutorial:
dave@vortex $ gcc base.c -o base ‘pkg-config --cflags --libs gtk+-2.0‘
This complied program was then executed using strace as follows:
dave@vortex $ strace -c ./base
1 The Gimp Tool Kit (GTK) is a software library designed for creating graphical user interfaces, and is available from
http://www.gtk.org.
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This execution resulted in the following system-call summary:
% time seconds usecs/call calls errors syscall
------ ----------- ----------- --------- --------- ----------------
43.83 0.004230 111 38 write
21.47 0.002072 11 184 2 read
6.37 0.000615 32 19 ioctl
4.30 0.000415 138 3 socket
4.22 0.000407 4 91 mmap2
3.74 0.000361 7 50 open
3.65 0.000352 39 9 writev
2.59 0.000250 125 2 select
2.49 0.000240 11 21 1 poll
1.24 0.000120 2 52 close
1.12 0.000108 2 47 fstat64
0.93 0.000090 5 18 13 access
0.91 0.000088 88 1 execve
0.87 0.000084 28 3 2 connect
0.63 0.000061 5 12 munmap
0.41 0.000040 20 2 readv
0.27 0.000026 7 4 2 lstat64
0.22 0.000021 3 8 uname
0.21 0.000020 7 3 mprotect
0.20 0.000019 2 9 fcntl64
0.11 0.000011 3 4 brk
0.05 0.000005 3 2 _llseek
0.05 0.000005 5 1 stat64
0.04 0.000004 1 3 getpid
0.02 0.000002 2 1 getrlimit
0.02 0.000002 2 1 getuid32
0.02 0.000002 2 1 getresuid32
0.02 0.000002 2 1 getresgid32
------ ----------- ----------- --------- --------- ----------------
100.00 0.009652 590 20 total
As can be easy seen, the 4 GTK library calls made in the original source code (gtk init, gtk window new,
gtk widget show, gtk main) resulted in 590 system library calls.
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C.2 Demonstration: Simple HLA Federate System Call Usage
A very simple HLA federate application is supplied with the US Department of Defence Modelling
and Simulation Office HLA Run-Time Infrastructure called ‘helloWorld’.
This program was compiled on the computer system described in Appendices B and B.1 as per
the Makefile provided.
This compiled program was executed a number of times using the Matis LEAPBM application
modified to include a simple counter of calls made by the program:
dave@vortex $ matisrti --run ./helloWorld Australia 1
These executions resulted in an average of 332 HLA library function calls.
The helloWorld federate was then executed a number of times using strace as follows:
dave@vortex $ strace -c ./helloWorld Australia 1
These executions resulted in an average 24918 of system-library function calls.
